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PREFACE
Aviation history is a type of technical history. 3ome
people believe that an aviation -historian is more technician
than he is historian. Others simply say, why write about aviation history? If one man writes about airplanes, should not another man write about automobiles, television, automatic dishwashers,. or any other aspect of modern technology? The ~nswer
to this quest1.on seems to be found 1.n the philosophy of what
is important and what is not. I am not advocating that automobiles, television, and automatic dishwashers have not had an
influence on t -he ht story of man. Yet, none of these things have
come to dominate man's existence like the airplane.
The problem facing aviation history is that most people
take it for granted. Everyone knows that the Wright Brothers
flew the f 1rst heavier-than-air vehicle at Ki tty Hawk, lJorth
Carol1.na, 1.n December, 1903. ~ow, we are about to introduce the
Boeing- ,747_ or Super Sonic Transport, SST. Much has happened
between these two mile stones in the annals of flight. One such
happening occurred dur1.ng the decade of history from 1917 to
1927 when a small atrfield. in :Jayton, Ohio, c_hallenz ed the
minds of aviation men every·where with many 1.mportant contributions to the fie_ld of aeronautics. This airfield was known as
McCook Field.
Few people today remember McCook Field. Many of those men
ii

and women who worl-ced there have e 1. ther ret 1.red fro::. government
service or d1.ed. i•luch of the hi.story and ro:nance that surrounded McCook F1.eld has sltpped 1.nto a type of memorial haze
which seems to engulf anything we as people take for granted.
no one 1.-.,:no,,ra or cares abo .lt ;,:c.Cook
,:; to sa·'f. t\,\at
..
..
I am no-c;· tryin...,.
1

:;, ield today. This is

'.'."10t

th,/ case. .r.cCook Field has

·;:,r;s :-1

·11r1. t-

ten about 1.n many sources and by :nany different wrlters. :iowever, at no time prior

·to this d1.d any writer ever att~:-::pt to

write solely on i1cCook F'ield and the decade of hi.story to wh1.ch
1

it belonged.
I am not ·insist1.ng that the history I have wr1.tten about
McCook F1.eld is an earth shaking achievement just because i t 1s
the only one of 1.ts kind. On the contrary, I am fully aware of
the fact that a technical history of this type has only, at
best, very limited appeal. The average reader would f1.nd 1.t,
for the most part, dry and un1maeinat1.ve. Yet, I believe th1.s
history serves a definite purpose, for it fills a void which
heretofore had gone unchallenged. I would also 11.ke to state
that I am not so presumptuous as to bell.eve that this hi.story
on ~cCook Field 1.s complete. There are a great man3 ~op1.cs of
much iillportance wh1.ch have, out of necesstty, gone unsa1.d 1.n
th1.s particular report. However, the important po1.nt, 1.n my
op1.nion, is that so ~any ~hings have now been sa1.d that were
previously sketchy bits of information.
Any project of this type requ1.res the asststance of many
people. At this ti~e, I would like to acknowledge those people
who have g1.ven me much valuable aid 1.n the preparation of this
111

history. First, and foremost, 1.s my good fr1end and advtsor,
Dr. George Ruppel of The Un1verstty of Dayton. It was because
of Dr. Ruppel that I first became 1nterested 1.n av1at1.on history
and to h1.m I owe much gratitude.
During the per1.od ~f research and wr1t1ng on th1s history,

I worl<ed w1.th several aviat1.on h1.stor1.ans whose help and encouragement was a constant s011rce of 1nsp1rat1.on to me. Among
thl.s group are four 1.nd1v1.duals I would 11.ke to acknowledge at
this t1.me: Mr. Ph1.llip Pollock, former Chief H1stor1.an of the
Aeronautical Systems D1v1.s1on; Dr. Paul Dav1.s, Chief liistorian
of the Atr Force Logtsttcs Command; Mrs. Hanna Masse, Ch1.ef
Archivist of the Air Force Logistics Command; and my good
friend, Mr. Ebert Smith, Base Historian, Wr1ght-Patterson Air
Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. These four people assisted me greatly
in securing doc~ents, reports, m1.crof1lms, and. pictures which
made the writing of this history possible.

T. M. Dean
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CHAP'I'ER I

THE AVIATIOl-! SECTIO~{ OF TEE SIGHAL CORPS, 1911}-19!.?
For practical purposes this paper starts on July 18, 1914,
when the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps of the U~1ted
States Army was created. Before that time there was litt~e real
interest in military aviation, and this fact was evidenced by
the few and meager appropriations from Congress. The Aviation
Section lacked aviation equipment, personnel, and trainin~ programs because there did not seem to be an immediate usefulness
or need.1 For example, the appropriation for the fiscal year
1915 was ~~250,000, and the following year only ~300,000 ~·ras

allotted for military aviation. Even these amounts had ~o be
shared with the administrative and engineering sections of the
Signal Corps. 2
Stories of the spectacular aerial combat and bombinc
lp_. M. McFarland, ed., ,.,.-r:e -;:istory of th~ Bu ~~lU os- ,~ir cra.ft Production (Dayton: Hi stor cal Office , /ir ·~::it1::r el Cor- ~and, 1951), I, 20, has this story in great detail. Additional
statistics are found in "Air ,Service Mer1orandum No. :J-hJI:.,
October 1, 1920." Aeronautical Syste:'1s Division, Docur.entation
~ivi ion ~i les. \lso s ee, E~~ard o. Purtee, History of the Ar~y
--- Servi ce 1so,-1q2~ (Dayton: g1stor1cal O~f1ce, Exe~utive
Scc..,..e:aria"t-, i ir -:o -~:.... iel Comma.nd, 1948), p. 21; and Arthur
Sweester, ~he American Air Service, (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1919), p. 25.
2

"Army Air Force Historical Study No. 25, Organization
of !1ili tary Aeronautics, AFLC Historical Office, Wri.ght-Patterson Air Force Base, 1944, p. 25.
11

2

attacks of the European war, coupled w1 th the dismal sh0·:11r.,o.:
in the I•Texican border incident, demonstrated by 1916 thA,t th(;
United States lar;rr,0d behind the other countries in 1 ts abil1 ty
to make use of military aviation, As Colonel Samuel Heber,
Chief of the Aviation Section, stated, "We have been ~o poor
we have just been able to keep ou.r own eo~uipn:ent l?;Oin 6

;;i t'i-jou t

doing any experimental work •••• .,3 To remedy this cond.i tior-,. the
National Adirisory Committee for Aeronautics was created by Cone;ress on March 3, 1915, to direct the necessary studier:: to improve mi'li tary aviation. Li, Additional plans to increase the
military effectiveness of the United States were brought forth
with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, and the
creation of the Council of N'ational Defense on August 29, 1916.5
This Council was "established for the coordination of industries
and resources for national security and welfare, 116
By virtue of the growing concern over the war ir1 E~ope,
C on~ress anS1·:ered the reco2Tienda tions of the Secretary of ··7ar,

l~e1-:-ton D. 3aker, ·Nith 8.n increased appropriation of ·'1L,CQ0 1 000
...,

Jsweester, American Air Service, p. 33.

4Purtee, Army Aii· Service, pp. 23-25; T'he Natiow.l Advisory Co:r:un.i ttee for Aeronautics was cor.i.posed of representatives of -:::he·.-rar, r:avy, ".:reasury, CoTimerce, andAsriculture
Depart:::',ents, as 1·rell as the Sm.i thsonian Institute, the 3ureau
of Standards, and -:he ':!eather Bureau,

5Ibid.

, :p. 33, 'I-he ::-_,e:nbers of the Council of ::s. ti c::-13.'2.. :;}ef ens G -:·:rere Secretary of Jar, ·_·e-wton D. 3aker; Secret.::-.~y of the
'i?avy, Josephus Daniels; Secre·.~ary of the Interior, ?ranklir.. K.
Lane; Secretary of Agriculture, David F. Houston; Secretary of
Comr.i..erce, 1.,rilliam c. Redfield; Secretary of Labor, ·.Jilliam B.
Wilson.

6 Mcwarland,
P.d,
• ..
- , His
- tor Y of th e B • A•P• , I , 61 •

J
lfJ, 19•1.fJ .? ~his r.;arl.'"Yl -::.he
r~ or military av 1...,t:i,,..
o. ~-•.;Y-: on
• ,-o•re~~..-c,r
1.
"
,• •
J~

-

be~inning of a neriod of i~crea~ed appropriations for

~~e Avia-

tion Section which were used to pus r, forward the exr;3.Y-13ion

pla~s of the Secretary of ',Jar. 3y April, 1917, these e:;c;-Ar.sion
proposals had co;r:e to he '.-mowr. as the "~nlar~ed Aircraft ?rc9.:ra:".• " "::et, 1·,hlle "7:0:".C.Y sol-Ired. the probler.1 of providir.:.: fo~
~ ore aircraft, increased appronriations could do little to
eli:.r11 i nate the fact that the ·c:r.i -:: . ed States had few t::'[,:'..:--.ul
pilots, virtually no civil aviation, and our aircraft lr ~ustry

Has s ;r.all and technically backward when compared with lts
Europea n counterparts. 8

Six days after the United Stat_e s declared i·rar on ~-<~ l"xar.y
on A?ril 6, 1917, the Council of National Defense nreated the

Aircraft Production 3oard. ? he purpose of this Board ~Bs to coordi~a te the activities of the nation's aircraft ~a~ufac~~~~rs
with the .~ overnment and to make available to these sa:~8 :-~.&-:-.·llfac turers the r..ecessary resources and raw r:.a terie.ls. 9 '.I"-::. :Lr_crease the effectiveness of t:2e Aircraf~ Productior_ ~--::-,~:. ~'.l,
there ,·:as also cre-;;,ted in April, 1917, the Army and
7

~-&.7 :J

''cFarland, ed.., ~:istor:y of the 3.A. P., I, 65-'.:-6.

5,.,,.,O.l..O.."ae
- . -... --.2.·.~.1.c;er 0__)• r,_,.orre.1...1.,
- -h
•.e 'ea.su •e of
'.;!' ~ 8. 1 S ·ro :_r.
er: 8. 'J. +- ca. l :. ~:' or t {B:.1r 1 in _..,..._-'"-' !°'_:_L
,,__
a_r._e- ?=r
-e---1-,-9'""'L·:.- - p-.--»-;al so see l"'.Jrtee ,
_., _ir .,ervL. e, p. 2 >:-.

' • !:>

'

'.

"'.L

1

J,...._- ,

-,

s~,rees ter, ; i..rrieri c 8.n J,_ ir Service, p. 48; :'he r.:e: . ~O!:",posins:
t1:".e ;",,i:r ·0 :raft Production ::::i. oe.rc. · ere t:"01·rarc.. 3. Coffin of t:r:e ~~udson "otor ':ar Co..,,pR-ny , c "ei ,.,.'3.n ; 2c.:ward. /~. Deec.s, Fresider_t of
t:.e Delco Co'!":p.:l.:-:~, of Dr.> :'tor. 1 uhi o; 3. obert L. :,ron t:-o::1erv :-:' the
J , --; , :::_ 12._ ~o--::pPny of Phi lad el phis.; Sidney D. ',Jaidoy: ;f the
Fl.Ct.:'.L
"'o .. or e..r Co pany ; General Squ1er, Chief Sigr.al Officer:
and .• d i al "Jav _s ·: . Tayl or, 'jhi ef of the Ka val Bureau of Cons true ti on and ~epai r .

4
Technical Board, ~his joint technical board was r.-ia.de up of
experienced military aviators who made valuable reco~me~da.tions
to the Aircraft Production Board as well as assisting in the.
distribution of contracts to aircraft ~anufacturers. 10
As in all such situations of national emergency, co~fusion

see~ed to dominate the aircraft production progra~ froIT. the
beginning. The council of Nati or.al Defense and its subortlina te,
the Aircraft Production Board, were not coordinatin~ t~eir
activities with the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps. ':'hus,
in June; 1917, control of military aviation as well as the
directorship of aircraft production was returned to the Si~~al
Corps, To accept the additional responsibility, the divisions
of the Signal Corps we~e increased and reorganized. 11
One of the major problems facing the Aviation Section was
the lack of adequate engineerin~ support facilities to hand.le
the demands of the aircraft production program. Prior to the
United States entering the war, the engineering department of
the Aviation Section consisted of three mens Henry Souther,
Consul ting Ene;ineer; Captain V. E, Clark, Chief of Airpla.ne
Design; and Charles B, King, Chief of Engine Design.1 2 On
June 17, 1917, the responsibilities of the engineering der~rtme:r. t were combined with t~~e work being conducted by the Aeronautical Experi~ental Station, Langley Field,, Eampton, Virginia,
which was at that time under the control of the newly created

10sweest~r, Ar1erican Air Service, p. 50; 'also see Purtee,
Ar"::!.y Air

Service, p . ,34.

11 McFarland, ed., 3istory of the B,A,P., I, 22-24.
12

Ibid,, II, 27 5,

5
Aircr~ft En~1neerin~ Division.
It was at this ti:-.r.e tha.t several :production and en~1neerin",
experts from the automotive industry were recruited to assist
in the aircraft production :program. Jesse G. Vincent of the
Pac}r...ard ~1otor Car Company and E. J. Eall of the Eall-Scott ~':otor
Car co~pany reorganized the En~ine Design Section for the Si~nal Corps ~1i th an engineering staff drawn from such co~:panie::::
as C2dillac, Dodge, Pa.ck..l':l.rd, Durant, Pierce, and otr-J;:rs.13
Production plans were then established to meet the c.er.i.ands
of U.S. military aviation, These initial plans devisec o~ July 4,
1917, called for the cons true tion of 3,500 planes, 14 :~owever,

this estimate was quickly changed, for on June 8, 1917, a ca.":;le
was received from the French Premier, Ribot, which der.'!2.nded
20,000 aircraft and 40, 00_0 mechanics as the United States' co!l-

tri bu tion to the Allied effort in the air. "The goal m;:i.s ,::;oc
high for the Americans, but it formed the basis of poli~y. 111 5
This type of quantity production of tactical ·aircraft was
completely beyond the capabilities of the Unit~d States• aircraft industry. The only aircraft company of any real i~portance
in the country at that time was the Curtiss Company; yet, ever~
their production capacity was limited. Therefore, it was decided
tha.t due to the critical lack of airplane design and production
facilities in this country we would select a].ready existing
1

3Purtee, Army Air Service, p, 38,

14

Elsbeth E. Freudenthal, The Aviation Business (New York:
The Vanguard Press, 1940), p, 36,
1

~urke Davis, The Billy Hitchell Affair (New Yorks Random
Eouse, 1967), p. J2,

6
European aircraft prototypes for use by the Aviation Section
and adapt them to American mass production techniques.
Since April, 1917, aviation missions had come to ·,i':J.:-;hington fro~ England, France, Canada, and Italy to offer sus ~estions
as to what type of equipment t~:e United Sta. tes should nror: u.ce.
However, no decision wa.s reachec. by these discussions .16 To
solve this problem, an American aviation mission wa.s sent to
Europe on June 17, 1917, under the leadership of Colonel Reynal

c.

Bolling . The recom,~endations of the mission stated that the

British 3ristol Scout and Bristol Fic;hter be adopted for advanced
training and reconaissance purposes respectively. Colonel Bolling
in his re port also recommended that the French Spad be accepted
as the pri~...ary tactical aircraft and that the Italian Caproni
bo:nber be adopted as a prototype for American constructio:1. 17
Having reconciled the problem of what types of aircraft
to produce, the Signal Corps initiated still another reorganization of its production organization to keep pace .w ith the increased demands. ':!:he result of this change was the creation of
the first Equipmep.t DiYision on Au.gust 2, 1917. Edward A. Deeds
of Dayton, Ohio, a former member of the Aircraft Production
Board., was !r.ade chief of the new division with the rank of
colonel in the Signal Corps.
Thus, by the end of August, 1917, the Signal Corps was
well under way towards establishing a workable aircraft

16sweester, American Air Service, p. 58.
1 7- urtee ,

'.!''T'V 1\ir Service , p. 53; also see McFarland,
ed,, -1s~or~ of the ~ . A. ~ . • l , 1178; and Gorrell, America's
Aeronaut· cal J:ffor-; , p . h.

7
production pro;,;rarr.. ,.,,he prohleT"S of inadequate fur1din? B.nd lf3.ck
of or 0 aniz n. ti on 1·:hich r,,.'ld. pla,sued ;1ili tary s,via ticr1 in the

united :;tates were beins solved. Yet, there ,·rere still tr.e probler::s resul tine-: fro::n tec:mi:~al confusion. Increased appropriations and reorganizations ~ithin the Si~nal Corps could not alleviate t h e fact that the A~erican aircraft industry ~as ~ ~ill
painfully inadequate and incapable of supporting the type of
experir:iental aviation prorr,ram necessary to ~eet the e:--:er-re;1cy.
It was d.ue to this inadeq_uacy that the Signal Corps Aviation

Section was forced to accen~ the responsibility for aircraft
experimental en~ineerin~ which led to the founding of !,: ccoot:
Field, Dayton, Ohio.1 8

1 8Additi6nal note: Efurard A. Deeds, Jesse G. Vincent, ~nd
3. J. ~:8.ll 1·rere the ~hree -.-•.en ~esponsi ble for the ini ti~:i.l nlannin1 , d esi ? n, and develoir ent of the Li~erty ~n~ine. ?or - ore
1
., G. .J. :-: ixter ".t'P'ld Lieutenant H. H. Er1-ons ,
,.
.de '.::-8.::.~s see: Colonel
J.!'cr--:-.:'-c, Produc-:ion "1.CtG (· ·ashin~ton So-rern) -:-,=,1;es -.:r-,y
~- .1. ,-;·
'
,
.,_ - 1
1 <?n
.:-r r.~in;- Cff:..c c , 19.L9 ) , pp . 11 - 21 ; and ":u;:;hes and Gregory
••;??vr -cs on .e',.:.rcra.:.. t Irve sti ! ations," Aerial APje ·.-1eekly, i ~ovember
1-, 1918 , pp . 462-471.
:,

(':,

.
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CriAPT2R II

TEE SECO:;D :SQ0IP:·-~E:rr DIVISIOi; M1D
'."i:~:J ?OJ_.E JLJG

OF HCCOOK FIELD

During tric summer of 1917, the atrcraft productio~ ,rogram in the United States was ln a state of constant fllx. FroCT
April, 1917, to Septe r:1.ber, 1917, the authority for the ;,roduct ion of military airplanes

had

rested with no less than four

different organizations. These were, in chronological o~der,
the Signal Corps Aviation Section, the Aircraft Production
3oard, the Aircraft Engineering Div1s1on, and the first ~quipoent Division. If this type of constant changing appears tonfusing, just imagine how frustrating it must have been

~0

try

and build airplanes under such a system. What the Ar:--:..y needed
at that time was an organizational structure for alrpla::10 pro-

duct ::.on which would last longer than six weeks and an experl~ental facility which could support the work of ~he ent~re produet ion program. In this chapter, ·we will see ho~i both these

9rot,le2s, were te:nporarily solved by the establ1.sh1.ng of the
second EQ.'J.,ipm.ent Division and

t}';e

found1.ng of r-IcCook Fteld.

I'he organization of the first Equipment ·nivtston :-ras

quickly found to be inadequate due to the large nu~ber of Sffi~ll
sections reporting to one central authority. Therefore, on
Au.gust 29, 1917, Offtce ~-:er:iorandum No. 121 did away w1t:·. the

old :iI:qul.p;ncnt Dl.viston and creD.ted the second Equtpmont :iivic1.cn

10
whi~h ~as to operate aG s~c~ for the ne~t clght ~onth~ c ~ the
war. ,: ' ::1 0 CoYistruc~ ion

:.n vis '!.on

of t'."I~ Signal Corps -,,;a.s 'f."1;pt

separate fror:i the .Squlp~r.ont D 1. 'l l. s ion, as it had '::Jeon

E i:'"i.Ce

Hay 21, 191,7, 1·rhon l.t was officially established. The c.utl.es
of the Construction Division rc~ained that of buildin~ and
mai~t a. ining flyl.n r: f icld s , and the di v1.s1.on was, cor:mand~1 by
Colonel C. G. Edgar. By September, 1917, the organizational
problems of the Signal Corps had been settled wtth th~ creatton
of nine divisions, all but one of which had to do wtth aviatton. 1
Along . with the establishing of the second Equipment Division, the Engine and Plane Dest.:;_,;n Secttons of the former Aircraft Ens ineering Divisl.on 1·1ere placed under the control of the
Production Department of the Equipment Di.vision. In Septe~oer,
1917, Captain V. E. Clark returned from Europe where he had
been assi '.'; ned to the Bol11.ng iUssl.on and was 1.mmediately pro-

mote d to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He took co~2ani of the
.flane 0es1 gn S.ection which :·1 as located 1.n the Airplane ~ z h1.bl.t1o ~ Building behl.nd the Smithsonian Institute. dork was 1.nit l.ated to adapt the 3ri t 1.sh (·lodel F-2B "3r1.stol Fighter to a

~tree~ drive Liberty 12 engine. The modified Bristol was to
h a ve the new name of USA0-1

(U.S.A. Observatton-1). Hmrnver, it

was obvious that thl.s type of overcrowded conditions :,ras not
cond'J.cive to the expansion of the aviation pro.1 ram.
On Septe~ber 8, 1917, Colonel Deeds took steps to achieve

maximum effl.ciency wl.thin the Equipment Division. lits plan in~
clu~e~ ors anizing the div1.slon 1nto four departments: t ~e
1 i'iC?arland, ed., r:tstory of the B.A.P., I, 25-26.
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Executlve, under Lleutenant Colonel Jeaone; the ?in~nce, Go~mr-rnded by Lteutenant Colonel Tho,r.psot1; the f'roduc t ton, he:.:.ri~rl.
by Colonel Waldon; and Purch~se and Supply, l~d by ~ajor ~8naon. 2
Yet, these changes dtd not allevlate the problem of r,on8olldatin~ the engtneertng acttvtttes of the Equlpment Dtvtston
whlch had been a paramount considera.tton of the St~nai. Corp.;;
since the beginning of the war. Thus, tt was wtth

t~~

7reatest

possible speed that a central aircraft enetneertng fa~iltty was
established so as not to jeopardize the enttre pro~ra~.
The -Aircraft Production Board, tn keeping wttt t~e plan to

improve operations, passed a resolution on September 25, 1917,
call 1ng for an "experimental factory anc. test tng gro •J.!',d" .3 as tde
from the Langley Field Expertmental Statton. This proposal was
carried further, and on October 13, 1917, Office Memorandum ~o.
22 --...1as issued outltntng the add1.t1.onal changes.

In order to centralize enginee~ing work and fiz respon-

sibility, tt was decided to bring the E~~ine Desi~n
Sect ion and the Plane Des i £:r.. Sect ion to,;;ether 1.nto a
s l.n;;le organization to 'Je lmo,-m as the Airplane :i::::'.'l ;;ir,eerin~ Depart:r.ent and. to locate this organlzat l.o.'.l 1.n
~ayton, Ohio, where its actl.vittes would be within a
ni~~t'~ r:de of In~ia~apolis, Detroit. 3ufftlo, Clevela.. •-4, .r: it., sbu.rgh. .~asnington, and the East.

Lieutenant Colonel Clark, who at the time was working in the
Plane Design Section, was made Officer-1.n-Charg~ of the new
Airplane Engineering Department. In response to the new or 6 an1.zational structure, the Engine and Plane Design Sections were
also removed from the Production Department of the Equipment
2 :ilcFarland,

,. r y o f· t h e i3 . A .
e d • , ·n1 1. ::ve

. ,

I , 26 •

3Ibid., II, 355. (For more information, see Appendtx I.)
4 Ibld.,

II, 278.
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Division. Jc~se G. Vincent, recently comm1ss1.oned

O.'.:;

f;.

;,:~~or in

0ddl.~ton
to hl.R- duties as ~r'itcf
of the
Engineering·Departmen t 1n =
Engine Design Section. Upon his appointment, Major V1ncen~ left
im~edlately for Dayton, Ohio, to begin arrangements for the
transfer of the t~o sections.
? receding the official issuance of Office ~emoran1~~ ~o.
22 on October 1J, 1917, Colonel Sdward Deeds, Chief of

~~e

Eq~ipment Division, sent a letter to the Dayton-Wright ~ercplane Company. In this letter, he stated that 1. t. had ~eerl decided to extend the laboratory f'acil1.t1.es of the soon tote
created Airplane Engineerl.ng Department to Dayton, Ohio •.. ,;
also announced that plans were be 1.ng made to ut il 1.ze t!",e; Da:rcon'.-lr1.,: sht experl.mental field as the s 1. te for the new laborat.or 1es.
It was noted that the a.dd1ti.onal constructl.on at the f1.eld. was
to be handled by the Construction Divisl.on of the Si s ~a~ Corps,
and the entire expense was to be incurred by the govern::ent for
the buildings whl.ch were to be of a temporary nature ser71ng
only untl.l Lancley Field could be completed.
A comml.ttee was appointed to study the possible -:..i.se of the
Dayton-~right fl.eld. This group was composed of Albert Xahn,
arcr..itect; Char.le_.s ?. lCe~terl.ne, repre::,cnt1ng the Dayton-:,Jrtght
Company; 11.eutenar..t Colo:r'"el 7. E. Clark, repi:esent tne

~= :-: •:

Sig-

nal Corps; and zr.ajors J. G. Vincent .and E. J. Hall. However, at
the ~eeting of the coom1ttee, Charles Kettering and~- E.
Talbott, Sr., another Dayton-~l:r·ight executive, announced that
they were eager to assist the $OVerrunent in any way except by

lJ
giving up the Dayton-Wright Company field. For, tf the field
were to have been acquired as an ezperimental facility by the
government, · lt would have been impossible for the Dayton-:..Ir1ght
Coillpany to fulfill the contract obligations it had with the
e;ovcrnmcnt for ene;1.necr1.ng work on the De Haviland DH-4 and De
Hav1.land DH-9 airplanes.
In order to avold any unnecessary conflict, Kettering and
Talbott suggested another location north of the city kno,r~ as
:-Jorth Field. The advantageG to this location were that it ·,;as
closer to the city and more easily reached by municipal transportatlon. In addition, the condition of the ground le~t l~self
more to the construction of buildings while the availab~lity of
gas, electricity, and especially sewage fac1.llt1es were ouch
better at the North Field site.
After the comi:ni ttee fully examined the new site. l t ":,as
decided on September 28, 1917, that the North Field locat~o~
would be suitable for the experimental factory a.vid test in"'. facility. In the meantime, Colonel Deeds i·ras rtotifl.ed of :.he decision to utilize :,Jorth Field. He, 1n turn, made the neces3ary
arrangements with :•lajor General George

o.

Squ1er, Chief ~tsnal

Officer, for the approval of the appropriation for the 1mprover.1ent of :,Jorth Field requisl. te to the government assuming control. Lleutenant Colonel Clark :•ms then infor411ed of Hhat had
~ranspi~ed in ilashington, and he propeeded to Detro1t to confer
with Albert Kahn, the architect, about the approval of the appropriation.5
5r1cFarland, ed.,

•Ti.......
., vO!

y

O .1,c

th e -::3 .
•

• .? • ,

II , J-::i57 - J58 •
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The lease for North Plcld was off1c1ally record~i on October 1, 1917, for tl.c period October 4, 1917, through Jl..lne ,;O,
1918. The land tn quest ton 1·ms bounded by Herman Avenue on the
south, Keowee Street on the east, and the ½tami River on the
north a nd we st. The ae;recd re n tal price for the land iras .)9, 493.
The lessor for thts a g ree:.:.w::it Has the Daytor. i•: etal .F : oiucts Com-

pa ny, 1•ihict had ovmed the land since 1915, and the les:;oE; ~•iaS
the United States Govcrnme n ~. The final negotiations were concluded by Colonel C. G. Eds ar, Stgnal Corps, represe ~tl~g the
United States and Charles ? . Ket tertn ~ re pre sent 1.ng t '.r,e Da.:,r:0:'1
;fotal Products Company. The lease also stated that the prl.ce
for rental of the property for the period July 1, 1918, throu~h
June JO , 19:l 9 , was to be :~12 , 800.
Since everythln~ in re s ard to the experimental field at
Dayton , Ohio, ~as going to be new, it was sug gested ttat a new
tltlE: for the old :~orth Field site be established.
1hc Aircraft Production Board on October 1, 1917, adopted a resolution"na~ln~ this temporary expert~e~tal
fi e ld "ZcCool'.: :? ield." in · honor of the ?i~ht in s ZfoCcoks
as the property until a short tt~c before, had been in
the possession of the ;-:cCoolc Family. ~1ajor Daniel
:,:ccook, t h e head of t h is family, and his nine sons
we r e all officers in the Civil War, . all but one being
wounded and six being lcilled, one of the survivors
1::)e ing ;.:ajar General Ale:::i~ander HcDowell McCook, t·rho
-r~~d:red dtst.ingutshed service both during and after
tn -.. :Tar. 6

.

'::::-:e area of the new station contained 254.37 acres and. was
locateQ one and one half miles from the center of tne city of
Dayton, Ohio. The girth of the field was 1L~,677 feet or 2.78
miles. After the land was initially acquired on October 1, 1917,
,,
0

1·-:: c? arland, ed., : :-I istory of the B .A.P., II, 358. (For
additional infor.""Jo.tion on the VicCooks see Appendix II.)
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consiclerable ·,rnrk

tm3

necessary to prepare the a1.te. : ·he ro~1eh

c ro.d in,:; clid. not con st i tutc muc,1 of the preparation cxc,:;,-:; at
the north end of the field where it wao necessary to rc::iove an
old river erabankraent. Tne f 1.nished grading, hOi·:ever, reqt:.!.red.
rr,.uch ::-.ore effort -:>,·:ni:'1.;: to the d.csirabll1ty of hav1.n2: an a·osolute ~rea of table land for experi~ental flying. In ad.dit~on,

tho -: m t ire ,field ,;,ras underlald 1:-1ith a stratum of ten to fifteen

feet of ~ravel wlth from one to three feet of ccverln~ tc ~ ~c~l.
Yet;, the top soil

11.;as

of a sandy loam., not r1.ch' 1.n v8.LJ.e, and.

de;nand..cd · constant seed in["'.: and reseeding 1.n order -to c.bta1.n a
~ood stand of crass.?
:J ecause of the particular uniform topography of the lancl,
d~aina~e of the field site was extremely difficult. This 3ituat io:i. Has only co:1plicated by the fact that all the 8tor~ oewers
surro unding the field i'rnre too high for dra1.nar.;e. 'I·he proole.:n
of stor:n dre.inae;e was handled through the construction of a

.

?rench drain. Sink sumps were placed 1.n the gra,.,el s~ra,; '..l!.1 to

aid the drainage of particuiarly d1.fficult sections of the
field.
Contracts for the construction work at McCook ~-rere awardec..
to the Dayton Lu..--:iber and ;,1anufactur1.ng Company on October 2,

1917. The authority for this action.was Colonel C. G. Ed~ar,

Cr. ie : of tae Co::~stru c•.:ion Division.

J .K. Grann1s was s ·J.oerin-

teJ1den'.: of Construction at 1-~ cCoolc Field, and he was ordered to
proceec. nith the purchase of the necessary mater1als locally

on October 2, 1917. Actual construct1.on began on October 2, 1917,

7The Aeronautical Systems Division TI1stor1cal Office,
Survey and Bi.story of ~cCook Fleld, Wright-Patterson AFB, 1952.
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with shifts workins around the clock.
The int t ia.l construct ion included "the en~lneer ln2:

,c;.'l.1

shop bulldinss. the final assembly building, the hcatl~~ ~lant,
main han~ar, ~arage barracks, mess hall. cafeteria, c~sinc te3t
stands, and transforwcr house. 118 '£he two ha?1gars located. at
North Field at the time of the acquisition were used ~c nouse
the dynamometer and the engine assembly bu1ld1ng. On Dece~ber

1917, construction had been

completed ✓ enough

5,

to allow the trans-

fer of the Alrplane Engineering Department from the Lindsey
Build1ne. ln Dayton to the new facility at McCook Fleld. This
marked the bceinning of operations of the Airplane Experlmental
Statton of the Signal Corps at McCook Field. The growth of McCook ?ield and its operations continued throughout the ·11ar; ho,·iever, it required constant additions to keep pace with expa~din3
activity.9
One of the most important features in the constructior. of
::ccook Field was the building of the 100 by 1,000 foot nacada.:n
and cinder runway. This -..ras a s1.gnif1.cant ach1.eve:nent 1.r. 1917,
~

'-'~·lcFarle.nd, ed., History of the 3.A.P., II, J59.
,...

73y November 11, 1918, ~cCook Field was composed of
2_5L~.33 acres, and to facil1.tate all ~-reather fly1.ng,

a 100

by 1,340 f6ot macadao runway had been built. In addition

a ~ctal of 371.914 square feet of floor space. Heatinc
~as provided to nearly all ~h~ buildings on the base by
a central heating plant. Due to the temporary construction o: most of the lmildin6 s, r::-:rcat precaution had to
be ~aken against fire da~a~e. In add1.tion to ~he most
;:,ociern fire equ1.pment, a stand-by fire protection
sys"cem was established using the Dayton water mains. The
total cost of McCook·Field uo to the Arm1.stlce was
,;2,352,790. i'lcFarland, ed., History of the B,A.P., II,
/

361.

4
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for the majority of flyl.n~ fields at that ttme were t race
strlps. Yet, bec:::m0c of tbe posit lon of the runway, 1 t S8r1r.:rl
as a d.ctri.:nent to any e:i:panci.on plans except for fly tn.~ f l.elrl
purposes. Hence, the ~otto of ~cCook Fleld justifiably beca~e
"'I'hi.s field. is small so use i.t s.11!"

stud:rins the history of avi.ati.on durin;;; ,lorld 1.. rar :

seotions, departments, and di.vlsions did not ~ake

;-:a s that

~ t~

story.

The successful development of the Liberty engine bro~3ht several l.nportant American industrial lsts and engineers to :;he '3.ttent ion of the nation as leaders of the wartime aviati.o~ production program. Such names as Deeds, Waldon, Vincent, Clark,
fl'lont ~o~e"!:y, I•: ixter, Marmon, and Hall would after Decem·oer, 1917,
beco:i1e synon~rrnous with the early history of .-~c:ook Ficlci just
as they left their imprint on the Liberty engine projec~. Although at times the hi.story of McCook Field during ~orl~ ~ar I
appeared to be nothing .more than a sertes of contirnlO'J.S '.)r;-an1.zational changes, the ever present genius of t,hese c:-.en and
uany others like them brought to light the story of JcCook
Field. :•Iany crit1cs of the m1.lltary av1.at1.on program in

·✓:orld

~ar I believed the entire operation to have been a failure. However, ·trhen one considered that the · Army began w1th v1.rtually
not:-:ine in the way of aviation exper1mental f.acilities in April,
1917, and finished the war 1-:1.th an installation like VicCook
Field, :hat had to be progress!

c:Ui.P'i'ER III

DJ::PAI~T l'!E;:fi'

A'r

MCCOOK FIELD

After the conclusLon of ne gotiatlons for McCook Field.

l-i ajor Vince nt was joined in Dayton by Lieutenant H. E. :.:)lood..
Lieut e nant 3lood had. been in charge of the Engine Deslr:':n ~.;ec-

t ior. at the .3 ureau of Standards in i-lashington.

When he arrived

in :iJayton, he brou~ht with hio -che first equipment and pcrzonnel of the Ene ine Design Section.

Lieutenant Colonel Clark re-

mained in ·w ashin~ton with the Plane Design Section until :Jovc::ibe:r 5, 1 917. to co:nplete the plans on the Bristol F i ;_)1ter
before releasing them to the Curtiss Company.
AsiQe fro~ the arrival of the Engine and Plane Dosi;311 Sections oy ~-J ove;.1ber 5, 1917, nothing had been officially stated

as to the duties or the experimental work to be done at ~c:ook
Field.

However, the Chief Signal Officer issued Office ~e~o-

randu:J. :Jo. 53 on "November 5, 1917, which establlshed that "all

:~~atters pertaining to tecl:mical and exper1.mental worl-:: at
La~;_; ley and /IcCook ?ields ".•rere to be assigned·

.,

:.::n~ i.neer1.ng Department.

,,.1..

to the Airplane

This order was followed

OY-1

Novell.ber 22,

1917, by another statement from the Chief Signal Officer defining
the duties of McCook Field.
lv..,
' , History of the B.A.P~. II. 279 •
.ic ... ar 1 an d , ea..
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Until further orders, all matters pertaining to tto instruction and experimentation in bombin3, photo~ra~hy,
radio, telegraph, together with all demonstr~tlons of
foreic;n airplanes le assi c;ned to Langley Pield. Zngtne
and plane develop:nont, the 1::"..stallat ion of ca:ncras on
e::~perimental planes, and work pertal.n ins to the synchronization of machine guns ls asstgned to EcCook
Field.2
W1th the expansion of activities at both Langley and
McCook Fields, it was found that a reorganization of the Airplane Engineerlnc; Depart;:ient would be required.

This :najor re-

organization of activities was outlined in Office Jr.e::iorandum
jo. 11, and it first appeared on January 8, 1918.

The ~c~'l

policy gave the Department the full responsibility for the design of airplanes and accessories.

It was also stated that the

Airplane En 0 ineerlng Department ~aintain;
••. the direction of the butldtn~ of expertmental models,
the tests of experimental alrplanes, enetnes and accessories; the final approval of all changes in design was
to be ~adc by the Airplane Ensineertng Department and
all specifications were to have the formal approval of
the Department before thetr use.3
Foll01·1tng the official designation of operations for the
Airplane Engineering Departillent, the Department of Production
2n3ineerir.s was created on January 11, 1918.

This new depart-

r.ient d.id. ::-10t take the placG of the Airplane Engineering Depart:r.cnt •_,jithin the frarne,;-rnrli.: of the Equipment Dtvision.

Established

at the ,same ti!TI.e as the Production Engtneering Departr:ient was
the Prod.uction 3oard..

'l'hl.s was not the same as the Atrcraft

Productio:1 Board of the early days of the war, for this new
board merely had control over the work of the Production
2:-'icE'arland, ed • , Hi
. . s t o ry o f · th e 3 • A• P • , II , 280 •
Jibtd., I, 29.
(Por more information concerning the reorganization see Appendix III.)
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EneinGering Department.
The operations of the Production Ensineerlng Depart2ent
were moved to Dayton shortly after 1.t was establ1.sr.ed.

The pur-

pose of the Department at i·IcCook ?ield was to prov1.de ens1neerin~ information necessary for 11anufacturing alrpla:nes, ~ncluding
engines anc. all accessories, and such other 11.nes of eq-,Jt.p:nent
as micht be.especially referrec. to lt.4

Major B. D. Gray,

Aviation Section Si2;nal Corp8 l"1eserve, was ma.de Chief of the
Production ing1neering Department as well as serving as a meaber of the Product ion Board.

He was responsible. for o:r::o..n1.zing

the Department in prepar,ation for the move to Dayton.

'l'he lo-

cation of the Production En~ineering Department in Dayton ~as
the Lindsey 3uilding; however, due to the lack of sufficient
space, the Department was transferred from Dayton to ·,,.1asi1in5ton
on April 15, 1918.

Its new headquarters was 1.n the Old .:asonic

Tei'ilple, 9th and F Street, :{orth:rnst.

On June

J, 1918, ~•iajor

Gray resigned after a dispute over interference wlth the a 1-1thor-

tty and. functions of his department.
After the general reorganization with1.n the Air-olane
3:n~;;ineering Department on January 8, 1918, orders were a:'.1.nounccd by the Chief Signal Officer through General i·iemorandu.n
No. 28 on January 25, 1918, regarding the dut1.es of specific
off ice:rs at I-lcCook F1.eld.

'i'his -11as done to i::elieve Liet:_tena..'1.t

Colonel Clark of the responsibility of incl.dental post matters.
D~e ~o ~is professional experience, Major J. G. Vincent, as
.:.: ,Jni ted. States Army s i,r.;nal Corps, "General Hem.orandu.-n
~(o. :;.6, 11 January 11, 1918, Aeronautical Systems Divisl.on,
Documentation Div1.sion Files.
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8h1.cf :~tl,Sineerin3 Off ice:r, :·:as placed 1.n charge of all f 1cld.

or ~a~ ization aside fro~ ~llltary affairs.

In order to ~andle

the ,·.1 llltary matters, i-~ajor Frederick T. Dick.man •;ras

Co;::~::andinc; Off leer of ;,le Cook ?leld.

;;-.arJ.e

In keeplng with this plan,

Ca'.")taln E. C. I•iarmon ~-ms ~aade .Assistant Znglnecr dlrectly sub-

ordl.nate to ::ajor Vir.cent.

3ecau1:.e of his advanced kr.owled2:e

of eJ.rplane desie;:"'~, Lieutenant Colonel Clark was relieved of all
d :-1t-J..cs

involving tl':e

11

actua.l construction of models

a~ri.

t:-;e

,;;c.'.:in.s of product ion drai·,inc;s, r: 5 so that he could d.evotc all

his activity towards aclvancod design and consult1.ne; work.
the admi n istrative chan~es within the Airplane :2:ns 1.r,eer1r..~

Dcpartme~t did not satisfy ~ajor Vlncent's ideas for lmprovln~
the ~echnical efficiency of the department.
I-Iajor Vincent su c;:;estcd a new organizational plan to the

Chief of the :Squip:nent Divls1.on based on the needs o:' ':ho Ai.rploxle ::::ng;il1.eer1.n3 Department, not on manpower availabil1. ty. 6

To prove his point, Jajor Vinc~nt was actively seektn~

t~~

services of aircraft e:1.,3 1.neer Don.s.ld Douglas, w;io at that ti.we
,·:as i·ror i".'.ing for the Wright-:-:art 1.n Aircraft Company. 7

-:'he ear-

nestness o:· :-:ajar Vincent's actions b:-ought about 1.m.:nedia.te
chex1 ~es.

Lieutenant Colonel Clark: :·ras reassi.~ed to the Office

of the Chief Si;-:-nal Officer.

c-·,-: February 5. 1918, i'1ajor DicV...m.an

· .-2.s :~e ll.e7e~ of all duties at :-:ccook Fteld, and Najor '/:.:.cent
5::c?arland, ed., ~~ l.storv o:' the B.A.P., II, 282.
/

0

?urtee, Arsy Air Service, p. 100.

cal

~

' .. _::10randum to Wllltara c. Potter,
:.;qu. i.pment D1.v1.s1.on," February 1,
~t v 1sion, Documentation Divlsion
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'\·ms pr·omotcd to t11c rank of Lioutenant Colonol and pl~.i.Cr)cl 1.n
chnr i::c of t he A1.rplane Ln.:~ i.nce1·inr: LlCpart:nent wttr. full co::1.::iand.

of ~•:ccoo l( F l.old by ord c:r of tho Chl.cf Si r:nal Officer.
3 y late January, 1918, the aircraft product ton pro:::;ra:n of

the Si. ri:n a l

had b ec:1 reasonably cstabltshcd.

COT !)3

:irowc·1cr,

was found that the services of Colonel Deeds would b8 ~or8

tt
U3C-

ful as head of the =xecuttvc Department of the Equtp~cnt ~1vi□ lo n

than as Chl.cf of the Equipment Division.

Therefore, on

Jo.nuo.ry 21, 1918, Colonel Deeds resigned. hts position as Criicf
of the .iquipment Division.
r.lont?;o rrrc ry.

I-:1. s replacement was Colonel h.L.

After the change of command, the naw i'.·1aterlels

Section, which ':rn.s concerned wl.th providing essential ra·,,; ~.1 ate•
1
r1e
.... s : or both forei gn and domesttc use, beca:ne the i~ aw .:ate-

ri 0 ls Depart ment.

In lrneping

!Ti th

the :progra-n of elev at in<:;

sect ior.. s to departmental status, the Hotor Transpori:;. Sec':; ton
;:"as ch2::1::ed to the :1:otor : : ' rans port De partn.ent, and the ~and

Production Department was created to provide conventional equtp-

2he only other principal chanse within the Equip~en~ Division was the creation of the ·position of Dire9tor of Prodaction.
This o L l.ce controlled. the ,mrlc of productl.on e.ni:;l.neering includ i G3 ~he dcpartcents of Production Engineerin3, Factory
?roci·_:_c.tion, En: 1.nes, Ord!"sa~ce, and. Instruments, Balloons, In-

s~ ·3 ction, :-loto1~ Transport, Land Transport, and Lubrication.
£he Dl.rector of Production took the place of the Production
Boa.2.~d. which had

been established in January, 1918, and the

duties of the Director \•,ere therein s1.e;nificantly in2.reased.
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iow ardors were 1.s~ue~ by the Chief Cl.gnal Off teer tn

for

rode f ini t ion of tho func t i.ons of the Airplane ~n,r,lni:-Jerl.n~

[t

Department at jcCook ?icld.

The orders stated:

... to proceed. to revise o.r..d enlar~e the organization
to S'JC'.h aY: e::,:tcl".t as r:,L:ht be necessary 1.!'l order to
::a:1c: lc tt:G lar.3 c volu..'"'lc of ,.-ror1c l.nvol ve6.. and t:-:s~,.; 'Jy
cafes·c~c.:c-i t:1e fut11r0 r.w.:'1ufactur1.n::; progra:a. The ~·-.1.:.:·,1~~e ~~~Lneerin~ Department was al3o charged with tho
re spons i bili ty for no vi and. arl·,anced models of al.r:;.,laf",8 s
, :h0 :-, ~1.c: •,elopcd for turnin2: models and. draw1.m~s o·;er to
~he Production ~ngincering Departmegt, who should as3Umc ~11 responsibility thereafter.
In acid.it ion, the Qrders spec if 5..ed that any changes ma,d.s ir.. ~le-

s 1.gn 1·:-ere to be ::iadc only when absolutely necessary, ana :;c.ese
changes ~-1ould be subject to the approval of the A1.rpla:r,e · z ,r_r:3...At this t 1.ne, the Airplane Enr,,;1.neerinr_::

nee ring Dcpart:nent.

D0part:nent ~-ras also given the authority to contact any c::o.nufact ,J.rers, thus establishing relations with respect1.ve engir..cer'i..Y-~,3
deoartne::ts resarding experimental al.rplanes and alrpla:;-;,E.; 1;o,;er

plant ene;ineerins.

Th1.s was· an 1.mprotant step, for ::the .Airplane

=nsineerin~ Division ~as relieved of all but t~e v1.tal work of
ad.vanccc. engineering and design. 11 9.
Tl".e expansion of ope rat ions ~-11. th1.n the Equ1.prnent Div l. sion
r·c~uireci tb..c fou.viding of a separate Personnel Depart:nent on
.-i.s.rc:1

9, 1 913.

·::i.'his ne:,:- orr;anizat ion was followed shortly

tl:.creafte:r by the creatl.on of the Inclu 9 trial _Re lat tons Depart-

:nent ·,:-hi.ch ,ras to ensure ':)ettcr 6.ondi t 1.ons between e!!lploycrs
a~Q employees.

It also had respons1bill.ty for alleviating the

B--..-.er<..,arland, ed. , H,istory of the :S .A. P. , II, 283.
9-Ibid.,

p. 283.

she~- ~.-::re

or

sl-: illc l labor, ~o::.-- the alrcraft product ion r;r0;.:ra;:-.
1

coulci 111 afford. ,-mrk ~:::a;, :xi.ge.:; ov 1.~r labor d1cputes.

Yc.:t, even

1tri th tr.c E.:.dcH t ion of ne:,, departm9nts, the ore,;a.rlizat ton of tr.e

Equi?~e~t Divlsion ~as found to be·no longer sufficient by the
s9rin::; of 1918.

CEAPTER IV

It waf, quite esrident d.uri:!f.' the winter of 191?-lS,1.~ -,n;:,.t

t:': e Siri:nal Corps. As early as J?..rmary 2L~, 1918, Dr. J,:>:-:eph A1:,es,
a :me!"'lber of the 3xecuti ve Co:?Jmi ttee of the :·,I a "c.ional A<iv-isory
COT!l.."!l.i ttee for Aeronautics, in an article which appe;;.red. in
Atl:::-,ntic r,1onthly "questioned the probable success of the aviation :oroe;ram. 111 Colonel Deeds, later in January, 1918, statec..
before the Senate Milit4rY Affairs Committee:
••• the constant alterin~ of pla~s to ~eet t~e rapid
~1.--:an~es in air fi1:5htinc; tac tics in ~urope, comhir:erl
·,ri th the delays in securing t'.a terial and the scarci t:,
of skilled labor, had put the aircraft pr~duction pro~ran at least two ~onths behind schedule.
:'!2-:riy conflicting explanations were beinP;; advanced .::1.s the

reas:)'"': •·,hy the oripinal Si~nal Corps estimate of 260 com·oat
squadrons in ?ranee by July 1, 1918, would not be satisfied.
o:r~e reaso:r-~ given in the magazine Aerial Arre r_ ·! eekly for April

1918 1 ',-~s.s sir.rply

11

e,

too r.1a.ny cooks. 0 3 Albeit this statement an,.

:peared. very, evasiYe, it did e:-:"9ress one idea which was basic
to 1.m.u.e!'s t :~.nding the overall p:-o-olem. The difficulty was that

1 Purtee, Army Air Service, p.

68.

P• 69.
3"Inner Problems of the Aircraft Situation Made Public and
Steps Proposed for Solution," Aerial Ar;e Weekly, April 8, 1918,
pp. 199-200.
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there ·w ere just too many self-s tyl0d 0.u thor1 t1es "who ,;er~ n upposed to know the fn.ct~;,"

,,

~

o.nd these p0ople were nr:r1jn·:

t.r;

tr,':)

confusion by issuin:;; ste.ter.1 ents h0.s8rl on m1~1nfor~.0.tion w'r,1ch
contributed more injury to the already dismal reputation of t ~c
aircrc1.:'t production pro;:_i;ra:11.
Various investie;ations were instigated during tr.e wi:n t er
of 1917-1918, in order to answer the perplexing question of ho'"fl
to improve the productive capacity of the aircraft pro~ram. The
Durtt-Drumm-Barber Board revised the original estimate of the
Sisnal Corps in January, 1918. The new plan called for a more
re a listic program requiring the delivery of 100 combat squadrons to Europe by December 31, 1918.5 The confusion pl~?uinp_;
the aircraft production program was brought to the attention
of the public in 1-'.rarch, 1918, through a series of articles published. in the !~ ew Yorl\'. ',1Torld by the internationally fa~_ot;.s
sculptor, Gutzon Borglum. 'Even though the text of Eor~~1u::1' s ~ccuss. t io::.s ;•;as based on general comments of misrnanagemen-:. ir, the
aircraft production program, he did succeed in causing Cor.v-essional action by arousins the public's interest.
April, 1918, marked the be~inn1ng of a period that witnessed. t hree official govern~ental investigations. Howards.
Coffin, Chair!:'.an of the Aircraft Production Board, at this tir.ie
':Je:;an a special inquiry for t}'.e 3oard. President Hilson appointed B. Snowden I,: arshall to lead an investigation of t::.e aircraft production program for the Chief Executive. In addition
4Purtee, Army Air Service, p. 69.
51-rc?arland, ed., Eistory of the B.A.P., I, '163.
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to these inquiries, the Senate : Iili tary Affairs Com~1 ttee also
1

bee;an their own probe. On April 10, 1918, the Senate Co::-:,::-ittee
issued a report on their findings calling for the rerr:ova.l of
the Sienal Corps from control of the aircraft production program. The report also reco!!!I!lended that the entire product1o!'l
profjrar:l be placed under the direction of one man whose business
interests were not connected with the production of airplanes
or related equipment.6 However, recommendations did not remove
the problems._ The public and the press were clamoring for nore
infor~ation concerning the status of the aircraft production
program. Yet, all the concern the public could muster would not
have been able to counteract the "la.ck of coordination a.nd efficiency in the production organiza.t1on."7
"Hhen the airplane manufacturers began to be a. ttacked for
the failure of the production program,

w.

A. Morgan, vice-pre-

sident of the Curtiss Airplane and Motor Company, answered with
an explanation of the problems facing his particular company.
First, the Curtiss Company had been requested to produce the
French Spad, single-seat, fighter aircraft. However, thi2 order
was changed when the Germans began using a. two-seat fighter.
The Curtiss Company was then contracted to build the two-seat
Bristol Fir;hter using the Liberty 8 ene;1ne 1 however, it ·,ra.s
discovered that the Liberty 8 engine would not fit the Bristol.
To answer this problem, a :?re~ch engine was substituted temporarily and eventually replaced by a more powerful American
611 The Senate Investigations of the Wa.r Department-Aircraft
Production," Aerial Arr,e '.'f eekly, April 15, 1918, pp. 262-262d.

?Purtee, Army Air Service, p. 78.
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built cnsine, the Liberty 12. '=-'his type of confusion lerl r:or~a.n
to state, "Any idea that reached here from abroad was :::e1zed
upon by those in charge of the air program. It was a case of
constantly copying soMething ... 8
The comn.ents of !~orr:an were supported by the lar0e aircra ft manufacturers. Hmrnver, the smaller companies ur. . 1 terl behind their spokes~.an, Grover Loening, to level verbal broadsides at the "Detroit Gang" of automobile men who supported the
lar,~e manufacturers and "had made a complete mess of the aircraft pror;ram. "9 Loenine had been one of the few aircraft J!lr~nufac turers in the United States prior to World War I, and he
certainly was not satisfied with the treatment shmrn his company and companies like his. Loening's chief arf!Ument was age.inst the constant a tternpts of the aircraft production !;roe;ra:--.
to adapt European designed tactical aircraft to the Liberty
engine. 10 However, the ideas of the small manufacturers ~-~ere
countered by explanations tr.at the best way to achieve quantity
production of tactical aircraft was to mass produce :Suropean
models. In addition, the most efficient means of assuring proper
use of mass production techniques was to place the contracts
,;-ri th the hie;hly organized large manufacturers. Thus, the a.ircraf t production controversy in April, 1918, was beginnin~ to
a&su::ne

8.

new dir:1ension as the srraller aircraf-t companies pre-

pared for a fight over production rights and the apparent
2-Aerial A.r;e :·l eekly, April
0

15, 1918, PP• 262-262d.

/Purtee, Army Air Service, p.

10

79.

. . Grover C. Loeninc5, Cur ':!inr;s Grow Faster (New Yorks
Do~bleday, Doran and Company, 1935), p. 65.

led to the cstabli::;hme~t of a suhdivlsion syster of operation
in the iquip~ent Division. ~he n~r prozra~ called for ~he ere..,., ,:r-... ,-_;
.....

o:f

;'" ent :Jivision

~·,e:re futile. '.That ~·:ras needed. WB.s a coT.:!-)le":e c:r.2.-:i r:e

ir:. t/,e cver2.ll or-:-:::::.::~. za ti on::11 s true ture if the succe::;s of 't'-:e

Unite~ States aviation prozram were to be assurea.

0:ffic el', issued Of:'ice :,:emora::.dum ~:o. 93. This order rec_,;_~red.
t112_t tt:e old /iir Division of the S119-1.e.l Corps be chanr~ecJ_ to trie

Air ~ervice Division, and ~ ri~adier Ge neral J illia~
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J ...J.
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er a ; encies, and offices, for other purposes, in the interest
of econorny and more efficient concentration of the Gover:-unent. 1112
I

r.rhe official life of the O.,..rer:r..an Act 1·1as for the duration of
the war and six months. The President, aside from hi::; powers
of reor ~anization of executive bureaus, had been desiGnated to:
••• establish an executive a 0 ency which -::.ay exercise
such jurisdiction and control over the production of
aeroplanes, aeroplane engines, and aircraft equipment,
and. further, to transfer to such an ar:.;ency, for i t,.s
use, all or any moneys heretofore appropriated for the
production of aer9planes, aeroplane engines, and aircraft equipment.lj
The powers delegated by the Overman Act could be -applied only
by the President "in m'3.tters relatinc; to the conduct of war. ,.ll1,
The Act also stipulated that any agency or bureau affected by
the reoreanization would return to its previous status upon
termination or· the Act. Thus, after the termination of the
Overman Act, any reorganization of the executive aeenc1es o~
bureaus would be done through direct legislative action.
In lrneping with the provisions of the Overman Act, on
I!ay 20, 1918, President Wilson issued an Executive Order ,·Thi ch
was to have a great effect on the conduct of future United
States military aviation operations. In this order, the Chief
Si13:nal Officer was relieved of all duties associated forT.erly
1-;ri th

the Aviation Section. A Director of Military Aeronautics

1•ms 9.lso co be appointed by the Comrnand~r-in-Chief of the Army.
It

Kas

to be the duty of this officer to take command of the

12TTcFarland, ed., :Ristory of the B.A.P., I, 98.
:.3 __ i •
.::..£::..9: t

1L_b_d

I

- ~-,

!) o

99 •

p. 100.
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activities of the Aviation Section under the direction of the
Secretary of Har. Finally, the Bureau of Aircraft Production
was es ta-Dlished and officially ct".arged with the responsibility
of the "production of airplanes, airplane engines and aircraft
equipment for use by th~ Army. 111 5 In kcepinp_; with the other
chan~es, the designation of the Aviation Section of the Signal
Corps was changed to the Army Air Service.
At the same time, John D. Ryan accepted the directorship
of 11.ircraft Production for the Army as head of the ne 7,:ly established Bureau of Aircraft Production. This . organiza ticn ·.-ras to
take the place of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps, as
well as assuming the responsibility for the work which was
formerly done by the Equipment Division. The last step in this
list of changes was completed with the creation of the Division
of ~-':ili tary Aeronautics under the com:r..and of Brigadier Seneral
Kenly, and Colonel H. H. Arnold was made Assistant Director.
'='he 1,-l'ar Department explained the Executive Order of :·ray 20,
1918, by issuing its own directive, War :Oepartl!.ent Order ::o.

51,

o!'l i';ay 24, 1918, outlining the duties of the Bureau of Aircraft
Production.
Jhe 3·LU'eau of Aircraft Production: it being the intent
~,e:reof to tra.nsfer fro:::! the jurisdiction of the Si~nal
Corps to the jurisdiction of the said 3ureau of Aircr?.i't Production, every function, power and duty con. :ec. wit"'. S'"' ~d. "Jroduc t.:_·:::;n , all property· of every
s ~-:;. or ~a--uTe ·,.sed o pr cc} red for ·use in, or in con~ectio-., ·1,i _t_ sa_c. pr od· ctior. , and. the entire personnel
1 the ~i nal Corps , a s a t 'present assigned to, or

1 5u,s. President, Executive Order, "Executive Order of
I-:ay 20, 1918," The Committee on Public Inf orma. tion, r.:ay 20,
1918. (Also see Appendix IV.)
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er-_,:a ? ed_ ·u-con, :•; or~ in, or in connection with,
cluction. lo

s ·J.~'r:

p!'o-

The :r=:c ecuti ve Officer of the Bureau of Aircraft Production was
desi rrnated as the Director of Aircraft Production. In addition,
the Director was delegated to· act as Chairman of the Aircraft
Board Hhich had ~een created. by an Act of Con~ess on October 1,

1917. 1 7
Additional chans-es within the Bureau of Aircraft Production
included the appointment of W.

c.

Potter as First Assist~~~

Director of Aircraft Production. On June 22, 1918, the ~~pointment of r~. W. Kellogg as Second Assistant Director of Aircraft
Production and the appointment of R. A, Landon as Chief of the
Production Division was officially approved by the Secretary
of ·.-Ia.r. Following the9e appointments, the Division of En;,;ineering
and Research was est-3.blished_ on June 24, 1918, by the Bureau of
Airer-aft Production Ger.eral Memorandum No. 2;3. This new di visi.on
was directly subordinate to the Second Assistant Director of
Aircraft Production, and it was composed of the Airplane En~1neering Department at McCook Field, the Science · and Research .
Department, the Technical Infor~ation Department, and the Production Engineering Department.

16 :-: cFarland, ed., History of theB,A.P •. , I, 34.
1 7?or information on the Aircraft Board see Appendix

v.

CHAPTER V

PBODUCTIOi ?30G2A~

John D. Ryan a.ssum.':d the Directorship of Aircraft Prod.uct1.on
and the Chairmanship of the.Aircraft Board on May 1, 1918. Fol-

lo':1ing this, on i·1 ay 29, 1918, Mr. Hyan took cont::rol of the;:

~;1-

reau of Aircraft Production. One of the first problems he faced
was the obvious lack of co-ordination between the Airplane 1n~1-

neering Department at i•1cCook Field and the Productl.on ~n~1.ne:er1.ng
Deoartment in ~ashington, D. c., as was evidenced by the resignation of Major Gray on June J, 1918. From all lndicat1.ons, 1.t
appeared that the two departments were working against each
other, for the Production Engineering Department was ~o~plet8ly
ignorant of the activities of the Airplane Engineering Department which was certainly not conducive to establ1.shing an efficient atmosphere. 1 In order to eliminate this serio~s dilem~a,
Rya".1

asked

c.

W.

:,rash of the :-~ ash i1otors Cpmpany to come and

'.-;orlr for the Bureau and establish a plan "to central1.ze the
engineering work of Aircraft Production and co-ordinate Engl-

1 Bri5adier General 1:1. L. Kenly and John D. Ryan, "Memorand.u::n to the Chi.ef of Staff," Ju~e 6, 1918, Aeronautical Systems

Division, Documentation Division Files.

2;,IcFarland, ed., History of the B.A.P., II, 289.

statH e~ts rc~ard in ~ the ~ituation of the aircraf~ proiuction
0

pro ··rs:r. :::·ef lee ted the rl i sor:-: ~ani zed. cond it ior! of• operat tor.s.

A~ the present tl~c it is or ~anized, as I understa~ ~
t~, Nith a military dep~r ~~~~t . an engineering dcpar~:~~nt , oni a productton de p&r t men t with ~11 depart~~ ~ts
::::c.8:•: i n:-: to be a 1J.nit ·-·~th in it.:elf anc. nat,.-lrally c~1;si~ ~ the~ all to pull~~ different directions. In ~act,
~ learned t hat
in so~e of the above na~ed depart~ents,
t~~Y are pullin~ in different directions within thet=
o·:r: c1. -::_'.)o.rt·~o~t:; . ::::n c:1 y juci ~eme :'lt , this ls al.2. -.~ron;;,;
-~ ~- -~ L!- 1,1.s •~a -L ..L~u-e Iftrom th strr~
~.)
-·· - ~ ,....._
a
.J,_

_j

: :..1

0

r..,

1.., •

~he investi s at~on led by C. ~- ~ash definitely diag~o~ed
the ,~ab le ~ confronting the aircraft production program in t~e

Un i te~ States in 1918.

3owever, he failed 1n one respect, fer

:"'!~.s e;o :-::;\ents ·,-rcre :Tlacic vri ~:1out proper reference to tn.e ::;_if f icul-c ~-:::: :~ c~nc oJ:r;.terecl in first e stab l l. shin~ an aircraft prod•.,; ct lo:i

. :::,:r ::: ca:;e ac.o ut as a rosul-: o:: a cable r:;ra'.ll fro:!l the ?re:,ch
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f ollowi:1 ,- :r; :

~Y the sprln ~ o f 1?1~ , h~e~ica ~a = to plan s~ndtn ~ t o

t he French Front !J,500 airplanea, 5,000 pllota, a~1
50,000 ~cchanics ~ ith the n~cc 3 sary equipment an~ ~~rs o :1nel. 'i':·rn chousand planes and L;, 000 engln8 s ~·ro ,..11.i
l18.VC

to

oe cor.stru.ctcc. ·durin1<; tne first six months of

1918 , event~ally reac h in~ a fatal of 16,000 planes and
J0,000 ens ines not includin~ tralners.4
0 :1 :iay 2'/, 1917, a proposal for final con struct;:.·;;_ ::-;tt-

,,_at e s ~-ra.s a:);i:roved by the Joint Army anci :;avy ·r echnlca.1 3oard
in. ·,:3.shin,:-; ton. 'I'his program called for the building of 12. 000

s e rvice aircraft with

2Lf,

OOCi service en~lnes in ad.di ti.or~ to

10, 0 0 8 ~rainers and 11,000 training engines. The total com~tt-

me nt anticipated i;•;ras for 22,625 planes and 42,250 en~ines; ho--,.:rever, no dell very date '.•ras ever establtnhed. Yet, . the demand
for A:ncrtcan built airplanes and engines by the Allies ~-;as very
gre ~t, for the Germans had introduced formation flyin e in the
su~~er of 1917, demonstrating that the air war ~as not s~ ~ething
to be taken lig htly.
The proble ~ of delays pla:;u.ed the aircraft production progra=: from the bee;inning. Wtile the Bolling iHsston was 1.n :Zurope,
t~e Frercch promised to ship a Spad aircraft on July 6, 1:;17. In
a ddition, the first order for 3,000 Spads with the Curtie~ Company ~·ras cancelled before production started. These plane::; were
sche d ule d. for service at the front, but 1.nstead of bulld1.ng

co~bat atrcraft, 1,000 Spads were later produced for training

l hus it was evident that prcductton time was the most dtff ic1;l t

obstacle to overcor.ie i.n the early days of World ilo.r I.

'-'.· ::;.orrell, America's Aeronautical Effort, p. 1.
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The LUropean estimate was ten months for dest~ing, butldtne,
and testin':" before an a1.rcraft could unci.cr,zo q_uant1ty prod. 1 ~ction.

Three additional months had to be added to th1.s estimate to
allo~·r for delivery of American bu1.lt a1.rcraft a.cro!;s t'.1c Atlant1c.

Yet, despite all the problems, the f1.rst De Haviland DE-L~ a1r-

c~aft ~ore ordered into production in the United States on October 18, 1917. By 1•Iay, 1918, the f1.rst Amer1.can bu1.lt D:-r-L~
e.rrivr-;d in France, o.nd 1.n July, 1918, DH-4's made 1n the Un1.ted

States be~an reaching Europe 1.n quantity.

The s1.gnif1.cance of

this event ":·ras that quantity produced American planes were
bein~j received at the front sixty days ahead of pr.ev1.oun estimates. 5 Thus, the crit1.c1.sm of

c.

W. Nash must be 1.nterpreted as

s.n evaluation of the internal organ1.zat tonal structure of the

aircraft production program not 1.n the 11.ght of its prior accomplish~ents but in reference to the e~pans1.on of actlv1t1es
in the future.
After ini t l.ally :nak1ng his comments, i'lr. :-J"ash 1.ssued hts

m·~ recommendattons on how to improve the alrcraft prograr.1. on
the basis of his vast experience as an automotive indust~l.alist.

His suzgestions were as follows:
,-:y j"J.d.? ;ement is that you (John D. Hyan) should select
a ~an and ~ive him a title of general mana~er or ~trcctor of cn~incer1.ng and production with full a~thor':. . -'cy under you (Ryan), and subject to no· other authorl."cy.
Proj,uction plans should. follow the requests of General
?e 2-·shine; for certa1.n kinds and quant 1. t 1es of planes for
one year ahead. In ~Y jud 0 e~ent, the next move for you
{:l yaYl) to naic0 1s for your zeneral manager to locate
at Dayton with all branches of aircraft production with
5Gc rre 11, _A_r:i__e__r__i_,c__a__' s__A=e_r__o;.;;.n:;.;;a;;..;u;.;t;;.;l;;.c=-a=l--=E:.:.f.:f.::o~r~t, p. 4 •

the cxceptton of you
end of the a1rcraft.

6 (Ryan's)

offlce and the ordnance

Jash's recommendations ~·rere accepted and provlded for the

centralizatton of all engtneer1ng and research done by the ~mreau of Aircraft Production.

Thus, the Eng1.neertng and Hescarch

Divtston was created on June 24, 1918, w1th Hr. Nash servtn~ as
Assistant to the Di.rector of Aircraft Production, 1.n char~e of
Aircraft Production.
I'-~a=:;h's intentton -;•ras to disturb the ex1st1.ng productton
and

ene lneertn~ programs ~s 11.ttle as posstble. Th1.s approach

:·ms due to the need of ttme in which to enact a major transit1.on.

However, he cont1.nued to insist on the move to McCook Field
which would include the Airplane Engi.neer1.ne; Department, the
Production Engtneering Department, and the Military Aeronautics
'I'echnical Section. His plans were stated in a memorandum to

A. A. Landon, :qtrector of Productton Eng1.neer1.ng, on July 24,
1918. Yet, thare were obstacles which had· to be overcome, and
one was the establtshtng of a closer relattonship bet~·reen the
military and civilian author1.t1.es controlling the aircraft
production program.?
After the creation of the Bureau of Aircraft Production.

t:r.e necessity for a better :-mrktng rela.t1onsh1p between the
Bureau and the Diviston of ~~1.litary Aeronautics appeared greater.
'I'he

initial ::neet 1.ng to ensure thts agreement was he_ld by John

D. Ryan and Brigadier General W. L. Kenly on June 9, 1918.
,

b;,1c?arland, ed., 7I1.story of the 3.A.P. , II, 290.
?captain H. H. Blee, Hlstc ·,- o t1e G_~ ~n.n znt~0 n. ••...:
Activities of the Alrol::me ~~nrr . .'"•P-rin- J~1 t sl.ort (110.aril.n
re.s.u of Aircraft Pro(luct1.on, 1919 , pp. l ? - 21 .
•

1

J8
Eom,~7 cc , ~he dee i:; ior: of th ls conf ere nee did not clearly rlef ine

the specific jurisdiction of t~e 3ureau or the Dlvlcion of
~ilitary Aeronautics.

The clarification of duties wa3 later

established and presented in a memorandum to the Chief o: Staff
on A~sust 1, 1918, and this statement concentrated on the tech.

~

nical and engtneerin~ problems which might be encountere~.u
·i.' he essence of the a.sreement between the Bureau of 1-.lrcraft Production and the Division of ~111tary Aeronautics could
be st be iescribed as a liaison between user, designer, and pro-

duce:r.

1;nd.er th ts plan. the Techn teal Sect ion of the Di ~r 1.:; ion

of ;,:ilitary Aeronautics would submit all lnformati.on for the
d e si!n or modification of airplanes, engines, and accessories
to the Airplane Engineering Department of the Bureau.

The co~-

pleted design was then forwarded to the Technical Sectio~ before
fouT test ~odels were built, one model going to the Alrpla~e

En ~l.neerin~ ~epartment, two ~odels to the Technical Section,
and one model for sand test1.ng.

The tested models were then

assi s ned written approval by the Technical Section.

After

approval i:•ms attatned, the
A1.rplane Engi.neer1.ng
Depa.rt:0.ent
'
.
would. ;nai{e arrarn5ements for mater le ls and standard1.zat 1.on of
drawin g s after- which the model would be turned over to the Production Eng1.neer1.ng Department.

The Production Englneerin~

:Je pa~t11ent, however, had no authorlty to make changes 1.n the
:7':c::e 1 ~-~i thout first consult 1.ng the A1.rplane Eng1.neer1.ns Depart-

~e nt w~ich in turn would recort to the Technical Section for
B-..•.c 'Q
. . ar 1 an d , e d . , History of the B.A.P •• II, 292-293 •
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f L:al o.pproval.

Ir. 2.rld.i t ion to the e stb.bl i sri~nent of an ope rat ic.nal pr0cGdurc plan for the 3ureau of Aircraft Production and~~~
Division of Jilitary Aeronautics, a memorandum was issued on
A1F1:ust 1, 1918.

The me,:1orandu:n called for the co:r.binat ton of

t ., . : e j ~ffee.u of Aircraft Prod.uction and the Dl.v1.s1.o::--. of .-~1.lttar::r

Aeronautics.

This order T,1as carried out later on AU f'.0.lSt 27,

191 8 , as John D. ?.yan was appointed to the position of hS3istant

~ecretary of War and Director of the Air Service.

Thls organiza-

tional chan~e gave the Air Service the prestige ~t needea. 10
The memorandum of August 1, 1918, also mirrored the plans
of

c.

r;ash, to concentrate alrcraft productlon work in Dayton.

~,J.

Nash stated:

To a ssure the proper cooperation between the two or3anlzations, the Technica1 ·section and the Alrplane
En ~ineeri~s Depart~ent, as well as to provide the~
~ith pro9er facilltles for carrytng on their work in
an efficient manner, they shall locate at Dayton. Ohio,
near Wilbur iJright and. AcCook Fields.11
The sug~estions of Mr. Nash had obvtously been taken seriously.

~he industrialist's enthusiasm was reflected in a letter

to John D. ~yan dated August 9, 1918.
?~r t

- '•;ant ... o

~:..;J tha~ ~Y plan to centralize as soon
~y~o~, Ohio , has met with very little
op G~i~ion .
~he· Ta~ortty Lnt ere3ted agree that lt tc
rl ~~ ~ove .
That naturally make3 me very happy.12

~c LO~sible at

5'ollo',,ing a trip to :Jayton in mid-August, i1r. r-rash not if led

/ .::..1.e:e, Airolane Eno;inecrin;z Divlsi.on, pp. 2J-26.
l')~lt'1- , d .,

p. 27 •

llMcFarland, ed., _TT__i_s_t_o_r__.y__o_f_...;t_l_1 ~a..:.•.::.:A::.:·:.::P:..:.., I I , 2 94 •
e;;;_J

12 Ibid., p. 298.

Llcntenant Colonel 'lincent, Ch1.ef Eng1.neer of the Airplane
En ~ineerin~ Department, that a new Airplane ~n~lnccrln~ ~Lvi~1on
of v-·, r) Sureau of Aircraft Production had been created.

:i::r:e com-

ponents of the new division were the old Airplane Engineering

and Production En,~tneer~n!?; Depart:nents.

Lieutenant Color~el

Vincent was also told a~ this tlme that he was to take C6arge

of the reor,csanizat ton 1 n Dayton, Ohio.

It was further a:~ded ln

the corn:nunique that the personnel and property of the i'roductl.on
Ens ineoring Department would be transferred immediately to
.Jayton.

The Bureau of Aircraft Product ion issued General ~-:e::ioranduT. {': o. 166 on September 13, 1918, announctn~ the official creation of the Airplane 3nglneering Divlston.

The state::ient told

of the organizations wh1ch were comb1.ned to form the Division
on Au,~ ust 31, 1918, under the direct ion e:>f C. W. Nash.

'I•he

orders also defined the duties of the Airplane Eng1.ncerins
Division as being

11

charged with complete supervision of all

eng ineering for the Eureau of Aircraft Production. 111 3

Ll.euten-

ant .: olonel '/incent was designated as Chief of the Airplane

Enc;ineerl.ng Dlvl.sion with the title of,!!Chlef Engineer."

Colo-

nels. D. Waldon was made "Associate Chief of Eng1.neer1.ng." In
keepinG with the proposed move of the Production Engineering
~Je;Dart -::~nt, ~he memorandum announced that the. new headquarters
fo:r the Product ion En~Ln.eering Department would be located in
the Air Service 3ul.lding, Dayton, Ohio.

Laitly, the orders

stated. that the Airplane Engineering Division would hereafter
1 J:-1cF ar 1 and , e d • , _I-i_i_s_t_o_r__.y.__o____f __t_h__e____B_.-'A__• P
___., I I , 30 0 •
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:'EE AIRPLA!':E El1GI1TEE?..E!G Dii.TISIO~-T ,.n !•:CCOO'K FI~D

Follo-:•rinc: the official creation of the Airplane .2n:,;ineer1ng
Division on September 13, 1918, a new organizational system was
developed for the Division at Dayton, Ohio, The CO:l"p0:r:.ents of
t}ie sy.s ter.: were Experirr.en tal Engineering, Production 2:n~ineering,
and Business and Military, and these were known as the subdivisions of the Airplane Engineerin~ Division.
The Experimental Engineering facility 1·ras located e. t :recook
Field. :·Tajor H.

c.

?1armon was mad.e the Chief of Experimental

Ensineerin~. The duties of this subdivision included:
••• all airplane en~ineering up to the point of release
for :production, administration of engineerin[! anc ezperi~ental wor1-: done under contract by co!Ill!lercial orp;a.nizations, and operation of the General Draft:.1r.::
P.oom, Airplane Factory, !·1athine Shop, Laboratory, anc.
E:q:,erimental Flyinl! Field.
This second subdivis.ion was formed from the old Frod.;__i_ct1on
Z:r,zineering Department and was called simply Production En,r,i~eerin~, under the new system. The headquarters for Production
Engineering was in the A,ir Service Building in downtown Dayton,
Ohio, and Mr. J. F. HcClelland assumed the leadership of the
ne1:lr organized group, Production Engineering was respor~s1'ble
for:
Airplane Engineering or. all work that is in production,
1KcFarland, ed., History of the B.A.P., II, JOO.

••• r:iaintB.ininf?: the only Official Point of Contact he:-

~1een the Airplane En~ineering Division and the Pr01u~tion Di vision, for the purpose of hand.lin~ all enr~i~eerin~ orders, records and information, and for this

:purpose, Prod.uction Enc:ineerin~ is authorized to r:iaintain enxineerin~ reuresentatives for specific job3 in
the Disfrict ori1ce;,, .. providing a referee for ~11 apulica tions for enr;ineerin.i:: chB.n~es proposed on work in·
proc.uc ti on, • , • es tahlishinri; a channel throur,;h which
Enr.rineerj nP- Cha·r1;res a.re transmitted. to the :r..~nufacturers, • : , a'.c tin~.,.9.S custodian of 11as.ter Dra.wine;s and
Suecification ~ecords for all production jobs, ••• continuint to be the sole a 0 ent for the preparation and
distribution of specification~,•••and operating the
Airplane Materiel Laboratory.
The third part of the subdivision system was the Business

and Military group also operating from the Air Service Building
in downtown Dayton. The Chief of the Business and Military subdivision was Captain H. E. Blood. Captain -Blood functioned in
this capacity as Executive Officer of the Airplane Engineering
Division. The main responsibility of the personnel of Business
and :•iili tary was the issuance .of General Orders, Special Orders,
and Instructions to the Airplane Engineering DiVision.
7he Bureau of Aircraft Production on September 12, 1918,
announced the contents of General Memorandum No. 164. The ir.1portance of this order was that it qualified within the fraT:iework of the new organizational system the relationship of the
Airplane Engineering Division and the Production Division of the
Army Air Service. (This Production Division was not the same as
the Production Engineering group at McCook Field.) The text of
the menorandum further asserted the complete authority held by
the Airplane Engineering Division over aircraft engineering. HoweYer, the Production Division was charged with "conducting all
2McFarland, ed •. , History of the B.A.P., II, JOl.

----

relations with contractc concernin~ eng1neer1n~, production, and
inspection, exceptinr.; only experimental work • .,3
In an attempt to maintain ~ore efficient production plans,
Joint Conferences were held in Dayton, Ohio, from time to ti~e.
The purpose of these meetings was to facilitate decisions on the
various questions affectin~ engineering and productio~ ~nd thorouc;hly coordinate the wor~~ of the Engineering and Production
Divisions and the Technical Section of the DiYision of ::1.lit..a.ry
Aeronautics. The Joint Conferences were held on the seventh
floor of. the Air Service Building in Dayton. (lTo)-r known as the
Knott Building.) The use of the conference technique and the
general organization in Dayton was deemed very satisfactory by
Lieutenant Colonel L.

s.

Horner, Chief of the Executive Staff

of the Bureau of Aircraft Production, while he was at ?'icCook
Field for meetings on September 17-18, 1918.
An addition to the ever f;TOi'Ting aircraft production facility in Dayton, Ohio, was suggested on August 20, 1918. At that
tirJ.e a letter was sent from the Office of the Chief of Ordnance
to the Director of the Bureau of Aircraft Production asking his
opinion of the proposed transfer of Ordnance Engineers and ·
DTafts~en to Dayton. It had been contemplated that if Ordnance
personnel were able to work more closely with the aircraft
sr:.-;::ineers greater efficiency ·would be attain~d in the de~ign
and installation of bo~b suspensions and bomo sights.

~he final decision regarding the move to Dayton was reached
after a meeting on September 18, 1918, which concluded thats
Jv
~. a_,..1 an d , e d • , History of the B.A.P., II, J02 •
.i'!C.t'

.:_~ ~- -: -~-.._~s , bo;::b

0e:-.,sories "he

Asncrsi ons, ~o~hs, and otter s i~i: ~r ~c2r~anently locat e~ at Dayton and coop~r-

Airpl8..ne En~ineerin~ Division an~~~~
\·Ji th tb
Tec ::--"nic.al Sec ~on of the Division of Kilitary Aer0.....-:
...
L~
.,au .1-.;
l,..:. c::;.

8.. ti:r:3

I t was also decid
SectioYJ. of the E·

at this meetin~ tha.t the Aircraft !1.. r:--B.::::ent
neering Division, Ordnance Departr_r;en t, s:-.ould

be located at Dayton in the Expori~e~tal Englneerin~ Jepart~en~
of ~he Airplane Engineerins Division. Follo~ing the directions

of th e teet i~g of Sept~ ~ber 18, 1918, the Armament S ection le1t
':-=>,.::: ,-,i n :; ton for Dayton on Oc t ober 3, 1918, and established o:pe:r-8.-

:1:2.nci. of the activities ,yf' the Arm8.r:sn t Se ction a.t !,recook ::;-ield.
ihus , with the arrival of the 1~rrnament Section, the las-;; ad-

di -:.1-o:r: to the experimental facilities at Dayton, Ohio, prior to
the Ar:!'.istice on ~r ovember 11, 1918, was completed.5
/:.

·::cFarland, ed., 5istory of the :~ .A.P., II, 308.
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.

_,, ,?~-:e follm: h:s table lists the total personnel at :-:~Coo:-:
?is:'..j_ ar:d in Dayton 1·ri thi n ~he three depe.rtments of the l:..irpl8.~e
2nfi~eering Divisio~.
Officers

Enlisted

~i i!ilian

:2=•::-:ie:r-i ri.en tal
=::.., :·S. :"lee:-ing

14

1335

::.rod.uc t i on

26

330

~~!lf:::~ ~:eeri11g

: ~~s ~ness and
;.:::.. l i to.:ry

:!. 2

':Lu t s.l

58

. 'cFa:rland, ed. ,

385

250

1915
of the 2,.A.P.,

356

II, 309.
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ENGIEEERING ACEIEVET IE!':TS AT !:CCOOK FIELD
1

I::i analyzing the contributions to the aviation pro,:ra"l: at
I·:cCoo1r Field, it becoYo.es r..ecef~sary to '.J.nde:rstan1 the u:r,derlyinr::

attitude in which the work was conducted at the faatJi~y. Lieutenant l.eed L. Parker released a discussion of ~!1li 'sary Ad;-::1inist::ra tion at r,IcCook Field on December 16, 1918, which co~re::.i:-e:d
the period of operations · from October 18, 1917, to :·: ovember

25,

1918, In his report, Lieuten9.nt Parker revealed some interesting
facts.
:::ccoolr Field wo.s to he 8.dr.1.inistE:red in the sa!:le rr2.r~r1er
as the Sic;nal Corps Gener8.l Supply Depots, Ar~:r ?ecru.-..!. 9. -'-.
r,
l
..., •
• ,;•:as t O •ce exvl ons ,.
.·: 0, 1_ 91 S \.,a t eQ, l,."18. -1-v T'
.·:Cv
00.K
.t' l e 1 Q
e~p ted frorn co~trdlby t~e Secretary of ~ar. Also, Ez- ·
ecutive Order dated 'October 13, 1917, placed all the
perso:r.s ~t --ccoo.~ unc-:.;!" C"c. e dule /1:•. of the Civil Ser•rice c:.·J:r _n: the i•m ~:::. .:.c:" _; t~ ted. that classified. "".)OSiti ·1.s 1•;ou_cl be e:-:e -:"'ted _~ o:- coBpeti tive exa:!!inatio:1s.
Ir c0-::pliance -::ri ti1. ~ .. c. ":''O::> • interpreta~ion of the
-'.;e'!'~ desi_ ed by the Equ~l, '.:! nt Di vision, I(cCook Field
fro.: t~.,.;; firct ··l""S considere d a business 1nsti tution
i,ather than a :'.lilitary post or station.1 '
J...

-.-a th

.!.. \

this infor:r:ia tion in r.iind.,

8.

discussion of the technical

a.cco:.'1plish~ents at !-1cCook Field oec~!D.es much more meaningful •

.,_,as the desi~ of the USAC-1 (l:SA.-Combat-1), This program
1 !~i:--::-::lane :::~~:inccrin1::, :':Ji vision, "~ecord of Hili tary Ad.~i:'.l.is tra tion at I•IcCool{ Field, Dayton, Ohio," December 16, 1918.
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-:-.:he

went into the desi~n of this aircraft, and this additic~al ef-

fort ri;:reatly facilitated the devclop!'nent of the US!:.C-2 ~-~?lic;-i
ir,c ol'nor8.tec the s treaT:"lined design of a veneered fu:::::e18 f~ c.

nression Lic,erty 12A enrd::,e. For experimen:.al ·;, 1.:.rpose3 tr.e air-

i ,'"".':!'18.tion-was cr.anp;ed to t h e USD-9-A. Se ·1eral distinc~ive uesi['$n fsa tures were incorporated into the USD-9-A hy ~-~';oc'-c

2n c; incers. Thre e such innovations were the Nelson Gun Con":r •;:,
the Loo~is Coolin~ Systen, and the ~cCook Field Gasoline System.
After all the chang es had been made, an additior..al J,000 drm Ti:ng s were accumulated ·oefore the USD-9-A v7as ree.dy for produc-

tion.
?ollo~in? work on the De Haviland aircraft, the ~cCook

enJ ineers ~esan the sa~e redesi s n operations on another Sritish
aircraft, the Bristol Fighter Model F-2-B. The major difference
bet":~sen the 3ristol and the De 3aviland was that the former used
s.. JOO h orsepower EiBpano-Suiza engine versus the Liberty 12r•• 3
'f'~:e ·_,:1e:-ican version of the F-2-3 was designated the USXB-1

"\·r :r:ic:, irj,cor~ora ted a s imilar s trearuined three-ply veneer-ed
f~sel s se like the USAC-2 besides steel landing gear.
?:i y

Y::ic.-June, 1918, another aircraft had become the center
of the B.A.P., II,

JlJ.

)3. D. 3eron, -1sto y of t re ircraft Piston En~ine (Detroit:
Et:-i_yl Corporation, 196 J , pp . 15- 16 .

of ac ti vi ty at McCook Field. ·'I'his airplane was the Vought ~•:osea ter advanced trainer built by the Louis and Vought ']orporation of Long Island City, New York. The objective of tr;e work
on the Vought Trainer was very much the same as had been done
in the past involvin 0 redesigning the aircraft prior to standardization for quantity production.
:-Tuch has already been said in reference to the red.esign ot:
aircraft at McCook Field, but specifics of this op~rat1on were
as impor-cant as the contributions. All the work of a.ircraft redesign was done by the Plane Design Section. The staff of this
section included: J. A. Roche, Plane Design Engineeri George
L. j';TcCain, Final Design Engineer: and E. J. Tubbs, Chief DraftsL.an. Of the many important achievements of the Plane Desi~n
Section, several were definite milestones in the development
of aeronautical engineering. They were:
••• the standardization of drawings of the Liberty 8cylinder engine for quantity production, ••• the design
of the sin~le cylinder and two cylinder Liberty test
en 0 ines for the engine testin0 laboratory, ••• the
Liberty epicyclic reduction gear under the direction
of A. Moorhouse and w. R. Griswold, ••• the Nelson Gun
~ontrol for synchronizing machine gun fire through
the propeller disc, ••• propeller design for experireental and production purposes for combat and training planes, ••• and the standardization of Utility
Farts and the preparation of the Standard Book for
all work on engines and planes done by American
plane manufacturers and Government departments.4
Another facility concerned with the new aviation techniques
a.t ~CcCook Field was the Experir.-.ental Factory. This orBanization
w.s.s responsible for all shop work conducted at McCook, and 1 t
included a yrood shop, a metal shop, an assembly shop, and a
4

McFarland, ed., History of the B.A.P., II, 316.

dope shop. Under the leadership of H. L. Bill from October~ 1917,
to February, 1918, and

c. F.

Simmons from February, 1912,

through the duration of the war, the Experimental Factory a:17'.assed

lone list of contributions. Basically, its achieve:nents

e.

tncludecl the desi~n and construction of all types of airplanes
and airplane engines, but, spec1f1cally, these planes ~ere the

us ~'\.C-1, the USD-9-A, the USB-1, the USXB-1, and the U37.~~-2. The
machine shop of the Experimental Factory accounted for en~1nes
ran ginP.; in size from the one cylinder Liberty test engine to the
twenty-four cylinder Liberty en~ine. The Nelson Gun Control was
also built in this same machine shop under the direction of the
Plane Desien Section.
The Aeronautical Research Laboratory at McCook Field was
established under Lieutenant Alexander Klemin in November, 1917.
The initial purpose of the lab was "to act as a service department for other departments at McCook Field."5 The Hassachunetts
Institute of 7echnology Aerodynamical Laboratory later be~an
conductin~ experiments under the direction of the Aeronautical
Researc!'l Laboratory at 11cCook. Th1s co-ordination of effort led
to the development of the first sand loading tests undertaken
in t:11s country. The sand loadin.~ tests eventually becar.-.e the
~ost significant achievement of the laboratory. This type of
testin.i::; 1·1as outstanding ~ecause it enabled the eneineers to simu~s. te ir.-rlie::nt stress throue;h the superposition of wei e;hts
,·rhich

d.~ d. :-:mch

to eliminate the errors of designers that could

be detected by conventional means. The two most crucial aspects
5Mc?arland, ed., Sistory of the B.A.P., II, 318.

50
of the flip;ht · on an airpla.ne involved the conciderRt1on of lift
a nd clra,: which applied to the aspects of a steep dive and provided a series of conditions whereby sand load testin~ c~1ld be
utilized satisfactorily. The tests of this type ~rere continued.
un til a ri.aximum stress level was achieved, thus assuri n~~ a rr.inimurr. of problems durine; actual flit';ht. '!.'he Aeror..auticB.l ?..esearch
Laboratory also conducted the first performance tests at :~cCook
Field, This later expanded into materiels testing wo~:r. The laboratory, in addition to its other activities, began -.ii v.:: tunnel
tests at · HcCook which led to the establishment of an actual
flyinp- aerodynamic laboratory.
~he Mechanical Research Department was founded on December

5, 1917, the same time operations of the Airplane Ens ineerin~
Department officially began at nccook. The most s1 0 nif1cant
achi evement of this department during the war was the desi ;;~n
and construction of the cooling system for the Liberty en~ine
by Allan Loomis. The system was incorporated into coTibat air-

craft at the front, and it bore the name of its inventor, the
Loorr.is Cooling System. Hr. Loomis also originated as a~curate
method for designing and constructing airplane cowlings ~nd.
fusela ges.6
F. G. Hahl, a research and metallur1g1cai engineer, supervised the experimentation of the Chemical and Physical Laborator:i..es at :~cCook Field., Under the leadership of, Mr. ::ahl, this
laboratory ran ~..any tests on aviation fuels, lubricating oils,
and nete.ls and special alloys. The 1ngenu1 ty of the chemists
,..

0

McFarland, ed., History of the B.A. P., . II, 326-327.
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was put to the test in attemptin~ to formulate a reliable blend
fo:- aviation :fuel. However, it was later dsico,rered tr..a.t the

real problem was with spark plugs used in the aircraft en~ines.
Thus, an intense series of tests was begun to determine the
durability of spB.rk plugs which remained the laboratory's

!!;.OSt

itrporte,nt contributio!). to the experi::-:iental aviation pro~an.
l'he En,r:ine Assembly and Testing Depart:r.!ent represented
still another aspect of McCook Field activities. Captain L. M.
Woolson and his small staff were provided with the mod.erYJ. facilities- and were prepared to conduct tests of any type or. aviation engines. These tests included work done on such accessories
as radiators, ~asoline systems, i~nition systems, and heatins
and liehting systems. Work was conducted on both engines r.i.anu-

factured at McCook and eneines produced by private companies
and sent to Dayton for general acceptance testing and overhaul.

The extensive testing and development which went into the construction of the NcCook Field Gasoline System stood out

a3

an

excellent example of the work of the Engine Assembly and Testing
:Jepe,rtmen t.
The r.:ccook Field Gasoline System utilized a pump system
of supplying gasoline to the carburetors from a main supply
ta.n~:. ':'his innovation eliminated the need for air pressure in

the fuel sys·tem, thus greatly reducing the fire haze.rd :f':i:-om
fuel lea1r...age. Through the work of this department the povre:::output and ov-erall efficiency of the Liberty engine was 1rrproved
to the point of perfection.
The Propeller Research Department was originally part of

52
the Pla,ne Desip;n Section which had been transferred fror.1 'tlash-

in_c-:;ton in the au.turnn of 1917. Th13 department was fcrt 11na te to
have F. ~·J. Caldwell, a nationally lr..nown aeronautical enriineer
formerly with the Curtiss Aeroplane I,iotor Company, as its chief.
The main responsibility of the departMent called for the developri.ent of propellers for both the Army Air Service and the ::6.7J1 •
~he research of the department included design, numerous full
flight tests, and destructive whirling tests. Experi~ents in
tip::_:,ine propellers was carried out with such !l".a.teriels as copper, bre,ss, pigskin, and lime. 'l'hese products were used to protect tl".e wooden propellers against abrasion while aluminum
served as a protective coating against moisture. In the spring
of 1918, an interesting research program was begun through the
introduction of the Seth Hart variable pitch propeller. This
e:.:perimentation, in turn, led to the contemplation of a revolutionary all steel propeller.
Armament research at I1cCook Field was under the direction
of the Aircraft Armament .Section, Office of the Chief of Ordnance. 7 A. L. lJelson i•Tas the representative of the Aircraft
Ar!'.'8.ment Section at HcCook. He ":·ras an engineer of great experience ·who had gone to Europe shortly aft~r the United States had
e::itered the war. His purpose there became the study of aircraft
ar!"'."Bment with particular attention being devoted to the problem
of s ynci".,:ronizine; the fire of fixed machine guns through the
propeller. !The Nelson Gun Control, which was designed and. built
2.. t

IIcCool--:, was easily the :rr.ost important work done by this
?McFarland, ed., History of the B.A.P., II, 330.
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depctrtment and possibly ranked as one of the most siry.ificant
achicvenents of the United States irl the area of aircraft ordn8.nce durin2: the war.

In addition to the Nelson Gun Control, the Ar:"laner..t Section
c.olivcred the "single sl'iot trigger," 'I'his device, when used on
the :~arlin, Vickers, and. 3ro:·:n~n~~ machine e;uns, reduced. tc a
nininun the nechanical defects incurred while firins ~t certain
critical speeds. However, the importance of the 1:elson Gun Control could not be overestimated. This new synchronizer replac~d
the older Constantinesco system i-rhich utilized a · pressure timing
device which synchronized the firing of the gun with the rotation of the propeller. The main objection to the Constantinesco
system was that it could not be used with four blade propellers
because of the fluctuation of the pressure device at high speeds.
l~elson overcame this difficulty with the use of a mechanical
device Nhich was found suitable for both the two and. the four
blad.e :9ropellers. Research on the !~els on Gun Control was also

conducted in conjunction with tests on aircraft am::unition
under the direction of Professor R.

c.

Tolman of the U:niirersity

of Illinois.
All flying done at ! !cCook Field 't·Tas of an experir::ental
1

natu:r·e and "lras conducted under the authority of the Director of
?lyL:. --:, :,:ajor A. D. Smi tr-; ·,ra.s tc1e first Director, and he was

co:'lsid.ered. to be one of the best aviators in the Arrri;:_r 8.t tr.at
ti:":'le. :~ajor S:mi th held the position until the spring of 1918
at which time he was injured in an accident. His replacenent
':-:as

c. s. Brage;, a former race driver turned aviator. Shortly

thereafter, Brae;e; was commissioned a Captain and sent to ~urope.
The last Director of flying before the Armistice was italph De
Palr.ia, another former race driver. Thus, it could be ~aid that
a trend in the type of people who flew aircraft at that ti-:ne
was being established, at least those who flew experimental
aircraft. 8
All test:Jo flown at !,: ccook Field were submitted to the
Director of Flying throueh the Full Flight Com.mi ttee. The ~u9.li ty of the flying done at NcCook was verified by the fa.ct that

there were no casualities and very few accidents - due to flying
from the opening of the field to the Armistice. Flight tests of
every type were flown including tests of experimental and. production planes~ engine tests, as well as tests of propellers,
radiators, carburetors, ignition systems; standard. and special
instruments, parachutes; and accessories. In addition to t l",e
actual testing of an airplane or piece of equipnent, the opinions of the pilot, observer, and mechanic played a very i~portant part in arriving at a valid evaluation of the article being
tested.
Due to the volume of work conducted by the Experimental
Engineering Departnent at HcCook Field, many of the projects
were, out of necessity, done under contract. These contra.cts
1·:e!'e ackinistered by the Airplane Engineering Division with

private engine~rin~ orr,;ar..iza tions. Auth9ri ty for su.c::i ac ti vi ty
~•; as t":-: e

Experimental :Sngineering Department as McCook and. the

business headquarters of the Airplane Engineering Division.
'
8
;,r cFarland, ed., History of the B.A.P., II, 332-333.

crmtro.ct

+'
C.J;.

Y'.onoplctne tHo-seat fL:;hter,

the ~~artin bor.foer, and the ·✓ 01..;.p;ht

'
. ...,ra.iner.
. .
.,9
ac.vo.ncea
I~ the sprin~ of 191 8 , the ?echnlcal Fublicatio~s 8n~ Li-

t ~2 Division. ~hes e early oneratio~s were later ex~anded into

and do~estic articles and publications

regarding aerona~t~cal

achiGvenents but also published reports covering the activities
of'

;:;he

experi!!lental ene;ineers at McCook.

~ublication work at f~Cock ~ield was increased under Capv,-.. . ..... ~ J

·'--,-:,;

V"

E. E . 2 lee in the !or~ o~ the 3 ulletin of the Ez~cri-~~t~l

Jc~nr t ~ent , Airnla~e 3n~ineer in~ Division. ?his was a ~c~t~ly

::;.?..i::,ed national recosn ition .-r'he·:1 the i:ational Advisory ':c:;;:~it1

-::;3e fo:r· Aeronautics r.;ave :r.otice of the

valuable cont::::-l bution

~- .: 3--:-:e:, ti 0:1: to tne !)irec tor of Aircraft Production, John 0 .

~-·-_c.

:::..1:::r2-r:'...es after the :·,ar ... lO In :-:eeping with the scientific
0

/:IcFarland, ed. , ~is tory 0f tr,e
'

.

.:.v:i:.oid., p.

34 J.

II, 335.

atmosphere a.t the field, the :-~ccook Field Aeronautical ?.eference -Li brary was enlarged in 1:ovember, 1918, to include "700
technical reference books, 200 pa~phlets, and. 42 aeronautical
and technical magazine subscriptions." 11 Thus, it could be
ea sily be seen that every endeavor was being made to keep experimentation and research up to date in Dayton.

An important aspect of experi~ental aircraft constru~tion
was

the use of new 11".a teriels and fittings. The responsi "hili ty

for investi gating the potential of new products was that of
J.

s. :-: cGregor and his Hateriels Engineering Department. Ori-

e inally, ?•:a teriels Engineering was to consist of e. group of

s pe cialists, each covering a particular ·materiel or group of
materiels. However, this type of organi,z ation had not been completed by the time of the Armistice. An additional duty of this
department was to serve as a clearing house for all the specifications to parts lists which involved providing a .r.ieans of
cross checking the specifications with those held by each independent organization in regard to the particular materiel
utilized.
The Ordnance Department followed much the same organizational evolution as did the Production Engineering Department
under whose authority 1 t was originally located. In the early
days at :•1cCook Field, it i':'as known as the Ordnance Section of
the Production Engineering Department, Equipment Division. At
tr.at ti r:-:e, the Section was responsible for the "designing of
gun ~ouhtings, cartridge chutes, gunsight mounts, and such
lL.
, F ar1 an d , e d • , History of the
i•:c

B.A~P., II, 345.
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Af ~c ~ the foun tlins of the ?ureau of Aircraft ?ro~~c~io~

G

2 l: planes with

~~e

..

.,.,

oris~~al desi ~~ for sue~ installations

A~ather forrner section of the old Production E~~inee~i~ ~
~epart~ent, Zquipment Division, was the Ins~rument Depar~~ent
e.t · ·cco ol-: :<'ield,
~eco~c ~h e

~

-

::::: .

,.

To:>. ?ra:1k 3cnlesinger founded what \-r&.s

t:.o

Instrument ~eua rtment in February, 1918. :he ez ~sri-

c 7 ~rland, ed., ?istory of the B.A.P., II,

348.

instruments, This maintained a valuable service to thosP; parties
who were :not well acquainted with airplane requirements.
In January, 1918, the Electrical Equipment Section of the
Production Engineering Department was or12;anized by R.R. Stuart.
After the creation of the Airplane Engineering Division, its
desi 0 nation was chan,:;ed to the Electrical and. Radio Depa.rtment
of Production Engineering, The main duty of the departrr.ent wa.s
to act as liaison between the Airplape Engineering Division and
the Division of Military Aeronautics. Its function 1n this cape.city was to obtain from the Division of !1111 ta.ry Aeronautics
"dat& and specifications of radios to be applied to each type

of plane and to direct installation, on planes, both experimental and production·, 111 5 Other activ1 ties of the Electrical
and P.adio Department were to provide specifications for the
purpose or · using lamps on all planes, to specify proper wires
and wirine; for switch panels and switches, to test and check
all heating and lighting generators, and to install all heating
and lighting equipment on planes.
'

?he Airplanes Department of Production Engineering was
responsible for all airplanes either at 11cCook Field or ordered
for ~roduction~ The engineers of this department were assigned
to the various plants where the planes were being produced.
Each sroup of en5ine~rs was given jurisdictiop over a specific
;,lane. The authority of,these engineers was limited to acting
as a liaison for general engineering supervision and interpretation of specifications for the manufacturers. Since the war
l5McFarland, ed., History of the B,A.P., II, 352,

59
ended sooner than expected, much of the assigned work for the
engineers of the Planes Department was curtailed. Only in a
feH cases were the ene;ineerc able to follow their specific

plane completely through production. However, despite the limited use of the pror::ram, the technique of providing enB1neerin~
support from Production Engineering was considered very satisfactory and an effective means for maintaining production schedules.
The development of the American military aviation pro,z-ram
during ·.-rorld War I was a difficult and complex procedure. Yet,
despite the anxieties and frustrations associated with the program, the accomplishments could be described by no other term
than rnagni,ficent. AI!lerican aviation had come a long way from
the Signal Corps Aviation Section and the Bolling Mission of
the summer of 1917, to the complex system of the Army Air Service in November, 1918. The mere fact that so much had been accomplished proved that the United States could develop a military air fleet, and furthermore America would never again lag
behind the other nations of the world in aviation.

Y.>lic8-tion at So.ndy 'Took,

:•:ff1T

Jcrr,ey, in 1912. ':Ie ser7u1 ·:·':.th

the nth cavalry durin 0 the ::exican ~:z:pedition in 191.1:,,

8.Y-:cl

8.t

that time, he became interested in the use of aircraft for
reco~~a iss an ce work.

re-.r. .<JJ:.

1
-::.

rece i ve d apprc?a~ tc
~

:'or duty e. s tl-'"1e .!tvia. tion School at l'Iorth IslB.:.r:d ,

37en before ~e received his wings,

S8..Y-1

Bane was appoi~ted ~s-

sist0.1:.t Secretary of the A':Tiation School in If:a.rch,

1917. as

t~ ere Kasa critical need for officers with previous ~ili~~ry
service L.'.1 the A.viatio!",. Section. In June, 1917, Lieuten8.r.t ~8.ne

,:8.s c_l:.i te evident to :11im that "/i.rr)erican a via ti on could : .)t :-;;.d-

0

v~~cs ~ ore ra~idly than ics theoretic~l knowled~e an1 t8c~n1cal

~e be~an ar, intensified study of

1

~..:-:-:.~;? ::istoric.s.l :-'ic ses.rc!'l Studies Institute, "B :t0·-r:::.1.p :-iical

.S~-::2 .. c::r. of
r. ~~8~~:'.:-l~~..~ ,

Color:el Thu.r:r.an 5. Jane," If:axr.-rell Air Force ; ase,
:i..957, P• 2.

a eronautics and desi~n for the Aviation School. After the introd.uc tio~ of his cou.rs e,

=~8.~8

wis also r-:o.de officer

~n

char;~e of

triG e:cperir::ental shops at ::orth Island.

~a ne's exceptional ability brou~ht r~pid advanc0~ont for
h i~. In October, 1917, he was promoted to the rank of li~ut8nant

colonel 1r..d. transferred to · !.8.f: 'ni nr-'.:ton, :). r;. , where he z errsrJ. a~
0

h i2 a9poi~ tm.ent to the Technic3.l B card.,

he '1Tcrn :rr.P...d.s 2zecu ti ve

Officer of the Air .J i vision of the Sie:n0.1 Corps, anc!. in '.~a.-J ,
1918, Lieutenant Colonel Bane became Chief of the Technic~l

Sectlcn of the :i1ivision of ~"!ilitary Aeronautics.

technical specifications for all rnilitary aircraft and equip~ent.
I:.ri his work, he was required. to maintain close coopera. t i on ,;,ri th

t h e 3 ure,9.U of Aircraft Production. In August, 1918, Thurrnan
2arse 1·ras :;i~omoted to the rank of colonel, and shortly 'chereaf ter,
he ~-:-as assi~ned. to temporary duty at HcCook Field as the chief

rep!'e.se~tative of the Technical Section of the :Jivision of ;":Tilit2~rY Aeronautics. Thus,

it ':ias an excellent decision to :::ake

Colonel 3ane the first, post-,;-1ar commander of :-:ccook Field,
~er h i s experience ir. the area of aircraft engineerir!-:;:- a~1d re-

lated production techniques was of inestirr.able value to the
future of ~cCock Field.
-~ r: •,
!. ove~oer,

or

• 9lrc,
.L

-: olonel Bane ':ra~ caught in the turmoil

-:he post-,:,rar reor::,;s.nization, for in fl:l.ct, he was ser\1'in 0 two

r-:?.sters si:,nul ta:neously. As Chief of the Airplane 3:ngineE:rine;
:ii vision,

he was responsi-ole to the 3ureau of Aircraft Production

n7d as C½ief of the Technic~l Section, he was ans~er~bl~ to

d. i ~~ turb ed by the confusion of tr.e orr-,;anizatl or.al s true -ture be-

c ci.usc he -r:r8.s much r.iore concerned •.-ri th the future of the aircr o. f t w~oduc ti on pro.::rar.1 and :r:u.li taTy aeronautics.
~'hur:~:2.n ~ane lost no time ir: ex:pressinr.; his id.eas ::'s~· a

at -,25, 0 00,000. :;:3 ane stressed the i;:iportance of contir:u:..:·:·~ e:r.:periY'lental worl<: in private factories, and he a.lso er,cour8..:-i ;f;d
t ~·"e Viod.i:f'ication of t:he Civil Service laws to per::lit ~,':u" re~ention of qualified engineers at hieher post-~1ar sala.r::.e s . 2
~ue to his excellent vantace point at VcCook Field, ~olcnel
3ane ~as able to foresee many of the emerg ing proble~s f~oi~~
t:'. e ;'.l:tliw.r:, aviation proe:ram. Assistant Director of ~--Lit::;;.ry
H,

Colonel Arhtur t:!oods,

In
t~"':~ s letter,

Colo:~el T:Iood.s estimated t:'le size of the -~oz--:-~·:P-.r

l:..i:::::- ~~ ervice at appro~i:."".8. tely hO, 000 officers and rr.en. :-:o-,rever,

mere i~p orta~t than this ~as the Colonel's coT:L~enta~y
f~t~~ e o~ aera~autical experi~entation within t~e Air Service.

I ·~ ~s ve1·y ce:c-ts.in t r1:J.t a section which is res-co:-1s1.s :.e
fc :· ~~e scie~ ~i~ic ~or~, ~n order to kee~ our i ir Service a he~d o: a ll o~~er cc~ntries of t~e world, should
~e ~de~uate:y or~a~ize~ in quality, irrespective of t~e
2

Col::i~1el r:-·. -"• Bane, Division of ~·:litary
to Office of the
:Ji ::.,..,,ec to:.,,. o::.~ ::ili tary Aeronautics, November 12, 1918.
,~ ::-:01,a::1.d."J.::) f1,or:

~'·.CJ:.' c -:·.c: ; ':..:.cs '='ec:-~::ical Section, t:ccock Field,

tSJ

~roblc~s he believed to be i~portant. In early Decer1cr,

: t i s also consi~2~ ~~ SQ ually ~ 5ts1 ~~~~ the intere~t
:) ~-~ -::, :---~r~ ~~:;.n11 :;:.... a.c t 1.;.~ s ~ ~:: ~ j ( .. 0 {'l_a, ,,c ~ ':,; c r1 CJ1(~8. -- ~8 'i 1 :'1 8,--:.rl !)_ ::. ~ OY'i
·:"1~::- :;rj_;,,cticr. ·.,or 1~ er"-:"':~-: s.l': -rs. ::oct of t:.::e,~: v:i~.i r.o
10°-,-:er })rod.uce ci.i::ncraf t, hut s oT"'.8 of tn0!!'1 1·,ould un(o~~tedly be willin~ to c ~rry a little experirentql
· ;."·,·'.r --.·~ "' '1·"' -1-1,,-,e "'ro.,..,nr
r-o~rern -:-:oc,V'l-1e.,.,~u~ur'=',.,_e,.,.,ent e h
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d i~ficulties for the Air Service and the private

a~~~r 2 ~~

~~-

dDstry . ~ rn~ever, his words ~are lost in the confusio~ of re-

Fiel~ did not look particularly proDisin~.

pe~ to the hose of the AirTilane ~n3ineerin5 Division? ~a~~ley

/ ' ·,_ .c-~·-.:"~-~-~o.-.J.:-~. f:-c·o~. ~ -.:: =._c _· ·.r.:: ·~ ;\.r tl"_·0.r· I ood.s, l~ssist,g~:r:-:-; ~i~ector
u . :~:':. ~_:_'_::.'.!.7 s\c:.~o:-,au--:ics, ~o Color: ·:: l '?. :-~. na.ne, Chie:- .)f -:'r"c
-~,:;r_• ,.::.e;:-:ll Ss c--:ion, : -: . :~.!,., 1~cCook Fielu., Dayton, Ohio, =:,:,·:err:oer
22 , .!. -;~_2: .

Je ce ~~e r 2, 19~ 2 .

:ro7 Colo~el ~ . ~ . ~ane ,
a~ ~ilitar y Ae ronau t ics, Washin;:::;-:on, D.C. ,

i ~ i~ for six mont~s

~~d

.

sore ti~e after that it ~ill be ~ove~

consolid.B.ted at :,:ccoo}: ?~eld. on :Jece:r:foer 20, 1918, by +;r.e co;".-

~~~~i n esrinG Division, the Technical Section of ~he Division of

0~ January 1, 1919, the Technical Division of th8 Ar~J Air

:-::.crvice was establi8hccl_ at :·,: ccook J:'ield. W1 th Colonel Bo.:r,,..; -0.s
its co:r:T"v' lnder, the neu divh,ion 1·ras divided into five der,a:::-t'!:1.-2nts: Airplane, Armament, Power ?lant, Equipment, and :··0.~erial. 7

Eo~·rever, the :.;:,echnical Division i:·ras only a tenporary ~r..8.n:1:e,
for on ~arch 13, 1919, the En~ineering Division of the Ar~y Air
_,.,

Se::::-vice ,<'as established at 1-:cCook Field and would rer:iain in e .1.-

feet until the creation o~ the Air Corps in 1926.B
'=1he ~n3ineerin.c; Di vision 1·:as divided into only -chree de-

::,8.rt.,.,.:,mts. Th ese i:·rere the T•:ili tary and ::3usiness Depart;".ent, the

Ser.rice Deps.rt".'-:ent, and. the Ensineering Departr:ient. "':'he
-':-'.:'"C:-)!'8.:::du:-1 from ~olonel I~rthur ':!oods, .Assistant LL~ector

ot ::-s_l-:tc_:,.ry Aeronautics to Colonel T.H. Bane, Chief ,Tf t:'1e Tech~1-s._c ~.l -:ectioY-., ~::i. ::.:-...., :·ccook ::;:;'~eld, Dayton, Ohio, Dece::-:;~er 5,
1 ~· 2- / .
/

~e:-,~-- et of t:".e ~r-',;i~0erin.-r Di vision, "Annual Hepcrt 7'or
1 ·':'· :'.:. 9 ," ~·~c:!'onautical Syster"·S Divi::::ior:., Documentation ;JiViGion

fu~ction~ of the 3n~incerin~ Jivision were 31milar

t (;

~~a~e

of

dcvelop~ent work for the Air 3ervice would continue to be h~~-

~at satisfied ~ ith

for t he 2~3ineerin~ Division. The restricted potential fer ex-

Ccl--::'":el ::.:a-,.ris, Of::'ice of the Director of the Army A"..,..r 3e:::··,:_')e,

the Jr oposed transfer of the Airplane En~ineering Div~sio~ from

Lc-.:--: ,_~:Le:r

:"i Gld.

lac~:ed. man1.:.fac tu.:ring facilities and had a serious

sc::-~rcity of q_·J2.lj_fied :"'.echc.r.ics • .-.2he:!'e was a possibility -:f'.at

ac::~ ·e::r· .::,::..~ losins ::'.EJ.ny ver~r ::e.rC:.-to-replace men. The lack of
CJ

·=~~~ee , Ar~v Air Jerrice, p, 115.
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coD~ercial and en~incerin~ support also jeopardized th~ conci~crntion of Lan~ley Field; hm:ever, th1a wac not co at •~cook.
?he D0.yton location ~rs.s in the center of a v-eat r2.n1)_fac turin~

area led. by such cities as Pi ttsbur~h, Detroit, Clevela:,1d,
CT~ica r;o, Cincinnati, and Indie.napolis.

:[ et, despite its shor t;coT".inzs, Colonel 3ane coulr.. see !:18.ny

aciv.::i.nt::::i.rr: es to Lanc-;ley :Field. T~e 7ir::;inia site had facili ";ies

i:<,., ereby Conc;ressmen and officers of the Ar7:.y Air Service could

hG.ve easier access to the experimentation being conducted.. ':C here
1·rere also a e;ood number of permanent buildings at Langley which
were not available at HcCoo1c. Colonel Bane summarized his remarks stattne;:

In spite of the objections which I have outlined for
Lanrr,ley Field, I ar.i cor!1.n1encing to believe that the
s-ound thine to do is to try to get there with the
lcnst possible delay. I should like to discuss this
1·ri th you ·( Colonel Davis) , and have the opinion o:'
other people on the thing.lo
In this same letter, Colonel Bane described the current
administrative situation at McCook. He detailed his remarks
thus:
••• this :Uivision is occupying a station which
t:::·ollec. and ahrays ::a.s been controlled by the
of Ai:rcr.s i.ft Production, while eighty per cent
r.ierson nel belones to the Division of !1111 tary
nautics .11
-

conBureau
of the
Aero-

'~he difficulties as he 11ras them were a result of the Bureau
10

colonel '='hurr:-an E. 3ane, "Letter to Colonel !·1. F. DaYis,
O:~fice of the Director of the Arey Air Service," February 21,

1915-.

11 r·

;d
_£;:_.,

one page letter.

Iiroo..uction, e.nd pr8.ctically all the operating r:2oney of tt:is

~iel~ was in jeopardy for both internal and external rea~o~s.

2.:-~·nlj_fi2d c-'.:::: the co:'.1troversy between the Air Ser-..rice and. the

airc~aft inclus try 1Jegan to ra[~e.

12

- Colonel Bane, "Letter to Colonel H. F. Davis."
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T't1e

confusion at /:cCoo \,: ?ie ld durin 0 the .~nonths l.~:::;-ied.i.-

follo-:·Jing the Armisttce

atP.ly

i ras

en'!,e n.dered by

inte ~ratton throughout the entire A1.r Serv1.ce.

a

ge:::-.eral

d 1.s-

The :;e~ iork

' ~i~es, later i.n the year 1919, would refer to the post-war re-

or~anization as a virtual demob1.lization of Air Ser7~ce.i
probler.is faclne; ::n.ilitary aviation were also complicated

The

by ti'ie

fact that the aircraft production program was literally falling
apart.
I'he initial blow dealt during the destruction period came
in r;he form of john D. Ryan's restrsnation as Ass~stant Secretary

of ':lar o:::--i Xovember 27·, 1918.

This resignation left vaca:r~t the

posit i..o :~. . s of Chairman of the Aircraft Board, Director of the
Air Service, Director of the Spruce Production Corporation, and

Di::'..'ector of the 3ureau of Aircraft Production.

By

A

,..,A
' 'j
'•

9

-

I

8.ll 7cstic;es of the 3ureau ·were gone, as President Wilson issued
& !':

ore.er on :,: arch 19. 1919, calling for all the production ac-

tlvities formerly control:ed by the 3ureau tQ be placed under
t r.e co :;:-: .trol of the Director of the A1.r Service.
c ::-d~~, tne Aircraft
~ ~a~t

:aoa~c.

In th1.s sa.T.e

ancl t::.e pos 1. t ion of D1.rec1;or of Air-

i roduction Nere dissolved with the power of eac~ ~eing

.l. :~:Jemoral izinz
the Army Air Scrvlcc," Aerial Arr.e :.foeli::ly •
.J,_i_ lJ 2 2 , 1919, pp. 92J-92l~.
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7·_~e
~ra,~_,edy
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:no••c~
~as that
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t::c aircraft productio!1 orf,aniza.tion ~-ms being returned. to tl-".e

control of the Aro.y 1•;hich hs.:i not been able to get tr.e alrcra.ft
pror:.1.:.cti.on p:'.:'otram off the ;:round durtnr; the first t:·:elve ::-.onthz

'_f:'nc rattle of the caisson :1c ;::;an to drown out the cl.1.n of
al..:cc rr;.: t

crn:;ine3 as i•Iajo:r Seneral Charles

r.

Eenoher wa::; ap-

1-:;oin"'.:cC: Chief of the Air Servl.ce on Dece~bcr 2J, 1918.

~:-;·,·H::ral

:-lc! noi:e:c, an old infantry officer and former com.11and.er of tho
f;c;

inbo,·r .Jivl.sion in ?ranee, reorganlzed the A1.r Serv1.c~ 1.n tt.e

sp~ tns of 191 9 to suit himsolf.J

The new organizational :truc-

turc ~-ra:-, ar, 8Xact copy of the ;li 'Jisl.onal system used 1.n :.? ranee
by the ~'.:-;ic1~ ican Sxped it ionary ?orce.

·::·::c: :'le ;,r Air Servl.ce conslstec: of four divisions, an execu1

L•
ti'rn officer, and an advisory board.'

'rhe divisions were de31.g-

no.ted as 3upply, Information, Training and Operat1.ons, anci Ad-

~tnistr~tion.

The Supply Division took over the functicns of

tl1e ~:.J_reau of Aircraft Prod.uction, but the r:iost important of
tl'!c ~1.ew divisions was 'I'rain1.ne and Ope rat ions led by .3r1.3:'ud 1.er

G-e::.8ral '.iillia::i. ~-litchell.

:io~·~ever, the newly organized Alr Ser

·;ice ~-:as :;:,la:s ued by uncertainty.

Until July, 1919, any plans

j ~ie fo:r t~e Air Service were on a te~porary basts be:~;se

::.ac. :iot

f' ·:.-. ::-. ::.::-:
-::..,

-.;h

':Jecn aut/:or'...zed for its opera.ti_on.

tiscal year 191)-1920, enough funds were appropriated

--- ------ - 2

Of . -.~:---~-~-~
- ·-

.... .E ~ tr t c :: , The Ci • S .

.,

At the beg1.n-

,
,'... r:ror-a ...l...1.c::::
,

in the 1... i r , p • 7 4 •

·'?urtce, Ar:ny Air 3c,,,vice, p. 109.

p. 36 •
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to mo..int.ain tho Al.r :.;cn-•11.ce unt 1.1 June: JO, 1 ?20.

:Cot, the ques-

t l.on of temporary statu:3 macle 1 t very d1.f f 1.cult for the A1.r .Scrv l.cc to retain many of 1.ts best people.5

E;:pans1.on plans for tho Air Service 1n 1919 were def1.n1.tely
out of the quest1.on.

Proposals had been ma.de to bu11(1 1,000 ad-

vanced. pur :.; •.1 t t ancl bor;f::ier aircraft.

The A1.r Ser71cc alco •,-71 ::::hc: d

to :r.aintain on s.cti'le duty 2,000 officers and 21,850 enli.:;tecl
/

c .. ·ri
1,m.........
.1..

l)

l:o~·:re·rnr, in July, 1919, the General Staff suppre3.sed tr.e

Air 38r'iicc plannin.6 by aut:1.orizine; the retention of only 1,0'JO

of f ic e rs· and 11.000 enlisted. r:en.

To add to the· rnl.sery, Sor.~iress

cut the Air Service appropriation frorn the requested ,;55,00C,000
to

J25,ooo,ooo.

Yet, Congress was not completely to bla~e for

thl.s appropriation cut.· The General Staff had great influenc8
in dctermininc; military appropriations, and they were not interested in lobbyine for the Air Service.

·rhe attitude of the Ar:ny

towards the Air Service was best described by General jtlling,
an e a rly advocate of bi. g :nilitary air pm·rer, who stated:
Thair minds went only as far as their men could ~o. The
:._:nfe.ntry off leer I S horizon \'78 S at the encl of a day t S
·-~2.rcl1. The cavalry man sa~·r a little further, a little
fast~r. ?he artillery ma~ could see · to the end of his
traj8ctoyies. 3ut none of then could see into the air.7

· :J~1f ortunately, the Air Service ·nas not the only r;roup to
suffer fro~.'! tl1e Ar:ny's reductions in ,-:i.anpower.and reduced ap}n~op~i.2.t ions, for tho American aircraft industry had been.

.Sc:,ief of the Air Service, ".Annual Report for : ;20, 11
2.~'.:>, Air Force Loeisti.cs Corr.:nand Historical Office.
bp~rtce, Array Air Service, p. 111.

7 ~10 :-::-;er Jurlinsa::1.c,

,..0· 1 -r".ll ~il 1 -., .iitctsll : C o.: oior of
l::: efc ;1sc (1.;e:-1 Yor!i:: :-: cv_a~r- i 1 3ootr
.. r-o
- ... nc ., l,15 2) , p .

~
10-.J.
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vl.rtunlly dc3troyecl by the lo.ei-:: 0f (:ovcrn~.1c~1ta.l e,cti'.Ji'::.J.

attitude of the aircraft induc~ry was expressed as follows:
yr,n-r- 10~
n
1'"' r•o fc:.r 1).8 t!'".o United ~tatcs ·;;a~; CO,'"'./-""/f
ccrnccl, '.:1ns b0;en u:1iq_;.J.c. ·.:ncrco.:J, on the siz-.r.1.nc o:~ :/;~
Ar~i2ticc, t ~e oth~r sr0at po~ers. Great Britain, ?ra~ce,
-.:..
- d J upn.n, r'"'C0"·,-..•,.,,,,.,,(1
,.,,.., •.Li,L~
-~no-,,.-!-an~P.
Oro
D•
l.Ll,'J.. 1 ~r, ctn_
"" •!..,J~ -•~1,,,,.,-'. ..l,.:.J.,..:,
....
1
-J.:·r"-,..r, "tnot o,'"'.lJ for co~:l~;c:--cc, but RS an inrll.spon::w.-'.Jle cl0"", >nt
ln ~ational defense, and appropriate~ hundreds of ~illions of dollars for the s~courase~0nt of the art, cu~
~overn~cnt halted for mo~t~s between two opinions, ~Lth
t]x; :result that thiJ i:i.-:.11_;stry i:•ras hard p e ssed, a.nd. i:nprovG;r:ont of types 1,as ?ra11ely j_elayed.-'

'1·;:--,..,
... 1 •_..

.

VC.-.-

l.~

t.J'-

,J

...

..,,

,I

_ ......,_,;...._l,

...,,

1

8

.:ere l ~r critic lz ln3 the ,c;;-o·,ernment for t ts lack of support d l.cl
1 i ttlc: to F-d'lancc the arr:•J_m.cnts of the aircraft industry.

tnc oJ.rcraft r;-,.anufacturers seized i.lpon the one aspect of 30·,crt'..~c~tal operations which conflicted most with their r1ghts, the
Encincerin3 Division at ~cCook Field.
After the creation'of the Engineering Dl.v1sion in ~arch,
1 91 9 , a Technical Data $ect ton 1·ms establ1.shed wt thin the Di v1.ston.

This section was to act as a contact between the Division

and the a~rcraft industry for the d1.ssehll.nat1on of technical
l.nforme.tion. 9

The manufacturers bees.me crl.t1cal of the 'rech.-.,.i-

cal ·Je.ta Section which promoted much of the a1.rcraft cievelop:':lcnt
~ork a t !cCook. • The aviation industry believed this type of
opera~ :.on created a situation 1-rhere "the worlc of des1. 0 nl.n~ and

The manufacturers went further and accused
,..,
0

::3.~"J.:'.\J.c-turers A i:ccraf t Association, Aircraft Year"":)ook,
:~ c::_ , C~e;-~ ·::::o:rk : ~oubleday, ?a.r.:e c;; Company, 1920), p. 15.

Ar ~y Ai~ Serv ice, p. 117.
---·- · , p • ...I.-17 •

l'.J,•01·c.'

c ,; :c'c D. 1.n'.~y not ttc respo~1sibility of Colonel Banc or r.is cii-;1.cior..

c ~ ~irc story, they ~ould have discovered that Colonel San~ ~a d
30~~ en r ocord showin: ~i3 personal concnrn for the atrcraft in1_h;_ ::; 0ry desp ite th e fact t1w.t tho Air Service and I•:cCoo~ : ielrl

~s ra literally fi~htin s for their o~m survival too.

1et, the

ac,~ u s a·t; lo:-is of the aircraft industr~r found an audience in r.L:_)1

~):~ac e s, :oart iculn.rly in the He port of the American J..·/ i ,? .t i.otl

the Armistice, Secretary of War Newton 3 aker was

ru1i cr pressure to o~plain the failure of the aircraft pr c~ :1ction

i~ tho aircraft industry s rew pro s ressively worse during the

e ~rly 2o n ths of 1919, Jecretary 3akcr was also urged to t evise
a pl an of r~overn::lental suppo!'t for the aircraft industry.

lfl

s.:-:s~·:e:r to 'both these problea1s, Secretary Balcer proposed an
.·-..::or:':. c.s.:~ Av iation :; issl o r. -::,e sent to 2urope to tnvcstl. 78.te

0:::-:s.n izG:clon, proclu.ctlo r,, and development ope_ratlons.
2 ~st ~~~

:,;,' }·.r.;

Sccre~ary o~ ~ar, 3onedict :rowell, ~as appoi~ ~e t

lea~ t ~e CT ission.

A~cc

7he concl~si o~s of the members of ~h6 ~i3sion

~:e r ~; ,ira-.;r~ i::.1dc::,c::-iclently ar,,d. later drafted 1nto a report which
~:<~,. ::;

SLJ_'::n itts t t o the Secretary of ",Jar in July, 1919.

73
i·'lo:::t boolcs on aviation hi.story cover1.ng the ycar3 1;.1::10d1.atcly follo'.1Il.n :-:, 'Jorld ·.-Tn.r I only ment1.on tho Heport of tr.' ; A~r-.cr-

ic a n Aviation ~icsion of 1919 for two reasons.

?1r~t, th~ report

1.- m::: supprc: sscd by S0crctary of ·,1ar Baker until Dcce::iorc:r, 191?,

t~cn the contents of the report were literally wrenc~~d looce
1J'.'8:n

"\-rit~1cLscc3 app8arin ::.: before tne ;louse Vi1.11tary Affair.::;

C:o '71;1 itt e c's subcom.mitte::c headed.

by P.cpresentatlve Fiorello :r •

.=, r i:_:adic:::- ';otwral ·:, ill ia..'il ;.: i tchell leveled hts 1.nl t 1.al cr.a.llen;3e

at t11c :':o:.vy ·in li'ebruary, :920.

Second, the report contained. a

very controversial recommendation which was stated 1.n the official transcript of the report thun:

"In England, Frar~cc, a.n(.2.

Italy Dentimcnt ts , undoubtedly in favor of the concentration of
aircraft development under one author1.tat1.ve head. 1111

'i'l-:is

staternent 1·ms interpreted before the LaGua:r-d1.a subcom:nit~ee by
Assist.s.:c1t Secretary of War Benedict Crowell.

Crowell statE":d

that the :-;1.emoers of the Arn.er lean Av tat 1.on H1.ss1.on fav·ored the
co:-;Ib:.:n.atio~ of' all ~ilttary, naval, and c1.v111.an avl.atl.on under
a s inc- l e :?ov-er::.2ent a ~;ency co-equal in status to t1:e Dcpartncnt::
o: ·, :ar, {-."D..vy, anci Co:n;nerce. :z

This one statef!lent beca2e the

oasis for the arG'..l..'1.ents launched by the advocates of central1.zed
:-:i.li tary air pm·rer ~-rho 1-rnre led. by the f larnboyant 3r1.gadior

.:;.e:,,. . eral :-: i tc'.:.cll.

Ho~·rcver, the true s 1.gn1f 1.cance of the report

was lost in tje sensationalism of the LaG~ard1.a 1nves tl~at1ons
'.?.nrl ir! t ::e fact that General I•a tchell used the report as
1 :A1.rcraft

Yearbook 1920, p. 106.

123urlin.~n~e,
C'na
t ~ of n~1. r De f ense, pp. 112-113.
-~
. moo..
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a,v::r:u1"..i t ten

to blast the

"i.;avy

and the War Department!l out

of

their qua~~ires of traditionalism.
The real importance of the rtcport of the Amertcan Avtatton
~-1'.Lsnion ,:o.s the support 1.t rendered to the dw1ndl1ng A.--:-.er1can
8.V

io.t ion indtlstry.

A 0 eneral state~:1cnt of the report' G tnten-

t ions est~blished:

As a result of these studiec the Mtssion emphasized the
unn.nLnous oDl.nion of its !!lecbers that 1.r.1m1;dtate s.c-ti.on .
;·:o.s ncce;:,~:. 1.1:;r to safe ; ._:- .1arci the air 1.ntcrest of tr.c
un 1 te cl Ste.tcs to preserve for the Government sot1c bon'3f it of the 2:reat aviation expencl i turc s made durtni,; t:".e
Dcrl.od of the ws.r, and to prGVGnt a vi tally necc ::::rn.ry
lndustry from disappcarin~ ••• ninety per cent .of the industry ~as been liquidated and unless some dcf1n1te policy is adopted by tfle Government 1.t is 1.nev1tabl~ that
the remal.ning ten per cent would also disappear • .t. 3
1

The report stated further some baste conclusions arrived at
through the ~ission's 1.nvestigations.

Some of these conclusions

were:
For economic reasons, no natl.on can hope 1n time of
peace to maintain ai-r forces adequate to 1 ts def cn:::i ·1e
need except throu3h the creation of a great reserve Ln
personnel, ~aterial, and production industry throu ~h
the Gncourage:,1 ent of civ1.l aeronautics. Com:nerclal
s.viatio:,i and -'cransJortation development must be rr.ade
to carry the ~inancial load.
It has been proven w1t:1in the experience of every
::-1.ati or:. enge.2;ed. in the i·rar that ti-ro years or more of
hiGh pressure effort have been needed to achieve the
quantity production of aircraft, a1.rcraft engines, and
accG3sory ~quip~ent.
fast experience and every economic consideration
pol.nt to tho vital need for the formulation by the
un ite d Sto.tcs, of a definite, comprehensive and continuin ~: 9oll.cy for tne developraent of every phase of
the aircraft art. Our Government is no':-r faced with the
tas:•: of n.ursins: and actively encouracing a new transport E.': io:1 iniustry, :,,hose ::~calthy growth is vital -:;o
tte prosrcs3 and defense of the nation.
Be cause of the lack of a def1.nite, intelligent~
and syopathetic pol1.cy in our Government aircraft
13Aircraft Yearbook
1920, p. 101.
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or,3anization since the armistice, our Amcr1.ca.n aeronautical industry built at cuch ~reat expense of money
o.nd effort is rapidly d.tsa,poar1.nr~. ~:o senslblo bu:;incss ra.an is ju.st ifiecl in koepin,s money in1restcd in the
aircraft industry under the conditions whlch ha7c been
r:iainta'.!..ncd in tho United States s1.nce !Joveo.ber 11, 1918.
The closest possible relations must continually
e::ist bct1·:ecn the aircraft a;:,:cncy of the Government
and. tho :oroduction anrl commercial industry en~aged 1.n
aircraft development.
A~crica's production industry reached lar~e
proportions during the ~ar, but since the ar~istlcc it
?:c>.s shrunl:en to a very S.'.1all volu.7e.
Unless 1.r:;~_:.e~liate
actLon is '; i7cn to its conser-..rat1.on, '.Lt w1.ll practically disappear. This industry does not require a large
7ol •J.r:i,: of :}'J.31-n.css to 1:c->ep it a11,,e and. healthy, ".)ut
it c.loc s :rcq_u. ir?- a stcaci:r e.nd. dependable dc:nand, otr.er~·:ise ·:;,Ti vat,3 capital and enterprise will not lon.: re.:n2..L1 i:1.tercstcd.
The aircr8.ft production industry should be conserved 8.nd kopt in a healthy condit1.on by a well defined and continuing program of production for military purposes over a period of years. This policy
should be continued until the col!lP.lercial der.iand is
-9 .dcquate to support an industry of suff 1.ctent proportions to form an E";:ffective nucleus upon which can be
built a war-time production in case of need.1 4
The conclusions in the report unquestionably indicated the concern of the Mission's members for the future of the M.erican
aviation industry.

E01·1ever, in the last seement of the report

a very curious attitude was revealed.
As 1-1as mentioned earller in this chapter, the McCoolc Field
Sn~ineerinc D1.v1.s1on had.been under attack by the aircraft industry for allcscdly infringing on thelr development rte:hts.
Scarin,3 in ml.nd that th~s controversy was raging during the
sa:ne period when the Hiss1on was conducting 1._ts 1.nvestigat tons,
the rcco:::.1:1endations made by the Htss1ori appeared to be a denu:1.c ie.t 1.on of the opere.tio:1.s of the Eng1neer1.ng D1. v1s1on. AlthouGh the report did not mention any names, a s1.m1.lar1ty can be

l!}Atrcraft Yearbook 1920, pp. 105-llL~.

noted between the act1vitiec of the ~taston's propoced Technical
Division and the actual re::;ponnib1.11.t1.es of the Ene;1.neer1.ne;
Division.
In 0.ll the :Suropcan countries visited, we found that
access to and use of the Governr:1ent o~·med facili ttes
for aircraft cle·.rclop;11e~t is established.
:fo rccon::-,se::.1.d that all tecl1.nlcal f~J.nct1.ons of th€: Government in rcsnect to aeronautics be centralized 1.n a
::::inr--le '.i.'echnic~.l Div•ision ~-rhich stall perform tho -,ror!{
for~the Ar~ny, :!avy, ancl Ci 11il aviation ••• that the technical facilities of the Technical Division for a~tation, ~hether no~ exist0nt or to be 6reated, shall be
:..vaila.ble to Drivate in ~,entors and desizners upo:-.:. :oroper a?id. reasonable ter;,1s.
In vie,·r of the eY.perience of Eneland and ::'ra:1.c£;,
it is danc;erous to allo-::-r the Technical Div1:sion to or-crate under nor:nal or 1·1ar condttions a department of
complete d.esign in heavter-tha.n-air machines or notors,
as such conpetition results im;:;iediately in stopping
private departments of destgn.
'l'he Tech.'Ylical Dl~1ision, therefore, should be a
critic of, and supplementary to, private deslr,:n, rather than aim at desi.3n on its 01m account. The poltcy
o:C the Technical Division should be to naintalr. a.:1.d cncour,o.n;e 2. considerable nunbcr of uell :ns.nncd and ~·Tell
equ,ipped prive,te clesi-:n plants and to cooperate ".·ritr,
these plants, at fair prices, for design and for experimental imri: of construction of motors, planes, ani
ar,>~J liances. Co:npetition of the Government 1·11.th lndus'cr·;; .should oe avoided; the only allowable exception
beinc; cases :·rhere, either on account of expense or fu::·
otner causes, the Technical D1.v1sion can not obtrtn
needed ~aterial or design from existing.sources. 5
-r~1ere should be no doubt that the Ge recommendat 1ons were d1.rccted spe~ifically at the l-lcCool.: Field Eng1.neer1ng D1v1.si.on •

.r~o~;eve::...~, the reader may renember a better known historical interpretation regardir.g the report.
For years historians have contended that the report of the
Ac:·.crican .twiatio:n :-Iisslon ':-ra.s ~-rithheld by the Secretary of War

"'..,c cause he d.isa 0 reed ~-rl.th the recom:nendattons of the report

..

~~~i~craft Yearbook 1920, pp. 117-120.
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rc ::a :c di..:::_) the con~;-;:U.clatl.o:r. of all r:11.11.tary and c1.v1l.l.ar1 ;,_ ·1 iat..io:"l

o_s Scc:rc~ary of War, '.:1a6. to have reco1"91lzed. the de~~:JE:::ratc: ::;1 tu-

ation ~&ctn ~ the Air Servl.ce durtn~ 1919 .
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·.-:a. s G-)) arently a shre;•rd enough observer to see the dan3e::' fac1.r. ~:
t he Atr S ervic e and the En~ lne erin~ Dl v tslon.

1-:e, therefore,

cl: :rc cted_ a ttention a~·ray fr0 :J. t~e :i:ng1.neer1ng D1.v1slon to the
cr ,.-:,:-:; j · ;·; -'" o f the proposed ';o-:e rnmG::.Lt aviation ~gency. thus al-

at rc r a f ~ ind~ stry to be decide ~ 2 radually.

CHAPTER X
A PERIOD OF FA~(U!E AT !'lCCOOK FIELD

On April 10, 1919, Colonel Bane issued a statement outlining the work then be1ne; done at HcCook Field. The duties of
the :Snsineering Division werea
••• the desi~n cf airplanes and airplane engines, including the installation of the sa~e accessories, ths
design of which had been furnished by other departments of the govern-r.ient, ••• as well as the building of
e~perirental models and the testing of airplane engines.
However, due to the pressure being placed on the Engineering
Division by the aircraft industry, the construction 0f ex~erime~tal ~odels had to be kept to a minimum. By Septembe~, 1919,
a formal procurement pla!! was established by the Engineerirl~
Diirision for securing experimental types of l;i.irc:-af"t f·ro::i pri-

7ate ::r:anufa.cturers. ·:rhe provisions of the plan ca.lle"~ f:.r the
following:
1. Circular proposals for design bids were to be sent

to prospective manufacturers.
2, Bids were to conform to government specifica.ticns.

J. Tnenty per cent of bids was to be paid at the time
of entry.

4. :']'Tee planes were to 'be bu11 t from the accepted.
design.

5. The first plane was to be used for static tests,
the second for service tests, and the th~rd for a
final checlc on changes and modification.
101'

~

m

...

- . . . o O!!e.L 1. 11.. Bane, "Organization of the Engineering Di visior.., April 10,. :i.919, '1 Aeronautical Systems Divisior~ 3istor1cal
Office, ~right Field.

2Purtee, Army Air Servioe, p. 118.
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Yet, 1·rhere this plan did much to temporarily placate the air-

craft industry,· it could not alleviate the larger problem that
there were simply very few airplanes being built for the Air
·Service in 1919 and later in 1920.
In the years iI!linedia tely following World War I, ~he Air

Service Nas forced to use equipment ~nd supplies produced durine; the war. "It had more than 3,500 De Haviland DE-'~ observa-

tion airplanes and alr.10st 12,000 Liberty engines on hand."3
'I'rce :Sngineering Division, instead of developing new 9.~_:::-·cr-a.ft or

new engines, was forced to modify or improve the- existing was
surplus equipnent. 4 The use of surplus equipment definitely re-

tarded the development plans of the Engineering Division, but
e,

m.ore serious problem was that the· equipment was not safe.

During 1920 alone, 150 war vintage aircraft were destroyed in
crashes, This fact only accentuated the demands of the Enei-

neerine-; Division for permission to begin ·work on newer and
safer aircraft.

An example of the defeated plans of the Enginee~i~c Division Has the proposed expand.ed development of the Martir_ r3omber.
By the end of World War I,

h E.d ·0eer.:. evidenced by the

the need for large bomber aircraft
fact that smaller planes could. ~wt

c3.r:-~~ ':1eaYier bombs. The answer to this requirement was satisfied wit::.. the de"frelopment o:t 7.:-'.e nel,: Martin :Bomber. 3:owever,
the -:rar e!lded before the new· Yiartins col_lld be suppl1e4 in

3Purtee, Arrri:y Air Service, p. 120.
4
.
.
,... "P..:rm::, Air Service Report, !Io. U-436,
October 1, 1920,
P• .:'..6, Aeronautical Systems Division, Documentation Division
11

}'iles.

.
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q_ucmti ty early in 1919 •. Colonel Bane was extremely interested
in procurine fifty Martin Bombers for use by the Air Service
and·for experimental purposes by the En~1neer1ng Division. His
request was denied by the Chief of the Air Service because
there were still a larp;e nur.i.ber of "P-adley-Page bombers left
l

from the ·,1ar. This refusal sent Colonel 3ane into a rar~e, and
irl

G.

letter to Najor General Henoher, he leveled a stern attack

on the continued use of the Hadley-Page. Colonel BaYJ.e stated:
It (Hadley-Page) is an antiquated old bus and the ~est
·ching which could happer.. for us -;-:ould be for a ::'i:.'.'e to
occur and burn them all. The machine 1s a flying ::ar·:: =:.

and does not handle like an airplane. On the other hand,
the :'·':artin Bomber 1s probably the greatest develop:nent
of the war.5
To

add to the discouragement of not being permitted to

·work with first rate eq_uipl!lent, the . Engineering Division al.so
suffered. from continual reductions in Air Service pe:r·sormel.
In 1920, Air Service nersonnel had been reduced to 8,155 civilians and 9,596 officers and men. The effects of this reduction
1·:as that on January 1, 1920, McCook Field had a. staff of only
1,061 civilians and 286 military personne1. 6 The staff of the

Production Engineering Section of the Engineering Division had
been red·o.ced to such an extent that the Chief of the Section

expressed grave concern that his representatives working in the
aircr2.ft plants were so few that t~e rr-ca.intenance of safe":" r
0

sta~aards on the construction of new aircraft was being sacrificed.
5'.:olo:riel :::'hurma1-: 3. 3ane, "Hemorandum to Chief of the Army
Air Se:r-,.rice," February 21, 1919, Aeronautical Systems Division,
:loc:::.:-.:e:-~·ca.tion Division Files.
,.
°Chief :::,f the En.gineerir-<~ Di visior..,

?!:eport to the Chief
of -che c·-.::cmy Air Service," January 21, 1920, Aeronautical Systems
Division, Documentation Division Files,
11

'I'he situation becar1e so critical in the Air 3erv1ce that
much azitation was directed toward the War Depart'!:ent to 1nstic:;ate some improver.:ients. In answer to this pressure, the Army
Reorc;anization Act of June, 1920, was passed. Hhere the Army
was determined to keep its air arm e.s e.n inte~al part of 1 ts
e;rouncl operations, provisions were made the.t the Air Service
become a part of the combat line of the Army eque.l to the artillery and the infantry.? The Reor;;,;anization Act also inc~e8-sed

the number of Air Service personnel to 1,516 officers

~~d

16,000

enlisted men as well as making provision for higher pay for
flight officers.8
isy virtue of the R.eorganiza.tion Act, the Engineeri:nc Divi-

sion could have at least looked fo!",rard to some degree of i~proved conditions in the Air Service. However, there was : till
0

one e;laring defect in the organization of the Air Servi:-;.e •tJ.::ich
had to be changed before any real progress could be r:2ade. This
problem was centered around the fact that the Chie~ of the Air
Service had the responsibility for the development of new airc::i::-e..ft

types. As !!lentioned earlier, Najor General Heno'her

was

an

infantry officer, and he could not even fly an airplane. r,renoher•s
lac};: of insie;ht into the problems of the Air Service was shown

in his refusal to ap:prove Colonel Bane's request for the Martin
?'o:::1:.ers. The obvious solution tc this problem ·was to place the
responsi"olli ty fo:r- all A1.r Service aircraft in the hands of' -:;he
people who lmew the ~est ar:,:,u-: air::planes and aviation

7Purtee,

Ar~...:y Air Service, ?• 124.

B..
.~ir s ervice Nemo. No. U-4 36 , p.· 25.
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reCT_uire!'lents, the T~ccook Field EngineeTing Di vision.
In the spirit of reor~anization which seemed to be penetrating the War Department in the sumrne~ of 1920, the En~ineering Division was finally given the power it had forr:erly lacked..
On Au.~ust 21, 1920, the Army Air Service issued Order No. 18.
This order stated that t::.1.e Engineering Division was thereafter
to ·nave "the technical control cf -:he Y'.i echanical c ·c,e!'':3.ticn,
re:p2.ir·, care, storage, :iandling, and packing o'!: al:::.. Air Service
hea.vier-tha.n-air eq_uipment. ,,9 The order also stated that "this
control will be exercised in the form of recommenda.ticY:.: to the
Chief of the Air Service, who 1·r111 cause to be issued trJ:: ::aecessa.ry orders to carry the recommendations 1nto effect,"lO ?his
\' :leant t:hat the Chief of the Engineering Di vision ~rould ":'.a.ve
virtually unque::; t:.ioned authority over his own operat1o:r.::. and
the operations of the entire Air Service simply because he controlled all the aircraft. In fact, this order made Colonel Bane
the ~ost important man in the Air Service.
The historical s1 0 nificance of this order has been apparently overlooked for many years. Yet, the fact was that 1t

did

not mean much ·to be the most important man in a second rate
air force, and thus, no one paid much attention to the ~rder
except the men of the Ene;ineering DiYision itself and one other
rr...an, 3rin;a.dier General Billy r-: i tchel1. ·

9Arny Air SerYice Ora.er No. 18, August 21, 1920, Aerona.utical Systems Division, Documentation Division Files,
lO:Jar Depar--r;ment, Office :.:,:"' ~:ne Chief of the Air Service,
to the Chief of the Engineering Di vision Mer: ::;ok
?~eld., ..)s.7ton, Ohio," September 25, 1920; Aeronautic~l Systems
Division, Documentation Division Files.
''=,e:.:rY!~8-Yl.dun

CHAPTER XI
BILLY -.:ITCHELL A::::; 'I'!IS ?IGHT
TO SAVE THE AIR 32RVICE

In 1920, there were two men 1.n the world who fully understood the strateg_l.c potential of b1.g a1.r power.

One ·was an Eng-

•

lish,- na!l, -Sir High Trenchard, and the other was an American,

Brigadler General William Mitchell.

Bllly Mitchell began h1.s

whirlwind m1.litary career 1.n 1298 when he left college ~n the
mtddle of his junior year to fight 1.n the Spanish American War.

After the ~ar, he spent a brief tou~ of duty 1.n the F~llipptnes,
and the::1 he was persuaded by the Chief Stg-nal Officer, General
Adolphus Greely, to volunteer for the mtss1.on to install telegraph lines along the Alaskan coast.

.I t was during thts mission

that t li~chell first became interested in aeronautlcs, ::er during
1

the long Alaskan winters, he had time to studY: the work of Otto
Lilienthal and Samuel Langley.1

In 1903, he returned from Alaska the youngest captain 1n
the Ar~y.

From 1903 to 1909, Mitchell was occupied with western

outpost duty or he ·was attending T.rari.ous Ar:!lY. shcools.
a~1~~~~!

~rief t~ur of duty in the P~ilippines, he led

;;1~ssi.o:r_._ t;o Japan in August, 1911.

·rhe report he f1le:-a.

After
q

spy
:in

hls
r-.

brought him much recognition in Washington. : Thus, in,1912,
1Davis, Billy Mitchell Affair, pp. ~8-19.
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~·1 i. tchel l was asst.crnecl to the In tell1.P;ence Branch of t:-:.1 General
Staff. 2
As an Intell1.gence Offlcer, Capta1.n Hitchell had access
to the reports of the war then going on 1.n the Balkans.

l-ie

was

particularly interested 1.n the reports on the use of aircraft
by

Bul£:arian fliers

•:rho

had dropped small bombs on the '_:,;.rk1.nh

strone:,hold of Adrianople.

During th1s ti.me, H1.tchell' s ~.n terest

in flying lncreased as he began to associate with the pilotc at
•
the Army
ar:

flylng school at College Park, r1aryland.

H1s work as

Intelligence Off1.cer combtned w1.th h1.s personal enthusiasm

for avlatton led to his be1.ng called as a witness be~ore the
::.o:'.1.gressional commlttee invest1.gat1.ng European a1.r power 1.n 1;1:3.
This appearance was to serve as a prelude to similar act1.v1."'c1.es
in the future, as Captain ~1.tchell, although not yet a pilot,

demonstrated an acute understanding of aviation.
After a severe ~erlod of 1.llness in 1915 due to a rheumat le
heart conditlon, Mitchell returned to act1ve duty in i1:6 as a
:'.tajor.

tie had completed h1s tou:r- of duty on the General Staff

and requested to be assigned to the Av1at1.on Section of the

Sl.e:-:'.:.al Corps.

While stationed in Washington wtth the Av1at1.on

~ec~1o~. he decided to learn how to fly.

So, he traveled to

~e~port ~ews, Virg1.n1.a, every we8kend for ftve months w~ere he

pl.lot traini.~cc

~ !~.

--nld.-Jar..;_9._y, 1;,17,

:;;,.'.'l-i

-:.y that ttme, he was

f'-:dly convl.nced that the Dnl.ted States would have to enter the
~~r

1~ Europe.

~ ith thls i dea in. mind, :!ttchell was deter~lned

2 Davis, Billy ~1.tchell Affai.r, pp. 20-2J.
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b:i·L:::c:rr::ti. his sup(iriors 11nt1.l he iTas p;ivP-n orri.ers to r:Dtl for

'co rev 1.0~~•:

0

the r;i,anu facture a:'ld development of alrcr11ft :::m ,J. re-

and flew over t~e ll~es ~1.ti
pi.lot:::: to ;a,i"'t a better :1nd.srstanding of the ground wa!',

~~~ h

At

Trenchard,· commander of the Royal ?lyl.ng Corps and was ~z-

tremely t~pressed by the splend1~ organization 0f the 3~1 -;~ .:h
air service in France as well as the daring of the ~.F.C. pllots.

However, Lieutenant Colonel ~ttchell began to be~ome frustrated
at t,:,-!e i nent i tude of the A'lerice:": a.vi 3.t ton effort.

!itchell was becoming irri~ated by the 1~activity of the
::;:rc,·,y--'.i off ic e :rs of the A'"'.lerican Exped1. t 1.onary Force wt th re3:ard

to aviation.

?.e e.ttac~ed. :Jsneral Pershing stat 1.ns, "G-eneral

?eTs~!~ ~

~i ~ssl~ thought aviatio~ was full of dynamite and

3~..

?ershi~~ wanted to send Mitchell no~P , but he could no~
3Javis, Billy ~ i~ ch ell Affair, p. 27.
4-. i .

.d:2_£.,

p. 35.

86
o.fforrl to lose such a valuable aviation officer.

In ord.er to

calm tb lnr~s doi.,m, P~rsh ing a.ppo 1.nted Major General W1.111.a.:r~ Y.enly

as Chief of the Air Service ln Europe.

However, this did not

solve the problem, for Mitchell only turned hls thrust towar1s

in Xove::iber, 191?, Vittchell literally hP-.1. a "f1eld d.ay 11 f1.r1.n;::;
c:c-i tic ism at Fo'J.lols and his air mission.

After '.3-eneral ?oulo 1.s

y-eplaced :-:ajor General Kenly, who had returned to ':iash1.r.. 0 ton to
assu~e che 01rectorship of th~ J09artment of M1.11.t~~y Aero~~ ~-

that I-:itchell be sent bac~ to Washington, but Sene:rP.J.:.. iershing
interceded. and in : Iay, 19~- 8, appo ~:'.1.ted Hajor '}er.eral Zasc:n. :-~.
1

?atrl c:,~ ~c replace Fouloi.s and. attempt to control i.'il.:, 2.:-.E: l.i..
~:~1t J.l this t im.e, I<i l tchell ~1ad been cot!1:r:a:1.d tng the A1r

~e :-cvice forces attached to the U.S. First Army.

However,. in ~-iay,

19:i.. G, r,e m:::.s r.1ade Chl.ef of the A1.r Service, Army Group, ",'1'1.th

the ran!( of 3risadier General.

·I 1hus, he. ,,ras made commander of

the e.ir fleets of the U . .:) . First and Second Arm1.es. 5

In truth,

Ge~er-a.i. :-Iitchell 1•:as ~.mch more than a trouble maker.

Only be-

cause r.e -,.:as the f 1.nest avlat1.on strategist and tactician the
lL :2 1-:_cans had_, we.s he allow8d tc remain 1.n Europe.

·,,,, . . . e·,- ,:;,

t:".

f\i:?'.'thera10re,

~:itchell comm.ancied. the larges~ stn~le al.:?'.' off,~ ~stve of

:·;ar d.urin::,_· the St. i,aM_e:.. ,-,a."'.•.pa,_r:n.
-

J

Tn t'n's
a"'tto
· n I .a
'"'e.
J. ·
'J
.._
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coor-llriatcd a.n at tack by 3r1. t 1. 3h, Pren ch, Ital1.an, anrl A:~.er1.can
~

-

unit3 total1.ng 1,500 aircraft.~

~1.tchell cl1.maxed his activities

du:rin.~ t:1c war by J.au.n~hins a masstv·e 350 plane raid on the
G-orna.n rP-ar posit ions corr:plctely disrupt 1.ng the Ger;~a:--1 r ·~ treat

~~lly .~itchell r0t .~:rned to the Jnited States in :;_91:; be0

1 iev :...-•'l'C: tr1.:1.t he was about to be a.ppo int eel Director of 1-Il.li ta.ry
iwro::_.' .c:.utics.

,,,-:-,~

1:iowever, his record of aviation tr11..l.Ihphs

, ,-,_ Service.

~=

~::rope

In ac'..:'...'i..t i.o:c. "':o h~s perso::.1.a2. d1.scoura.c;eraents,

aviacion.

officers who had been assigned to study the lesso~s of war r e ported to General Pershing, who ~as
::0 >, Cl--:.ief of /Jtaff, that though aviation was useful
foT o~servation, there ~as no sign that 1.t would be~o~e a decisive wea~on.b

3020
1

A:i ir::. '::r.s confusio-yi of disarma:nent and the bel1.ttll.ng co:n:nentc.:ries co~1.cernin 0 airpm·:cr, General Mttchell found fe,i reasons
fo~ rejoici~g.

YGt, there was one thing which interested him

?rot:.1 the be .s inning of 31.lly M1.tchell•s association •.• rtth

U.S . Alrpower, p. 6J.
"

;-Ja-:is, ~illy iHtchell Affatr, p.

55.
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the Engtneerlng Div1.s1.on and its Chief, Colonel .Bane, a.nunusual dichotomy was established.

By virtue of his conduct 1.n

deo.li:rig with his superiors during the war, H1tchell had few

friends on wh1.ch he could rely to help h1m 1ri h1.s campaign for
expanding the Air Service.

---

On the other hand, the roof was

literally falll.ng l.n-on Colonel Bans a.nc. the Engineer: ·,:1-:. 0 iv1.s1.on.
Attacks from the aircraft ~ndustry, continuous reduct i or-s 1n
pcrso:rrnel, and control of its operat tons by the Chief of the }d.r

Seruicc ~1a c.. severely hampered the Engineert:--1~3; D:.vls1on.

T!lere-

for e , Colonel Bane had nothing to lose 1.n supportin 6 : , i -c -~ 11ell,

for if he could do anything to l~prove conditions ~1.thin the Air
Service in 1919, Colonel 3ane naturally had to try t".J ·:: elp.
Shortly after assuming command of the Training .sa.nd. Cperations Division in the spring of 1919, General Mitchell
first trip to f.IcCook Fleld.
ThoTia.s Morse fighter.

macle

his

On thts vl.stt. he .fle~·l the new

Mitchell co1mn.ented that "the Horse was

the best all-around fighting single-seater 1n the world, and he
ordered it into production. 119

Mitchell was also very interested

in the experimentation being done at McCook Field on higp altitude variable pitch propellers.

The , General was fascinated

by the parachute tests at I•lcCook as well as the tests us1ng the
DR- 1rn aircraft as a dive bo~.1 ber.

Through Mitchell's 1.nterventton,

G9orge Goddard, a young p:'1oto ::rapher from ?l~:r!.da, -:;,~as brought
to '.: cCook where he ·oe:7;an c. ::·,elop:.':..g the processes for ach1evi.n3 ·

h t3h qualttr photography from a flying aircraft.

•3 eneral I·~itchell, at th1.s time. made an i.mport&.nt frtend
n
7

Davis, _._:~l~--··. . . ,;. ••~:~~~c~r~.P~l==-~r.~.-~
,
~
ra
= i~
1· ,. ~. 53.

of the former Buss 1.::,x1 : :n.;}o~ Alc::;:r.mclcr d.c Scversl-::y.

Se·1ercky

thow~h t lilrn ff, i tcholl ·.rhon it ca11e to the develop:nent of a.tr
l)O \·:Cl' l:tC

D.

1
ci S ive co~'
· "· force
c.,_c
, ~-' CJ ;)_..,

::(;ncro.l to enl1.st 88VC:!rs1'::y'

8i 3h t.

.'.'C:

•

,.,1'.",eir J.,e,ric·ndsh1.p
-

-,,H'

- - -'-

+-.',,e
vJ · -

ho"lp 1.n building a ne-..1 type bo:ab

~he Russian inventor ~as set to work at ~cCook ?ield

lo.te L :
:J..s he :ranted to keep clc sc. ·:r ~tch over the ->~-;elG ::..:::s :: t

of t ~a bo3~ sight.

These visits, in turn, brought General

_;itc.11ell into closer c ontact with Colonel Bane.

As

2.

.res:.1lt,

i::;:::. :: in? over VicCoolc Field as his m·m prtvate av1.at1.on labo.ratory.

If

~'.·:c:::·c

it

had beer._ a~y resen--c11ent of I-11.tchell by Color.el ::.aflc ,

.:~ s r.ot ..'.'.lanifestcd onertl7, for Bane would. !;.ave certai n ly

follo~·,c cJ. the vis1.onary General I-: itchell rather than the un-

imasinativ e Ge neral ~enoher.
~':-:.o plan s Billy i-11 tchcll had. beeYJ. n:ak1.ng for :r.:or_tns came

into focus tn Februajy, 1920, when, as the newly appoi~t ~i As-

si s t a nt ~hlef of the Air Service, he testified before t~e LaGuardia s~bco ~~ittec.
t'r,rc

r::onservat i ve olc :;ie~t in the ·.-:ar Depart;:icnt arl'::.. t.Le ~·:a'ly

:OE: r,: ·3_:::·-,_ :::r1~.
0

., / ? •j

?he General-was now prepared tb attack

.

In some •,- ra·., q r' s ~: i -: inri; was rP.+:'r:.er bad C<:; ~;c:- _· .cc:~ con-

a.s a result of the separattst movement which had 7,::-:-o~·m 0u-c

of =~; port for Benedict Crowell's testimony before th~ ~aGuar~ia
0-

'> •Y

r......v -

not th0 Sancral 1 3 primary intention at that time.

l!e waa more

concerned Hl.th convincirn: ilis super1orc of tho 1.mporta.ncc of

air power and .demonstrating the strategic potent1al cf a 11iat1.on.
Eis 'Ld.cas 1·rnre popular 'iTith men like Colonel Bane. 11

Yet, when

he clelivered his challcng2 to the ~;avy stat1ng that b0.ttleshl.ps

·,rerc obsolete and. completely vulnerable to attack fror.a. the alr,
t•'i.itchell hlt hard. at the "holy of holies" of conserve.t~ve r:i.ilt-

t.9.ry tradition.

Not only t... id the· Navy lash out at suer, ·_:,::st1,;nony,

but thE ~eneral Star~ rushed to the defense of its sister ser-

'

Ge:ieral .:e.son Patrick atte-;:'lpte-::. -+.:;c justifd- tt~i::; Army's ~o~·_,.,arva-

·r:'le lac~i::: of understanding was most notable 1n th~ ·,:ar
~~?artoe~t itself, where a certain jealousy of the Air
~srvi.cG ~-ms mar-'rndly in e•;ldence. The a1r corn.ponGr,t :,:·
the Army was a :new thin~.a. an innovation, and like su.G~1.
it met with opposition.iG . ,

Jesptte unfavorable reaction from both the Army and the
Navy, ~Htchell continued. to insist that airplanes could s1nk
battleships.

The General demanded an opportunity to pro,,e ::is

theory of aerial superiority

0

1er capl tal ships, and he ·,ras

1

supported in his request by ~epr~scntat1ve LaGue.rd1a.

~~o·:rever,

ever. 3-ene!'al WllliG.:.~~ ~.: i tci1ell could not carry out a stunt 11.ke

went, a!ld by
- virtue o:' t~c Air Se_.,..vice· Order of A'll'"'c::-t
u .... ~ -?1 • ". :. ·-,,:i20 •
~11 ~1oav ier-th2.:'l-ai~c :-1ach l.nes ~-rere under the .control of the

~~ :i.orr::anlzat ion of ~,: il 1. ta.ry Aeronaut i.cs, p. 52.
.
~~?atr~o~, The ~.s. tn the Air, pp. 89-90:

.,
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Chict of the Engincer1n3 Division.
This situation had to be nomewhat d1fflcult for ~itchell.

Since he returned fro:n Europe in 1919, he had flol'm to :11c".!ook
Pielc1 :aany times i·rhtle representing the "lr.nleht ln shtnln;:

o.rr'los:- 11 about to sa 110 the Ensineertng Div ts1.on fro:n. the clra?;onc
l:n the 'dar .Jepartmont.

the

&. i:cplanes,

~-a tchell

After Colonel 3ane was g1ven control of
was forced to change hts strategy.

The

General sousht to make Colonel Bane feel a part of the c.o::1btng
plans, as .·lttchell wrote to 3ane stattng:

n:o:rc f ire~·rnrks.

"We wlll have zo:.:ie

We axe go fne to smoke these people out that clo

not believe in the air business and either make them 'fish c~
cut -oa.i t. '( 11 3

Thts approach was fine as- far as 1t ·went.

However, .-atchell

apparently failed to realize that he was not deal.1.ng with so~e
starry-eyed visionary.

Thurman Bane was an astute aviator, and

further@ore, he l{new exactly vrhat the capab111ttes o:- the Air
Servics ~-rere.

Colonel 2ane :•ms also well aware of the results

of the navy bombin13 tests which were conducted ir. vctober, 1920,
usi.n.s; the old ha.ttlesh1p Indtana.

rrhe Navy concluded that ae-

r1.al bombardment of battleships :wuld have ltttle 1f any da:n-

asing effects.

It was d1.scovered later that the Navy used only

c:.:,L--::.:i.:,,· bombs in their attack on the Ind1ana 1n an attempt to

d.iscredlt i·lttchell •. Yet, :his fact only se:rv,9d. to further ~c::_-

.:usc Colonel Bane and many ot:.".8:t'S like him.· The Navy!s report
:iad no~ changed General !-11 tchell' s plans to sink battleshtps

from the stir, and it certainly d1.d not alleviate .the defects

1 3nav1.s, Billy Mitchell Affair, p. 72.

in tho Air Service which concerned Colonel Bnne.
In January, 192:i., the main opstacle to General ;11. tchell' s

propo!:lcd bomb1.ne tc3ts ~•ras re.moved.

As a result of a jo1.nt

resolut 1.on of Congress, the ;_,Javy was ordered to turn over to
the Air Service obsoletQ vessels for testtng.

Thts resolutton

was tenporarlly blocked in com!Tlittec heartngs on the subject,
but an agreement •:ras reached between the 'dar Department and the
Navy :Jepartment allo1-ring Hi tchell to conduct his tests under
Navy direction. 1 4
l-!01,; . that

iH tchell had been granted the ships for h1s tests,

he lost no ti~e contact1.n6 Colonel Bane about the aircraft for
the tests.

The General wrote to Colonel Bane on January 31,

1921, stating:
;l'his means of course, that 1.t 1.s;: up to us to make the
host demonstration possible .•• Now, ~hat I w1sh you
·i'rnuld do is have whatever armament that you think
would. be good ready to send here at any t1me for demonstration ••• Let me hear from you on these th1ngs as
soor. as you can, because we may be fll-lled upon to
carr-y 0 1it this attacJc very quickly. )

i•atchell then added:
I' want you to be sure to have what bombardment aircraft ;:;-ou have ree.dy to be used with the 1r crews when
the attack of the warships takes place. This 1s to my
mind the most important thi:n3 that ~Te _have before us. l6
In reply to these requests, Colonel Bane revealed the true conditions at :1ccook Field regarding the prospects of preparing
_,

,,

-

:
_:·c1-:::"" slct, '---r: _ 01 tlcs ~?f :: tl_t2.r;7 n.'
, 1..,.?.- - 1"2._. (Co ... .:.-.. s , •
.,e
_:: ,:,ta e
• - · 17.

l5navis, Billy ~·1itchell Affalr.~.p. 75. ,
,
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for tho

bomb1ng tests.

Colonel 3anc replied:

Your letter of Janunry J:L 1.s at hand. The flrr~t r 'J.::-r).c0raph, in ,;-1htch you cD.y you uant to have what bo;r:oa~clmcnt aircraft wo have rr:,.,l llJ to be used wt th tho lr c ri:;·,7z-~
for the attack on the warships, tu a little perturjtn1.
Of course, you know we have no crew3 a3sl~ncd to nuch
aircraft. In fa.ct, we have not a s1.nr;le officer who
ever dropped a bomb-with a bomb st~ht or ev~r wac tnstructed to drop bombs with tho idea of hlttin~ a
tarr;et.17
If ths Colonel's reply appeared 11lrn a "wet ":Jlanket !I tc~hnique,
it ·,ras :1ot intended to be.
a:ns-:·1erf1

Hot·rever, Thurman Bane's:·\~:,::~ frank

could. :iot deter i-atchell.

·T he General returned a let-

ter to Colonel 3ane assuring ni:c.:::
.0o not 1·1orry about the plan of operations fo:r the a~tack 0:1 the battleships. We will take care of tr:-e,-: •••
Uhat I want to t~press on you 1.s that we · do :not want
to waste time about thts.11::5

ro

prepare for the bombing tests General Mitchell t~en

e::::ts~:il;shed the First Provisional Air Br1gade at La:1/:.. ey .~ ield,
· · ·,_ ;.-,r;inia, in February, 1921.

This unit was litera.i.ly a

C/ ::".-

glomerate of men and :aach1ncs ;-1itchell had p1rated from fielis
all over the country.

One of the men ;,11 tchell enlisted for n1s

ne~·r ?ro--::i.sional Brigade was Georr::;e Goddard, the photograr,\~:.-~
:·rizar::::.. from ~,:ccook Field..

·J 1.tc:iell

was planning s:. gigantic

publicity campaign on the success of the bombing tests.

?or

this ~9eration, Goddard outfitted eighteen De Haviland aircraft

as p~otocraphic planes. 1 9

Colonel Bane did not object to God1ard

le2.vl.ns- HcCoolc to join. t ~e. Pro,11.sional 3rigade, for Goddard had

17uavts, Btlly Hite::-._e_l_l_A_f_f_a
__
i._r, p. 75.
18-b'd
.:!:..__h_.

t

p. 77 •

79.

94
::owcvor.,

of Mitchell's favorites from the beginning.

been

wh en the General com~ande8red aome pilots from McCook Field,

Colonel 3 anc ordered his ~en back to ~use.

General ~itchcll,

not "being accustooed to hav1.ne; his wishes thwarted by off1.cers
of lo~-rcr ranlr, merely had Colonel "3n.ne 's order counter;:.1a:.dcd by
a ~) _p c alin.; directly to Gcr:~ral ::enohe;r.

.

difficult situation.

Colonel Bane

-7 2.s

'.Ln a

For :•rhile the Colonel had_ the po~·rsr to

control ;.Ii tche 11' s plans by ·wi thholdirn; the necessary .' lircraft,
J a ne 1,ras po~·rnrless to

disobey Ger!.eral Henoher who by t:::.s ti.me

had been . completely deceived by Jltchell.
In ;,Ia.rch, 1921, I-r ite.hell wrote to Colonel 3a'l1.e concerr-.1.ng
the status of the new Hartin Bombers then be1.ng built a-: t,,_te

:·,I art in Plant in Cleveland, Ohta.

The General's anxiet:y showed,

as nc ·.•rrote:

I a:i. anxious to see the actual tests of the 11ft1.n 0
pm-rcr of the r.Iart1.n. I want again to impress upon you
the necessity for .: :;ett in:1; these aircraft out a:r~j r::ett ing them to Lan~ley in the shortest possible ti :~.,-, .
'.~:'.:-t is 1s th~ most important ~ging there 1s today •..
g ot those Martin aiyplanes.

It was evident that rutchell no longer intended to treat
Colonel Bane

1·1i th

kid gloves, and eventually the Genej:-2.:.' s

dealings with Bane toolr the form of mild insults.

Such was the

ca.Se. -: ·r hen Mitchell heard that the :Japanese were building a

codern air force using French Type JO N1euports, Breguets, and

Farman bombers.

3e 1m~edtately

went into a stew over the devel-

opuent plans for the Air Service, and this caused him
to Colonel :Sane tn a very caustic tone.

;.;0 ·

r~_"'i te

Mitchell blasted Bane

statinE,;, "i:-Jo:·r, you are the bird that ls charged with fixing
20

navis, Billy Hitchell Affa1r , p. ' 81~.
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these pro~rams prtmartly.
f~e t

Of course, each year tho SJ~te~ wtll

a little better. unle"ss we ,~et pO ;:mch system that notn1.n~

vtill worl-c. 11 21

Despite the obvious breakdo1-m 1n the relations.hip

between the two men and the fact that he dtsagreed w1. tn .a tchell,

'1'0 ~J.r[Tlan 13,::,_ne '1,as a prae;r.iattst and realtzed that the ::.;eneral was
s c. ill s'.r1e ·oest hope of s 2- .., in~ the .Alr 2. ,~rvtce.

After so:r.e minor technical ::.elays imposed on : I1.tchell by
0

the ~-:avy, the bombing tests f lnally ber'jan on June 20. 1 S~l, off

t he Jirginta Capes.

On this date, the Navy, ustng F-5-L air-

c r::~ f t, sun le the captured. German submartne U-117 •. ?ollowt?l~ th1..s

1921, the Alr Service sanlc the destroyer G-1Cl2 1.!'l

aircraft were no match for heavy capttal ships.

~Ltchell be ~an

to di.spell their doubts when the ltght cruiser Frankfurt, 5,100
tons, was sunk a few days later.

Yet, the greatest ~est was

still to 0ome.
On July 20, 1921, the Navy launched a serles 0t 11.r(nc
bo mb e r attacks a t;;ainst the ca~tured German battles'.d.p, 0:ctfr1.es-

lan1.

The Navy attack was unsuccessful.

The Atr Service fol-

Alt :-:01.F;h the Ostfriesland d td not s 1.nk, 1. t .-ras heavily da'naged.

On J~ly 21,1921, the ~artins renewed the attack usin~

')

-

-..1..:::,avis, 3illy ;-atcl-",e :'.. .~ ;.:.f :tair, p.
22 Ibid.,

pp.

94-112.
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Thus, 31.lly tHtchell proved that battlesh1ps could bo
cessfully attackGd from the atr and sunk.

!1 1lC-

Yet, d1d thccr? tests

have any s1gnif1.cance in improving the cond1t1ons within the
Air Service and at ricCook ?1.eld?

General Mitchell's only hope for using the bombing te~ts
to effect chan~es 1.n the Air St;;;rvice re~ted with the conclustons

~3tablis~ed

by

the Joint Army and Navy Board which was assembled

to revtcw the results of the tests.

General Pershing appear0d

a s a traitor to the Air Service, for when the Board's official

co~ cl~sions were released in September, 1921, it .was clear that
?ers ~ 1.ng had sided with the Navy.

The Board stated that it rec-

o.s n1 zed the .striking power of aircraft, but:

••. the battleship ts still the backbone of the fleet
and the bulwar~ of the nation's sea defense and will
so remain so long as safe navi.3";at i.on of the sea fo_r
purpo~es of ~Jade or transportatton is vital to success 1n war.
This one statement exhibited the tragedy of the whole cpisoie.

General Mitchell had won for htmself nat1.onal recogntt1.on, but
he did not succeed in changin~ the conservative attttudes of

the General Staff towards the Air Service.

The result was that

the problems facin 0 the Ln~ineering Dtv1sion had not changed

at all.

General i:-litchell would continue to argue for air power

to be considered as an tntegral part o~ organized national
defense. but such arguments did 11.ttle to hel9 McCook Field.

? '<

.

-JDavis, 3illy ~ttchell Affair, p. 117.

CEAPTER XII

r::·:ne ·oo~bin~ tests of 1921 were the type of e.eris.l s·-:.,2ctacular::: ti,a t only GenerE:.l ]illy ?-~i tchell could en.o ;ineer.

::r:,,-tT-

,..,-.rer, a sid.e fro;r, putting on the best air show since cr.: e

~tles

'~; 1;..

c?er t ~ s {estern ?rant, ~itchell had accomplished very little.
A ~~

~ranch cf the Air Service, the men of the Ens i~e~r~~~

their fellow officers and :nen in the Air Se!'vice. Eowe~re~-. because cf the responsibilities of the Engineering Divis1on,•its

probl8~s were more complicated. These difficulties could he

cate ~orized in three types: reduced appropriations, continued
attacks from the aircraft industry, and the dilemma of trying
to operate a successful program of research and develo·c:"1e·(. ~
in addition to the other two difficulties.
In Eovember, 1920, Harren G. Harding was elected President
of t~1e United States on a campaign ticket which stressed a
policy of "3ack to }Jormalcy." The irony of this slogar. ·,:'3.s ~i'ia t
i:.n tr.e case of appropriations for I!.ili tary aviation tradi t1 o:r:al

1-iorT::alcy ::-c_ear.t virtually nothing. During the period :C rom 1920

~-.:; ::.92.3, -che expen d.i t ures for ::1ili tary aviation in Great
~ritain and France totale~ ~92,000,JOO and ~58,000,000 respecc:ively. ~~et, while ou:- :t;uropean allies were sponsc::::·i,~.g pr0p:res-

si-,r e ::proe;rams of military aviation, the United States :;y its

annual appropriations demonstrated a la.ck of official concer:?1
1
r.l.~Jr ~1·11~r~y
nv•a~•::i.n..!..
v <:.l.1.
C.4
.J..
-v .;. l •
'-

J. ;

V

I m:media tely following the wur,

'~ 25, 000, 000 wa.s apr,rorJri-

a ted tor the I.ir Service for operations during the f1:::ca.l year
1 9 :. 9 -1 920 . Oddly enoup;h, durine; the follml'ing fiscal year, 1920-

lc.s t :ree,r for ma::.y years therea.f ter in ·:-rhich an appronri&. ~ion
ec~ua.i. to

tc.e needs

of' the. Air Service was rr.ade. 2 Per

.-,-~_;, fiscal

y e ~r 192: -1922, the amoun t allotted to t~e Air Service was rsduced f ro rr t~e ?revious yea~ to include only 119~200,00u. The

sar:e ~a tt er::--, ·:~as followed duriYi g t:ne next two fiscal periods.
J_:-;

t'.1e bud.g et for 1922-1923, tne appropriation was lowe:r-e~ ~o

'::; 12, ?00 , 000, and in the follovring year, 1923-1924-, Cot::~:r~~s s a.1~
"'12
' ~'() , oru O
1 oK cc.:.. on..i..y
·s , /J,.(_

-r or ~he Air Service.3

.: r..r-ough out t r.e entire Air S ervice, the sr:,,all a ~,_:-r ,)r,::•·ia"CJ.o:'ls had a:i injurious effect; however, the hardes-t 1:-~1 t of anr
,s ::ccup in the Air Service was t h e Engineering Di vision at lfoCook
Field. ? he amount of funds allocated for the Engineerin~ Division_ :Crom 1921 to 1924 corresponded to the appropria-cior. red ~c tions for the Air Service in general. On a yearly basis~

Z<,-,-,ro ~n·::.. a tio:ns

for the Enc; ineering Di vision amounted to in

· ; , CC0 ,0 00 , T:-1is continuous pro;:,;rarn of reductions mea.:r1t t ·,.;..8.t

.
_ - "'. -:·:ml and :·'.ili t a ry AeronB.u tics," Aerial Ae;e Weekly,
Gc~0oer ~~ , 1921, pp. 150-160.

J

<·!.cror10.utical Chamber of Conmerce of America, Ai:r·crB.f t
--~c:;~1' ~~-: co:ir: 192), p. 310.
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the brunt of the industry's attacks, Hhat the aircraft 1nduf;try
needed was either direct [1;01rernment subsidies or greater ,;,:overnmcnt procurement, IIO'irever t the Engineerine Di vision was po~:rerless to chan,se the circumstances within the aircraft industry
when the1·e ';,rere no funds being appro:;;ria. ted for such expansion

Criticism by the aircraft industry continued um.r.,..'.:l,ted even
3.fte:r the reco::1mendatio:'1s of the American A-riation :::1.:;sicr1 -,:-ere
released in 1919, Finally, the E~sineering Divisio~ answered the
'chal::..enc~es of the aircr2:.ft industry in a nation~l-ly

::,:-y-,c.,\•,~

a:via.-

tion ,J3.'"':azine. The statenents ::i..s,d.e in the article ·were to for:n
t'.:2 o ,9_ sis of the defense of tbe

1

-:ccook Field posl tio::-~ rlurinz

the 1920 1 s. The opening paragraph of the article defined the

co~troversy as seen by the Engineering Division,
L so::1e-:,rh8-t superficial investigation of the •present con-

ditions controlling ways and means for the develop~eY'..~
of ~ilitary airplanes for the U~ited States Ar~y indicates a lacJc ,")f sy:r:rpathy bet:-:een the civilian desit:;ners
anc constructors, and the officials of the Airplane
En.::-,;ineerine; Di visioi.1. at :,recook Field. If this cond1tior_ is real, it is much to be deplored, for, until
these t,.,·10 factions, each indispensable for the perfection of desien of military equipment, come to work ir.
he2.rty sympathy and understanding, development ca.Aviot
go f onrard at a proper rate. 7

::1.e

article went on to state the possible reasons for the

controversy, The first explanation was based on the question
of ~or o:-:i ""':i ty.

:•"cCool-:: Field. is in Ohio·, wl1.ile a laree part of the pre~::ey,_t airplane industry is cor..centrated around Few ·fork
Si~y. Consequently, the !~Cook Field officials do not
see enoush of the activities of the civilian experta,
7 "?·:cCook ?ield. and the Airplane Industry," Avie.ti on
l'I8.--:aziY~e, January 15, 1920, p. 5~5.
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d.o not talk to them often cnour:h to learn their ?i,-iny
problems, or to e;et first hand their point of v1o·,r.
On the other hand, it ir_; prohable that the civilians
of the industry do not keep themselves inti111.a.tely
nostcd rerrarrlinr,r the work at McCook Field, and rna.y at
times condemn this institution for its method without really knowing the conditions under which it labars and which make its task a very complicated one. 8
-

.J

~~

This 18.ck of cor:ununication obviously led to the proble:'.". of conflict of aims in the production of military aircraft. ?he article stetted:
'::'he Ei1r;ineerin,~ Division feels that civilian des:.~~r:ers
?"lave sacrificed the ease of production and maints::2.:r"~e
for ,erformance. In 6 eneral, it 1s true that exp8rimental airplanes delivered to ~cCook Field are unsat.....
~ -:.cry :"or '""'.il:.. ~-- ~·
~UT".>oses without extensive al·;::_' ~:.. :.11~. _ er:~:-)8 ... :·.::.. :Sr-.-'_:-:eerini:.:; Di vision is e.t
::~· 1-: 2.:. ::--1ot ~t;;ttiri,.,. c2.c['•. ·• before the civilian en-'.~ ::•..;::..-:.-:~ie :...,...)o:---- :ince of ease of production,
r:aintenance and perfor!rRnce. The usual aim for a military airplane in the civilian industry is super-3)erformance, while the :rr:ilitary aim is a proper vehicle
for transporting the diversified military equipment
required, and doing this in a manner to make the co~posite result an apparatus of easy maintenance in the
field and with as good a performance as it is possible to obtain.9
The result of the aircraft industry's failure to realize .the
production aims of the military had serious implications for
the industry.

ci -r.r::.:r.·:.a.n dee i r--ne_ s n.re per~cc tly c~p~hle '?f
c~,irr!:'..::1s c::cellent ai ~pl2.r~ .... . . . roi•~c rer , tne : 11:~r of -

!~-·c:~•..:..c'1.vi

:':.~_..-.1: feel 7,· ---t f:G :: o.r- n.u· cl·rilian desi'T111;:r~ ~a.i·L
t.:. .c.ep ir~ :;oucl-. '•Ti -:n t...,0 a.e-rcloi-ent of mili tar· · ....
stru~~~ts ~rd t~c u~c~ to which Military airplanr~ arc

} ··t, a?;. 4 a_ e, t:.e:ne.~o:·e , not fully qualified ; o build
· i 1 ' -- ~ "'".
,&.----"'!""-..
... J

ai· -..... 'n
1 ,.., re..
~,_....,..
. Ye 1 0

.

In light of the reasons given for the controversy, the
BAnV1 a t·ion ..
'
J anuary 15, 19 2 o; p.
J'!an;az 1 ne,
9Ibid., p. 525~
lOI.
;d
_.£:._.,
p.

525.

525.
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En[!:incerine; Division announced its policy towards the aircraft
industry, the needs of military aviation, and problemz of
buildins military aircraft.
The officials at :recook Field believe, first, tr.o.t indeuendent civilian desi~ners ~hould be encoura~ed ~hen
their work is of such q11ali ty to warrant it, 'not~-:. financially and by close cooperation and assistance;
second., t:1at 7:cCook :;::;'ield i:-:; in a much better position
to }::nmr intimately the req_uiremcnts touchine: on :'r.ilitqry airplanes and equipment than any independent desi~~er; t~ird, that, as ~cCook Field is required to
::,::,.;;s on ai:('pl.o.nes su_b!ni tted 'by outside desizners and
to correct defects in these airplanes after they are
:'.:)1r.ced in service, :•:cCool( Field must kw:m intina. tely
the ~robler::.s and difficulties of des:L::n, and it is
1::D,intained at HcCook Field that these things can cnly
oe learned by actually designing and building, in a
lir-:ited r,·ray, airplanes.11
·
'I'r1e article concluded with a statement of McCook Fielti 1s

intentions and limitations.
~ccook Field is willing and anxious at any time to T8ceive suggestions in the way of designs from all civilian concerns interested. The shortage of fur.cl~:, '-:.c/;,rever, will prevent the lettini?: of rnany experimer,tB.l
contracts, as the correction of defects of existing
types must go on. It is believed that all unite in hoDing that Congressional appropriations will be mor1;; liberal, so more work can be done by independent desir_i;ners.12
1

,lhat, therefore, was to be the correct interpretation of !·~cCook

Field's position in American aeronautics? The aircraft industry
sa::·: the Engineering Di vision as a

threat to 1 ts developrnen t.

On the other hand, the Army viewed McCook Field as ~n

nec8 □ sity

for the :maintenance of established standards in the production
o::~ :rr.ili tary aircraft. However, both these arguments re1.)resented

co!'l te::di:::g points of view, and as such, neither could be

..

1. ... -:".via

tion 7':a~azine, January 15, 1920, p. 525. ·

12 :hid., p.

525.

? or Lunately for t he ~~ke of t~c historian, th0 c0~~r~7ersy

~,:~.~-: e :.: 3. -::;:::.2. t 8-:·:.c~-,..:.:_ ~- ,Jf· ~::::ti 7'1S tB.}:inr5 ·.~er~ i r, ex ·s~ ri ··.~ e :.: · i Y2.S, :. . ._es.s u1~~- i1.i?-; , C8. 1 c u1.2 tin r_:, ar
~3. evi ::: i :,---,_~ to ~~ !:;C :..;_:_:_. e
<.:_-:. ~ J~s e~~l ir: a.e1~0 ~:-l~t!le C()Y-:str1.1_ction, '. :orco~,e~, -~:: ,:,~"':
1
_(~

~~csti5at io~s b~!~~ results in the for ~ of ta~les,
~~~~ t ions, stresses, or littl e matters of dcsi~n
·. /, ic'.'" c2.Yl::•.J t ·'.) e -;,.,,_ter.. tec: a:-:c~ :--- ?.cs tne e:zclusive ~JTO : '::;:;.···::;~• of so;"'.e par ti cu.18.T i ::di viclw1.l o:r cor:;[Ys.ny, '>:: c~~s c o: this, co~~ercial aeronautical companie~, ~uc~
~s the re R~e, either de not undertake work of t~e c~s ra cter at all, or if they do, guard the results as their
~~:r-;:: >2 secrets.13
1

: , I"'.

-~SY, ,

"~ .. c(; tJ()~'::

~-,_ ,. c ri CR.:l

be carried on without any regard to immediate co~~erci?..l returns. In other words, we hr-'J.Ve to hB.ve wh.a. t
practically amounts to a national laboratory for B.erona uticRl research. In this direction a certain amount
of work is bein,3 carried out in various 1nst1 tutions,
but the place where such work is carried out probably lLi,
on the largest scale 1s at r-TcCook Field, Dayton, Ohio.
';!here many people no doubt disagreed with !'ir. Cammen•s
theory of the need for a national aviation laboratory, he did
a great service for the historian who, in a search for objectivity, must attempt to place McCook Field in its proper perspec-

tive. Another important point which Carn.men brought out,in his
discussion was the fact that experimental research work in
aeronautics was being carried out in various insti tutior,s in
the United States during the 192o•s. In addition to HcCoo1,;: Field,
the two :::::iost important research facilities were the Aeronautical
Laboratory of the Bureau of Standards and the Forest Laboratory
at I'iadison, Wisconsin. This fact explained the reason why the
aircraft industry never mentioned McCook Field directly in its
criticism of government competition, but' the airplane manufacturers still believed HcCook to be the arch culprit in their
struegle for survival.
I:n the concluding portion of his article, Leon Ca.mmen ·summarized the state of aviation in America.in three phases. First,
he felt that the commercial possibilities for aviation would be
so~e time in comin~. To bridge the gap, a poltcy of government
subsidy, similar to that instigated in England and France, was
a potential solution. However, Cammen believed that the best
suppor·t
1 L;,.

the governr.:ent could offer to the aviation industry

- ::echa.nical Engineering Journal, pp. 441-444.
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we,s in the continued sponsorship of aeronautical reoearch. Second, he co~mented th~t if the science of aeronautical research

in the United States were to keep pace with the expansion in
other countries there would be "room and need for an organization
e-..ren larr;er than that of the original McCook Field plan. 111 5
Third, :<7r. Carnmen elevated the position of McCook Field to a

})lace of unquestioned importance to every American citizen
stati:n13:
It might be well, perhaps, to remember that the world's

co!'ld.itio:ns are still extrerriely unsettled, and that it

would really be a bold man who would dare to prophesy

that this country will be confronted within the life of
the present generation with an energency similar to
that of February, 1917. The developrcent of aeronautical en,'3ineeriT1Js as carried on by institutions like:
>TcCool{ Field is not a cheap pronosi tion. On the othe::::-:and_, however, it d.oes not require any SU::'.;:S tr.a".: nit:1.t
i1") the least prove burdensome to a country as weal th:y
as ours, and the value of such an investment would -oe
repaid a thousand fold in many ways, especially if •:re
should have the misfortune, together with the rest of
the world, to be faced with a grave war emergency in
the future.lb
·

The discouraging fact about the entire situation was that the

valuable insight of such men as Leon Cammen was overshadowed
by an economy minded Congress, a conservative General Staff,
and a battle of personalities within the Air Service itself.
After the conclusion of the bombing tests in Septerr.ber,
1921, General lf:itchell emerged as the most popular aviator i:-:

the cour:try. ·rhis fact immedis,tely led. to a personality clash

bet;•ieen !!i tchell and the Chief of the Air Service, I'Iajor Geners,.l Charles ::enoher. Ni tchell, re~ognizing the controversy

e:::isti:r,s bet1·reen his sunerior and himself, offered to resign
15,,.ecc
- , . 9.nlca
. l 3n.r:,::ineerinri;
Journal, pp,

16-,
....
l Ol,to

I

pp.

lJ-41-444.

441-444.

106

-

...,

1912 •

.>::::: vice 5.n the hands of res·oc,1sible leadership. ~:"e,:,

.:i::s of ';encral
~ .. s

:~i tchell,

~e constontly strove to ~-=·.:.iere a

tte;:::' ·.)osi tion for t?:e Air SerYice by 1·rorkins quietly and

-"'1;;
. j

~av:. s ,
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December 1, 1921, and provided for the creation of five divisions, These divisionG included: Personnel, Information, Traini nr~ and TJar Plans, Supply, and Engineering. Under the reor~a.n-

ized :plan, the Ene;ineerin.n.; Division at McCook Field was composed
of the Planninr.; .Sectiorr, 'Pechnico.1 Section, Factory Section,

FlyiT ~ 3ection, Procurement Section, Supply Section, Paten~s

Section, and. l'!ilitary Section. 18 Seemingly, General Patrick's
cl".B.nf.es could h~ve appeared to some observers to be a reor38.niza.ti 011. of the Air Service merely for the sake of reorganizing,
out t'i1is was certainly not the case.
Unlike Billy I-!i tchell, General Patrick did not seek to
build a nassive, co:::::1bat air arn. Patrick soue;ht to "T-,reserve
sor.,e se!'!'lblance of the wartime strength of the Air Service ir: the

face of a lack of understanding as to its vital functior!.." 1 9
::::'he

General, being the praerna.tist that he was, reco3:!"1iz;::;d. the

econony mindedness of Congress as a temporarily insur~ountable
obstacle. He, therefore, planned the operations of the Air Service so as not to oppose Congress or the General Staff but to
achieve as much as possible with what funds that were provided
for the Air Service. Ee stated his attitudes on economy thusly:
'Jhile the necessity for retrenchment in government expenditures is fully appreciated, there are certain considerations of vital imuortance to our national defense,
and to the efficiency of our existing establishrrents,
1·rhich, v,hile invol vina.; the appropriation. of additional
~un~~ may stil~ ~B classified as measures of strict and
.... as ~ing econo:ny.
1811 Reorc;anization of the Office of the Chief of the Air

Service," Aviation T•:arsazine, January 9, 1922, p. 42.
1 9?urtee, Arr:,,y Air Service, p. 130.

20

chief of the Air Service; "Annual Report for 1922," p. 41.
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Beo.rin,c~ in mind his rem:J.r1rn, General Patrick then attacked what
he believed to be the three major problems confront1ne the Air
Ser>vice. These problems were the failure to centralize the location of Air Service property, the lack of effective traini~~
methods, and the need for nore modern equipment.
The solution of the first problem was handled ,-ri th 11 ttle
confusion, as all the Air Service materials previously stored
in the twenty-two depots throughout the country were relocated
in five Intermediate Air Depots. One of the five depots

•,-1::3.s

lo-

cated in ·Fairfield, Ohio, just a few miles northeast of .. :cCook
Field. 'I'he problem of achieving more efficient trainir~~ :'.T'.ett.ods
was solved by planning for the continuation of the EnginE:ering
School at HcCook Field, the Field Officers School at Lan!_5ley
Field, Virginia, and the School of Aviation Nedicine at ::i tchell
Field, New York. However, the third problem could not ·ne ;:-esolved by ~elocating material or continuing existing operations.
l'Jew equipment cost money and required experienced enrc:ineers
to desiGn and test it~ and the Air Service in 1~21 was short of
both these things. Yet; General Patrick was not completely
stymied by the problem of trying to secure needed modern equipment for Air Service, for he had at his co:zmnand one of the
finest aeronautical research laboratories in the world at ·McCook
Field. If it ·were humanly possible to produce-the needed equipment, Patrick knew that the engineers of :McCook Field would
anm·rnr the req_uire:oents of the Air Service despite the lack of
funds and personnel.
As the year 1921 drew t ·o a close, one o-r the most eventful
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periods in the history of American aviation ended. Since the
Armistice, the Air Service hr'J.d undcrr:;one two reorganizations,
General Vii tchell had challen.~ed the battleship and won, I1ajor
General Patrick had bccor.ie the new Chief of the Air Service,
and the varti:ne aviation industry had virtually va.nisr-.e"3.•

·_.a th

tl"'.e passing of these events ca~e an even more irr.porta,nt consic.er:3.tio~, the war was overt As ridiculous as this :might sound,
no s~oup realized this fact more than the officers anc.

~~n

of

the I-:ccool<: Field Engineering Division. The days of the large
Har appropriations were gone, and hard ti~es had-ironically hit
the En0 ineering Division in the midst of unparalleled national
:,o:-osperi ty. This fact ~-ras evidenced by the curtailment of ~,rork
at :-: ccool< Field 8.s compared with the impressive achie-.;er.:ents of
\-.:crld \·Tar I days. Colonel Bane at the close of the year p·i1~lished a brief report of the accomplishments of the E~~i~eering
Di vision, so as to convince the "doubting Thomases'' that +,he
Division had actually done something.21
Such a situation was not part of the tradition of r.:ccook
Field, and it must have grieved Colonel Bane very much to admit that although the accomplishments were few, they were importa.Ylt. One important event was that Lieutenant I1acready, a

>:cCoo~i: Field pilot; broke the old altitude record established
by ~-".ajor Schroeder at McCook Field in 1920 with a flight of

37,670 feet. In ,addition, the 700 horsepo·wer model "W" ensine
~12.d

been successfully tested for fifty hours, and work had

21 colonel Thurman 3ane, "Work at McCook Field in 1921,"
Aviation :1ar:azine, January 9, 1922, pp. 41-42.
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ri.'h e

-__m in the Power Plant ~;cction on a 1,000 horsepower eneine.
first duralumin o.irplane was also under conntruction e.t

?;cc ook Field durinG 1921. c oloncl 0ane praised his Equ1 v:;cnt
S e c t ion for the development of the earth inductor

COJ;!p:-J.:-~~~ ,

clouu. flyin2~ lm~trur.1e:nt· hoard, ancl non-fror1t1nG r~orr,rr,lc( 22
Colon el co~cluded his report by extending reco 6 nition to the
ArT:1-0.,!1 cnt Section for the perfection of the electrical ST:,-

Cfsro~1izer and L~,000 pound bonb rac1i:, the Estoppey bo:r.o :::1~:::.t,
2.nd the Universal bomb hoist. All these achievements :::a'!".. e believ e d. ,;,~ ou.ld improve the opera ti on of the newly acquired. ~-~ar~in

·:;:1::e briefness of Colonel Ba~e 's report only servec. ~o er.!p l'la s ize ho1•; ::iuch the econony :measures of Congress had hurt the

2:'l[.I;i!1eeri nQ; Division. Bane admitted that the Contract s ~.: c~-;i0n
of the Division had accomplished very 11 ttle dur1ne; 1921 sir;,ply
bec.::rnse there were no funds for procurement. 24 However, this
period. of inactivity at I(cCook Field was an exceptional tine.

?he :2n0 ineerins; Division was faced with havine; to adjust to
reduced. peacetime budgets just as ·were all the other di visions
of ~h e Air Service. Ironically, the lean years which were to
~:)i:::_y;-: :oroduced the ::~reatest achievements at NcCook Field, for

::.,~T in3 t h e ::ctid..-1 920 's,

tl1.e scier.. tists and engineers of t h e

:::;~-"rdt:,::-;;:rir.t.G Di vision l1.ad li tt2.e to work with .but their own
3e:,1i1.,;.1:: ) 3.:n c. it 1-:-as this ingenui-::r alor-1e that kept the Air· Ser-

'Tic c ::::-o~ beco:::i.ine; co:rtpletely obsolete.

pp . 41-42.
I)... .

41-42.

~he character of aviation in the United States di~ not

' n 3c a~pre ClcD
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The story was ~alnly

a r e it~ration of previo~s ar~u~ents.
~over~~ents of ?ranee, 3reRt Gritain, Russia, a~~
.Jer~any, a mong others, have devoted their main en~r,- ie s to ,,rari the ere at i.o-n of r:: i.l i tary aeronaut l.cal csi::: .::si ~ sh~:1e·:1t s.
The United States, while reco:mizin-:
t ho aerial ar~ as essenttal, has since the Armlst~c0,
re7~rted to its traditional non-~ilitary outlook u~o~
~orld affairs and has turned its attentic~ to do~~s~~e

tic problens. Thus American aviation has been deprtve1
tc a lar~e extent of the hourishment of ~ilitary appro·..-.. v, ', ,-, .._ \ ons- l
!J..L-C...v•

.

Yat, despite the dismal picture of American aviation, there
were several significant achievements made by the McCook Field

ens i~eers and the aircraft industry.
2:.co bc..bly the most important ,-rnrk done by the al.rcraf t

in-

dustry since the war was accomplished in 1922 as a result of
the National Air Races held at Detroit in October.

The ~orale

of the Ta~ufacturers was greatly improved when the Air Service

so~sht assistance in preparing planes for the competition.
~~e ~ir ~ervice req4estcd the Curtiss Aer6plane and
::otor Corpora~ion; the Loaning Aeronautical En~ineeriTT ,:;o~?orat1oi:; the .Lla'::'rer.ce ::ipe:r·~y A:r-Corporation;
~nd ~~e ~no~as-Morse Aircr~f~ Corporation to lay o~t
t')·~rs'.J. it pl,'.3.:'1e s.
i'l:e ert~inee:r.s :,ere permitted a : ree
0

.:.,\;:o:ron.a utical

tc ~-

C:--,amber of Co=1merce of A.:Tierica, Inc.,
,) l, p • 1 •

112

h~~d---a prlvilc~o thu~ offered for the flrat tlm0 ln
t he history of the industry.~
Since the prospect of bulldin~ ractng atrcraft lnaptrod th~
airc:raft industry, it also did :nuch to engender enthus1.as:n at

The engineers at ~cCook Field became particularly 1.ntcrestPd in the Curtiss

s-6 Racerc.

These were externally ~raced

s~reamlining of this aircraft was accomplished by the aerodyna;n le des 1. 0 n of the cool inr::; system and the co:npactne ss of the

Curtlss D-12.· rhe ori~tnal purpose of the R-6 Racers was to

co~pete in the Pulitzer Trophy Race at the National Air Races.
One of these planes, flOi·m by a :-lcCook Field pilot, Lieutenant
L. ::{. ;.;au3han, won the race with Lieutenant L. J. Vial. tlar.d 1.n

ftnishin~ second.

Lieutenant Maughan, at tfd.s tl.:ne,

established a new World Straightaway Speed Record of 236.57
miles per hour over a one kilometer course.

This record was

2Aircraft Year Book 1923, p. 57.
')

..J"The Curtiss D-12 water-cooled , direct drlve, V-12
en~inc of 4~-in. bore by 6-in. stroke (1145-cubic- lnchcapacity) was a landmark in engine dnvelopment that had
world-:·ricle effects. The D-12, 1-1h 1.ch passed i. ts f 1rst type
test in 1921, was based on the Curtiss K-12 engine desic:ned. in 1917-18 by Charles 3. Kirkha:n but never fully
developed. The engine was rated at 425 hp at 2300 rp~,
an~ ~~ve very excellent service at thl.s rating of gasollne of 50 octane number {or lower) wh1ch was then currcn"c .i:n the U .~. '.i:he .J-12 wa3 extensively used ';:Jy the
l.J'.3AA?' for fi,;hter aircraft and used by them. in the Surtis~ htpla~e racing aircraft. Curtiss later enlarxe~ tje
D-12 ~~tc ~he V1400 ·which was used in the Curtiss ;acl.n:
a:.rcraft. Altho'.1c;h the D-12 and 1.ts successor had a re:.,e.:r'lrn.ble career, develop:nent of its advanced engines wl. th
'!es.red propellers and. r;eared S'..l.percharger s d1d not go for~a~~ as a - sult of aircoolsd en~lne development in the
u . .::.;.n :-Ieron, Al.rcraft Piston Engl.ne, pp. 17-1~.
0
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.L2.i;cr ·01·0\-::cn in ?ebru.o.ry, 1923, by Lieutenant Alford 1:n..lllamn,

u.s. ~·., with a sneed of 2~6.58 miles

per hour over a three kilo-

meter co'J.rse in a plane modeled after the R- 6 Racer.

L1

l .. t this same time, much work 1-ms also be tng done at ::ccook

Field with re~ard to cxperi~entation on training aircraft.

In

t:::0 e; a rly 1')20's, training planes -;•rere d"ivtded·1.nto two basic
C8.te ,-:,_- oyics, the primary and the advanced.

The Curtiss J~:4-Ll, the

oldest of the pri~ary trainers, had become the principal inst:rucU.on tool of the Al.r Service.

The govern:nent d1.zposed. of

these planes in large quantities after the l•rar, ·,:hlch acco,.ir~ted
for their use by :nany so-called barn stormers and co,~ ~erc ~al
pilots.

The JN4-D was replaced by the TW-3 which was produced.

by t'::e Consalid.ate<l Aircraft Co:npany and po".•rered by a :,,fright

:-:oc.el

11

E 11

,

180 horsepower engine.

The advanced training air-

c:raft primarily used ~-ras the i/ou.~ ht 'lE-7.

Because of t ts higher

spec1s and great manueverability, it required greater ehperience
to fly.

The V-:!.-7 utilized a Wright 180 horsepower ~n£;ine:.

Other

traininc aircraft included:
•.. the Huff Daland TA-2 which used a Lawrence "R 11 , lL;-4horsepower engine; the Cox Klemin TW-2 which had a
:lrir:;ht "I", 150 horsepower engine; the Dayton-T1lri2:ht
'2..'A-5 ,:•:hich contained a Lawrence J-1 A1.r Cooled 210
~orsepower engine; and the Fokker TW-4 ~hich 1ncorporated a Curtiss "OX", 90 horsepower eng1.ne.5
:i'he 1-IcCook Field engineers, hm-mver, did not limit their

research and clevelop:n.cnt only to atrplanes and airplane en~1.nes.
jor John F . Curry, Select Co:n:r.ittee of InqQiry into ~he
___
~ - ~s of the
.s. Air 3erv1.ce
k Field, 1924, p. 29

) ; also see Heron, Aircraft Piston En~ine,
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n 1_T1n;; f '.):r o.v io.t ion o:-tlr-;inatcd in Dayton, Ohio.

Cne ::·;ch arJ.-

v.T1.:::r,(i_ o.vio.~ion tcchniq_,-1.c ~-ro.s the development of Ewrial ere.::,

T~e early tests with crop dusters were conduct01 by

dusti~g.

in.·_:; operations ,;,rcre done over Catalpa Grove just nor:.r:. of: ;)ay-

ton.

Tho riircrnft ~sed for these tests was the Huff ~ala~d

Aircr2.ft dust in,:: operations 1·1ere expanded 1n Aue,711:::t, 1 J22.
n.s t-.ro (;-:]:ctiss airplane:: were obtained from 2,Iaxwell ?l.el'l in

Sl:o,' flc,-.r t'.:e first dusting fll.f3;hts which were under the cliroct-

tion of

:-::r. -~.

Coe.d of the Depart:r.. ent of Agriculture.

;oars of careful ezpcrimontation, the Department of A1riculture
'r--:t:.rl :;lo.nes of the Euff Daland type desir;ned and. constructed. for

eJ.~ten-:iccl aerial dust in:3 ope::ce.t ions. 11 6
'::':~2 ;-IcCook engineers of the Plane

Design Sect ton. uerc

oq~i)pcd to test any aircraft for aerial stabl.ltty produced. tn

the ~orld.

7he reason behind their success ln locating struc-

tural ~cakncsses in aircraft designs was primarily due to the

tests they could· conduct on their outstandtng flve foot -irind
tu:1;_1el.

e:rc:!_·J.ci.ve

T;-1e construction of the tunnel was completed l.n 1922.

ti.SC

of a one, 1•·"'-·",,,..,d--ed
forty' .l,:,oo.,:__l.,
_c

ng ar •

t,.,,:,..
u ....

The max i::1•1:n

,::.:._:c s ·::::!:'c,:;;::: cc..:::,able of attainc:J.ent during tests was five feet l.n

of Ar:.erica, Inc. ,
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:,c.· 1lc nodcls of V,'J.riou::: airplanes, ',11.ngs, and diti'~ i':)lc.3
11crc eo:'1structcd a:1.d- place:cl 1.n the a1r stream.

After r:-,L10r arl-

jnst.n.c1nts ~-rnrc :nadc, tho Hind tunnel tests furn1shed a rcliacle

bG.::is upon i•Thich to predict the flight perfor.:nance o: t:-.rJ full.size u.i.rplanc.

'J:he value of this instrument to earl:/ aircraf'c.

en "':i.ncer·s 1,as ii'iL11easurable.

The f indin5s .zaincd f'rc'.71 1. t.:; tc sts

reduc~d t~e risk of havin~ to redesi~n the entire aircra~t in
o:rir:r to s2cu::ce the necessary 2od1.fications.

The ad.d.1.tional

·oo ::--,1;t? of i:~ir:.d tunnel test in,?; was that it represented. only

a~out one per cent of the ent1.re cost of constructing afi airCT<J.ft.

I·l-.us, it co:J.ld easily be seen Nhy ~•lcCook en,?;lneers con-

s iderccl their wind tunnel one of their most valu::J.ble plec1:s of
research eq 1.tipm.erit. 7

In additton to the f1.ve foot wind tunnel, the propeller
testin,s faciD.tics· at 11cCook Pteld were very outstand1.nr::.

In

f a ct, the propeller testin3 equipment at the field was cc~sidercd to be the most advanced of its ltlnd anywhere in the

-:rnrld~

Joth the Air Service and the }Javy aa well as private

a.i::cc raft co:npanies ut il l.zcd the test equipment.
entailed •,rhirlinc; the

.
propeller at

The procod'.1 re

the upper end of a teat rig

at either double tho horsepower or double the rotatton ~pood ·
t:-,c ;Jro~i 1~ould ·encounter in actual fll;:;ht.

-Ttiis act 1. vi ty ~-ru.s

conti~~cd for a period of ten ho ~rs, at which time the propeller
~a3 ~2c:ared air worthy.

~ater spray tests ~ould also be con-

d.ucted. in conji;,:::1ction ~,itl1 the whlrlin3 . tests.

7c,:;,:.·ry , Onero:'.:ionc at :: ccook Field, p. 9.

Th1.s was done
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tho.t the al.rcrnft industry had suffered greatly from the •;,rar
c:-: pan sion and late):- curtailment of production, but there were
still many men within the aircraft industry who believed that
direct s ovcrnmcnt subsidies were not necessary.

These rr.cn felt

t}: at co:·.1::1.e rc ial e.v int !.on uould succeed in thl') United Ctatcs 1n

t i~e .

~oTTcver, the q~estion was ho~ nuch longer would t n o ltq-

uid.2.t ion of , the ind.ustTJ continue, for a long period of contrnc t ion :-rould gravely affect o'.lr aerial defenses.

2 :1c ncccl for co:r.1.crc l.al aviation in the United States to

sust a in the aircraft l.ndustry and to draw cr1.t1.c1.sm a:.-ray frorr.
VicCoo :: ?ield ~·rn.s vividly apparent.

Congress1.onal action to:mr'.:l.

alleviatin3 the proble:n toolc the form. of the Winslow-Wa.ds,rorth

"S ill.
T~1e Act, in "hrl.cf, ,rovided for the establishment in
t !H:~ Deps. rt~cnt oi Co ~l1 :icrce of a~ TI11reau of c1.~,1.1 Acro.__,.:::1u t ic s . The act was divided into five parts and. esta':Jlis}-lod authority for inspect ion and licensing of
·9. irc.ra ft and. pilots, establishing and cert ifyin5 al.r
ro utes a.nd. termin-?..ls, as well as rules of the air and
t'.18ir e.dministration, and so co-operating with our
;,1ilitary, ~,Iaval, Postal, and Commerce a.tr activities
tl:a t_ the '>Thole can literally be co-ordinated 1:nto the
l1.1r i?o,;,;er of the United States. 11 _
._ .
;.::' h (~ Hhi te 2onsc follm,;ed the lead of Congress by speak inc
., '0 v . L,

in favor. of inp:?:"o·,red policies toward aviation.

"Doth Pres-

:10.::::ding and President Cool1.dg e urged _legislation for the

i d. c :1t

1~c c;;;.1ntior:. , relief, and encoura6 ement of aviation. 11 1 2

Em·rever,

l o:;: i::::l o.tlon and su:Jport from the Executive I•ransion did not
c hc•.;1 :;c, t h e situa-r.ion.
1

~t appeared as i{ the Untt·ed States would

:~ircraft Year ~ook

12-,
.d
.±.21:._. ,

p.

137 .

1924, pp. 124-125. ·
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not ~ct unless 1t wns chocked out of 1ts period on 1nacttv1ty.
The voice of 1mpondin~ doom came from the lips of dolonel Dwt~ht
P. Davis, Assistant .Secretary of 'da.r, as he addressed the Third

National Aero Con3ress in St. Louis on October 1, 192J.
In his 8pcech, Colonel Davis concentrated on the state of
r1ilito.ry aviation and the aircraft industry.

As far a!:; topics

·vrerc co~cerned, both of these had been attacked raany t1.:r.:.cs be_f o:-e.

~:ouever, the importance of tho Colonel's speech ·,-ras not

;'.'/iat he caid, but

the

•:iay

he said it.

lie stated:

·.:~1at ·~•;e are doinr; ts literally cte.rv1.ne to death tr:e
.nost vital branch of our national defense. If Congrccs
c1.ccs not ,a8.::c aderr.19.tc ap9rop:riations 1.n the n'::;a.:r futu:rc, ou.!' Air Service ,·rill oe rendered absolutely 1:n~)otent. :.::ven a more .serious situation than this, of
t'.':ere ca:ri be a more serious situation, 1.s the fact
that our co~~crcial aviation industry is also being

starved to death.

One of the lessons of the World ~ar

~-ms t:1e fact that aircraft are absolutely indispensable in modern warfare, and the nation wh1.ch 13 net
provid.ed Hlth adeg_,;atc air forces is almost certa.l.?1ly
doomed to defeat.Lj

Colonel Davis did not advocate the building of a ereat air
fleet, and he di.d not Hant to see the United States 1n coai:-)et1.-

tl.on Hl.th other nat1.ons for a;v1a.t1.on supremacy.

He ::mgg cs'i;ed

instead a sradual ten-year pro,~ram of aircraft construction bcco.usc his idea 1'm.s "to e;tve our a1rplane ::nanufacturers some
basis on ,·rhich to f ie;ure thay can stay in business. 11 14

Colonel

Davis concluded h1s remarlcs by stating, "We should giv~ our
air force at least a chance to protect us, and we should give
11 1~ .·.-The Assistant
our a:1iation industry a chance to exist.
.
~.
'
.

:i..3Atrcraft Year 3ook 192L~, p. 1l~4.
d
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Jc ere '. ,a1·;;.,- of l;Jar was not a ru.dieal of the i·ll tchell typo.

He was

merely r.;t at. i:c1G the truth when he placed the blame for the ent tre
sil:uatioi1 -;-1 ith Cone.:rcsc.

The fact was that the A1r Servi.cc wac

barely holdinc itself to~cthcr deopite tho emer5ency aust~rity
mc :;. snr c s of Ge11c:ral Patrick, anrl l t waz al:::o clear that the

c,x l c.:.t ion 1.11clust17 ;·;ould ne '.r e :~ he able to pull itself' out of the

It se:c :·~ed. o.s th01.1.;s i Colonel Da•rls worded h1.s speech az a

Davis called u;,-:>n tb.c lc2.ders of the nation to Gi7(; the

::ci o lc:..

Ai.~ Gci~·-' ico

11

a chG.nce to protect" the country.

The t:;oal o: the

~:::-,:; ~::ce:rins Di vision fitted 1.nto thiz plan well, fo~ l. t -.-:as
thGir sole inter-1tion to keep the Alr Service as stror:-=5 as pos-

-·

'.i:he 2.ccor.-:plish;1ents at ~-lcCool{ Fl.eld took on arld.ecl cl.c-

siblc.

n ificancc as the conditions in the Air Service grew worse, an1
by ::,o nc a ns the least of these accomplishments was in the areas

of ?Drsul.t and 3 omber aircraft.
·;he Pursuit Aircraft were the fighter planes of the post
;:•~c.:r c :;.~a.

'Il:c purpose of these a1.rcraft was to secure the .sl:1es

ov e r the front and also to afford protect1.on for heavy, less
::1a.YYu.c ·rn rablc bor'.lbers.
1·;~:. s

D..

conste. :nt bo. ttle

Thus, the problem of structural des i5n
1.i1.

trie cicvelopmcnt of Pursu1 t Atrcraft

d.u.c to tho required ~ombinatlon of s~rength with lightness.

The

:·cincip~l aircraft in this group were the · Curtiss P:l-2 and the
.J o c i 11: ? ':: -).
_::,o~ :~:.-:- c l~-::: :.:::c.

30th these pla11.es used the Curtiss D-12, 37.5 horseli.dclitional pursuit sh1.ps were:
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incrc ~ ~0 in tho po~cr of the cn ~ ines alon~ with a

~hcs n :~o.pons were loo~ed upon by th0 i~-

;~rc.: ::..tl y i. ;~.crcascd the st:-i :-:in;::; capability of the i!lil i tary force

bo ~~ ~L i ~hcd only 112 pounds, but as the importance of the alr
, ~r'.:3 ir.c:r-ec.scd, t:1e size of Ol'Cb'.i.o.ncc lrnpt pace.
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I t was booed on a

,, s1x L1bcrt,y
"' bv
_ poi·rcr""d

·1·Ta~

12 11

11

c,Y·;inc s, each rjencrnt in.~j 1:.00 horccpm·rer.
In the suomcr of 1923, the Rarlin~ Bo~ber was acse~bled at

·::rir:J·st c,:1cl :-IcCool--: ?iclds.

1lalter Barl1ng, the des1r;ner, d1.rec-

1

The ...·olanc had to be asse:nbled out-of-doors

c"lou·::;I-: to house it. The f i.rst fl1.ght of the Barllns ·.m,s c~-1
.:.1..:.r~:uct 22, 1923, by i.,:eutenants Harold L. Harris anC:. i'i. ~-

I-'8.ircl1 i.ld..

:i'oll01·r1ng tho test ir1g of the aircraft, in ;:,:;arch, 192!;,

the :Jo.rlinc; L:an 6 ar :·ms co:npleted· at the north end of Wilb•1r
1
:!~L:5:1t :?ield., -:·rhich hous od the ~iant ship for mo.ny ycar;;. 7

1

:c:1e I-ia:ct in and Elias 3orr:':)ors ,·rere also destgned for lor.7:
:~c,:-1:::;c attack purposes.

::owever, both of these aircraft -.-:Gre

:,rnch s:-:1allcr than the Barlin2;.

Officially designated the .~art1n

~Co:.~0 eio Plane and the ;i:lias NBS-J, both plane~ were p01·1cred by

t

1

•0

Li:)ci-ty

11

12." cn,: ;ines.

The Curtiss

z,rns-1 was some\·rh,'!tt sr:ialler

"c:-,0.i.1 tl1e: ::3lias 1.)0:nbcr, but it ·s till used t1-ro Libert:;

_::i.ncs.
~~s

~

11

12 11 en.-

'l'he 12.st i:Tiportant ~omoer was the Gallo.udet :JB-1 wh1ch

sinsle cncinc nonoplane powered by the Eng1neer1n~ Div1-

sion ~-~-A 700 horsepower cnsine.
-.-.'::.0:1 cons id.ering s.iTplanes, the most important feat· ;.:~e :·,as,

As has been noted in tte nrecedin,-:;
-

.J
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:-:i.n..-:.1.y:>Lc, v::.riouc:; 1-;ypo:::;

ll·0.d

sizes of engtnco -..,ere utilizorl for

di f :C'orr; ;).I; '.cincls o:C o.i.rcro.:::'t and the funct tono they z;crf·or,1 0d.

--

:~'hu::, ;:;:10 .L'o~·:r8r PJ.o.nt, :-..ioctl.on at 1-icCook Fteld remaincr: one of the
: 10 ~:~

L:'.Dorto.nt f ac ili tics of the installat ton.

Its d'J.t ics

inc~~ucJ.e;,:::_ not only the dosisn a.:-1.rl construct1.on of en-:-:incs but

-

of tho ':Iri.r~ht J..cronnutlco.l Corporatton
so:::.
priccc;_ one ,-:;roup of ?rivatcly nanuf ::?.ctured po~·rcr pla:n.ts ' :!'".i~:i

~:rcrc ~losely associatc,l -:·rl.tl1 :IcCool: Pield .engineers.

i'h8 ;:rigt,t

and the ·,:ri,3ht i-Iodel J ( forrr:crly ti. e
Ls.~;:::-c:1cc :)-cylinder) 1·rcre all en::;inc~ manufactured for t:-:,:,;
::.::n,3incorin.:.; Division.· i-Iorc specifically; the Wright Radial ~m.s

a 33J horsepoTTcr, hish powered, air-cooled engine which ~a2
lli.-idc:r clcvelopment during the· early 1920 rs for use 1n purs'J.1 t
or o-oservation alrplancs.

The T-3 was a 12-cy11.nder heavy duty

cn3inc built primarily for bonbing aircraft.

~he Wr1~ht ~odel

J -::as a s:aaller 200 horsepm-rcr, a tr-cooled en 0 1.ne which had

.

:Jecn succes::;fully incorporated 1.i.'lto the TA-6 and TA-5 airplnncs. 1 3

Arwth,:n" Yc;ry populc.r on.sine wa:::: the Pacl{ard lA-1,500.
:T?i::r"

The

:'u:l.ctio;,1 of this po:·rer plant· t·m.s for use 1.n pursuit a1r-

cra~~.

It was a 12-cylinder, V-type, water-cooled engine pro-

Due to its light weicht of
o:-:.ly ?25 ~o~:1ds, it :ras co::.nidered to have great potential as

-

------ -- -..
.:. ;_, Surry, O!Jc1-·c.tions at ;:c8ook Field, p. 11.
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c ;1--:L:c p1·ovcid that i1o c nll D.ttc 'n pt:::: of the i-: cCook ~"iclrl on?;L1.ocra

c u lc cl. i rl cuccor;s.

'.i.'hi:::: G-cy linclcr, water-cooled en,: :;ino hacl

p,:i.~;::;c ,::. the f ift;:/ hou:;.~ to ct Gat i sfactor1.ly, ?Ut the power plr.:mt
pro v e d to be too hi s h in ~ci~ht for the limited hor6cpow9r

davc lo ,cd to meet ~ir S0rvico require ments.

I t l:o.d. previously bee n r1ounted on a ground attack aircra.:t, t~v::
GL-2, a~1d proved very successful in fllght.

iiowever, d.ue to the

s u e co ss of' tl1.e Pac lea.rd !A-1500 en.; 1.ne ,·Thi ch gave greater ;;0·. mr
fro~ less tteisht, the extensive applicatiori of the W-1 see~ed
unli'.:cly.
In spite of the fact that tl1e Liberty

11

12 11 engine was a

'\•;o.r-t i r.ie prod.uct, it was st i l l the :nost widely used po.·rer plant
b y t:: e Air Service during the 1920 1 s.

This was partially d.ue

t o t ~1e fact the.t havlnc; so::ne 10,000 of these engines cY-• .i.1ancl
o.f' tc1· t :1c ,-rar, it bcca"J.e necessary to concentrate upon t ~·.c 5.r

r Gfine.,1on.t and add to their usefulness for the sake of cconony.
i.c'::c : .~2: s :..,lt of this 1·rorlc :w.s an en.c ine of great reliablli ty and

s 1)lc ::cUd ~)erformancc.

The Li bcrty 1·ras used almost exclu::.: i vcl;y

l".'1 t:1c J. ii~ ~lail Service, on t!1.e Airi·mys,

for cross co-....n.try fly-

inc; , :x .-~c: for fur!1ishi:".i.G the po~·rcr for the Barl1.ng, :-Iar•ci~1, ~1d

ot :·:2~ ':.:.0;1:::ers.

·r he ,o~·rer plan-: s use cl i.n the 'I'ransco.r..~ ::.ne ntal

'i't1c Inverted Liberty :~nr.,;in0 Has sttll another e:~pcrtruent

boiiv; cond.uctod durl.n~ the poc:c--~mr pcrtod at :-recook.
po,;ro1~ plc.nts ~-rcro not c.

;--1e~-:-

Inverted

concept, for the Gcrr:ians h2.rl be[{Un

test in'-- in this arco. durin[: ·.:o:rld Hn.r I.

The value of such a

pro_jcct ~·ms th"J,t i t ,,-roulcl afford. the pl.lot better vl.si:-.,ili.ty
for ,::,oth lancH;:1c; and r:i.ant.l.'3Vcrinr; the aircraft if t?-ie c;1;~':.::--1e
,;-;ere to be in::itallcd up:::1.do d01·:n.

Other adve.ntap;e~ includ.f.:d. the

~os~~~ility of a simplified fuel cystem and the accecs1.bil1ty
of ':;:1e engine for repair •.-rork -;•rould be creatly t:r.pro~red.

Also,

l.11

co:--n,bo.t suc:'1 an en?ino conficura.tion 1-rould reduce the dan:3cr

~
Ol.

.1_1;;__,1..,..,

~~~Q' ~~ ~011~~1.·o~"
.1.......
;.i,.:.:,. 19
-..J.L.i.

-...,

....

.1ith the increG.sod speeds and [jrcatcr r:ianeuverabi.11.'cy of

1

c.irc:~a:t p!'oduccd durin1; the 1920' s, higher service cellinr;s

'.~ore also :lcsired.

This de.;:and for airplanes which could opcr-

at~ at higher altitudes led to-the development of the si~c type
s1.1)crcbar~;ors at i ~cCook Field.
0

The Power Plant Section butlt

a::1d -:--,2.c_c tests i·rith e.11 airplane usin3 their superchar5er 1.n

:L921:.

At that tir1e, a :naxim'Ll.!'"1 altitude of 32,000 feet :·ras at-

taL1ecl..

The introduction of supercharged enc;tnes ·Has also found

to increase clinbing p01·mr.

In this sane series of tests in

1921.1, the a.ircraft climbed to 20,000 feet in flfteen and one

hc..lf r:-i.i:nutcs, and it reached a heisht of 27,000 feet in twenty-

·~~·he best -:.re.y - to s1-.m.r:1a.:rizc the :'..)erioc1 from 1922 to 1923,
~:r~-ie:-i thG

Air .Se~vice ~ras sufferir...g many discourageme:r..ts, 1.s

e, ::ote of encour&~_r::e::1.ent.

on

::ajor '.;enere.l ?atrick, never !mm·m for

1 9curry, O~eretio~s at ~cCook Field, p. 12.
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hi::; o·,~;i.;,1io;,1, clicl flncl one thin:; in 1·!hich to rejoice r~.u:rin-: 1'.)23 ..

'.C>,c .:\ir :]cY7 i. ,·r:: . ~;--1,·i °L1cc1~inr: :J 1 vis ion is ,robc.oly the
;-:'_Oct coJ1.Dloto, t:·10. :most ofricicnt, an'.:l the most :,:-:-orJ.uct i vc o.oro:1.c.,J.t lcRl l:?.ooro.tor:r ln tho 1-rorld. Its doctrl..ne

of ~ro~rossivo con3orvatisq based on thorou~h rc~~arch
i--· i 'c i(_ c.cJ.11crc:1.ce Jco :]ol1ncJ. onzineer 1.n.s _pr 1.nc l~Jlo s !"iD~3
sc:-:- Tr·; :::. to r::i •ro it tJ. crccli blc sha.y-e in _pr act tcall:r e':o-;:J
/•.
TGco~c-cL oi no·cc no':-r listed. in the annuals of aviati0n.,,.,

(___,_~.~cl.

0

CHAPTER XIV
A NEW HOME FOR MCCOOK FIELD
Whenever the achievements of McCook Field are analyzed,
it ~ust be remember that these accomplishments were done anid

an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the ultimate future of the
field.. Ever since the letter of Colonel Ban·e in February, 1919,
the pressure to find a neK location for the Engineering ~ivision had been mounting. Various arguments against 1':ci:::ook ?ield
,;,~ere presented during the early 192o•s. Some people stated that
the rent paid private holders was too excessive. Pilots com~ented that the 225 acres of flying area was not adequate.
Landinr::s had. to be made over congested city areas, e,nd the run·way its elf was -well under 2,000 feet in length and considered
substandard for use by higher powered aircraft. To add to the
dilew~~, nearly everyone connected with the field was concerned
about the temporary nature of the buildings used to house the
facility due to the constant danger of fire.
Thus, it could be said that the arguments against the retention of McCook were in the majority. Yet, the question re!:1-8.i:'1.ed.

as to where the onera tions of HcCook Field would be

transferred so as to provide all the advantages of Dayton, Ohio.
Colonel Bane suggested Langley Field in 1919, and since that
t:i.Y.,e other sites had been reviewed in New Jersey and !-!aryland,
but no definite action was taken. However, Colonel Bane had
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reti:ced from the Army in January, 1923, due to ill he&.l th. :::tis
successor, Major L •. W. 11cintosh, inher1 ted the problem 'hut was
unable to do anything about improving the situation.
Oddly , enough, the action to keep the aircraft en~ineering
facility in :Dayton was not sponsored by any government agency.
In October, 1922, a group of proI!l.inent Daytonians :net

o. "t

:~(te

Da yton Country Club. At this time, the ini tia.l plans •.: ere es ta.blished for financing the purchase of land to be presented to
the government to serve as the future home of McCook Field..
The · name adopted by this citizen group was the Day~on Air
Service Incorporated Committee. After a two day fund drive, tr.e
sum of ~400,000 had been raised solely through public su~scrlr,tion.

'I'n.e

pride of the Daytonians' aviation heritage was exe .: -

.

plified as rich and poor alike contributed to avoid losin?
their claim as the center of aviation technology in the lini te cl
States.
The land ·to be purchased for the new ?•!cCook Field site was
composed of farms totaling 663 acres. The remainder of the land
was to include 4,325 acres of land then belonging to the Miami
Conservancy District. 1 The total cost of the land amounted to

(3 236, 106 with the balance of the original contributions to be
used to construct a memorial to the accomplishments of the
.-I ri r;~t Brothers. Eowe . .rer,
.
the success of the .Dayton A1r Ser-

1

vic e Incorporated Committee did not slacken the demands for a
tra~s fer of operations from McCook.
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Yet, in a letter from Fred. B. Patterson, Chairman of the

Dayton Air Service Incorporaterl Comrni ttee, to Hajor General
Mason Patrick, Chief of the Army Air Service, dated November

23, 1923, Mr. Patterson stated:
our public spirited citizens today went over the top
in the campai~n to raise sufficient money to put the
nc~r site for the .i:;overnr.-,ent 's avie.tion experim~ntal
field on the easterly boundary of Dayton. 7hey subscribed enough money to pay for 5,000 acres in t'.'ie
proposed gift, and a sufficient amount to be used
as a nucleus for a l'!lcmorial to the Wright Brothers.
Stens will be taken at once to arrant5e for the lse;al
transfer of land titles to the U.S. ·government. ·:hey
will be sent to you at the earliest possible moment. 2
Despite the encouragement provided by the proposals of a
new site for McCook Field, the old demands during 1924 began
to come from new voices. In a letter from Major Kelner at

~-re-

cook to Colonel Singleton, Office of the Director of th~ Air
Service, the arguments for transfer of operation~ were brou~ht
upto date with examples from 1924. The Engineering Division
desired new facilities on the grounds that the present location
had neither "adequate landing nor suitable housing facilities. 3
0

A nove to a new location was said to have meant an annual saving
of '~68,204 on rent and maintenance costs. However, the only
factor preventing the move at this time was the lack of a.ppropriations.
The drawbacks to the facilities in north Dayton as seen by
Major Kelner included: danger to pilots and the public; expensive maintenance, due to poor construction of the plant;
2Dayton Journal Herald, Au~. 17, 1924, sec. 1, p. 1.
3::ajor Kelner, "Present and Projected Location and Activities of the Ene;ineerir.s DiYision, from a letter providing inforr-..a.tion for Colonel Singleton, October 9, 1924, p. J.
11
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unnecessary expense in operations; and extreme fire hazards.
It uas noted that the deaths of several pilots had been attrib-

uted to the close proximity to the city and the limited size of
the lo.ncline field. No Dayton resident!: were killed or injured .
a~; a result of these accidents, but there were a number of nar-

rmr es canes.
3 ecause of the danc;er involved, experimental aircraft were
virtually barred from :-:cCook. With the loss of experi:me'!'ltal
flying, the additional ex:pendi ture for maintenance of frorL
·~Lt0,000

to 1~50,000 annually could no lon5er be justified. 'T.'he

operation of the Engineenine; Division was also se-rerly r1a~pered
by the haphazard.. arrangement of buildings, specifically sixty

buildings on thirty acres. This arrangement was conde:nned as a
res"'J.lt of ha.sty development of the facility during-World :.'ia.r I
·;,J"i th

no provision for expansion during the post-war period.
I!ajor Kelner concluded his remarks by stating that there

,.ra.s no :Possible way of achiev-ing efficiency under the present

condi~ions at T{cCook in 1924. He reinforced his arguments by
addi!'lC: that in 1924, the Engineering Division at I•!cCool{ was
ha~dling ap~roximately ninety-five per cent of all the research
and development for the Air Service, He further added that if
increased appropriations and better facilities were not :made
available the potential of duplicating the effort would be 'definitel:.r jeopardized. The I•':ajor's !'ernarl-i::s_ concerning the Air
Sc:-·vice in eeneral mirrored the urgency of the need for the re-

It r:.as been said that the United States is behind. sol'!!e

forei~~ countries in the development of metal aircr~ft.
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If this country is to keep ahead of its co~petitor3
i n de"I.TcJ. o -pin~~ its £1.ir force, a more eztensi ve pro0"r t:1.n of reseo.rch must be m~pped out, even thour.;h
·the benifits fron such~ course cannot be eApected
as an im1.1ediate result.~
Eevrever, al::nost as Major Kelner was wri tine; these words, the
future of aviation research was becoming much briehter.
On Aur.,;ust 17, 1924, E'. B. Patterson met w~th the Secretary
ct ~I a.r, John Weelrn, in Washington. At this tim~; Pat~e!'son

turned over to the Federal Governreent the deeds to l~, 988 acres
of land. in :•Tonte;onery and Greene Counties; Ohio, on behalf' of

t h e Dayton Air Service Incorporated Comrct.ttee. The Secretary of
~-J g,r responded by insisting that Hr. Patterson have an audience
,·ri th President Coolidge. This eift served a twofold purpose.
X ot only did it provide the goYernment w1 th the location for

.

• the r,_e-;, r en 0 ineerin3 facility, but 1 t accomplished the goal of
F. ·3 . Pa tterson's late father, John H. Pattersor,, PrE::si d.ont of

.the ·rational Cash Register Company, to strenethen the experi_;
mental operations at McCook Field by having them expanded and
IT!oved fr-om the city. Hr. Patterson and the Dayton Air Service
Incorporated Committee also viewed the development of the new
field as having great effects on the future of commercial aviation. Thus, the future of McCook Field was virtually decided.

Th e next move would have to be made by the War Department, and
the ~en of the Engineering Division looked forward to this
eve1: t i·:ri th much anticipation. The prospects of gaining a ne~-r
fe.cili ty served to encourage the work at McCook Field, a.:"lc. during

~{elner, 11 Loca tion and Acti iri ties of the Engineering
Diy·isio:1," p. 5.
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the closinc; years of tho Field's history, many new projects
w8re ruld.ed to its erowin.ri; list of achievements.

The evolution of observation aircraft came about when demands for spotters increased during World War I. The type of
observation plane used during the war was heavier and not as
fast as the attack or pursuit aircraft. It usually carried both
a pilot and a gunner. The De Haviland D!I-l+B becane the nost
widely used plane for this type of operation.
In the course of six years, rr~ny modifications had been
;11.,3,de

to the Dli-4B which proved to ms.ke it a much- safer aircraft.

3mrever, for s oPJ.e time prior to this, the DH-43 was considered
to be a "flying coffin." "The report of the First Transcontinental Air Derby in 1919, told of fifty-four accidents, ~ost of
the!:! !!!.inor in nature, seven De Ha.viland.s crashed with nine
fatalities."5 In most of these accidents, the pilot was trapped
bet1·reen the engine and the gasoline tank and burned. Several
references were also made to the custom of the mec:rian1c sliding
down the tail of the plane upon landing to counteract the tendency of the craft to nose over. However, by 1924 the De Haviland had undere;one many engineering improvements and was proYen
to be one of the most reliable aircraft in the skies. Yet, even
with the innovations to the DH-4, the real dream of the engineers
had. been the development of a nei·r model observation plane. This
d.esire becan:e reality with the appearance of the "CO" series
of observatior. aircraft. This program led to the construction
of t~e CO-~, C0-5, and the C0-6. All these retained the
~

..1surry, Operations at !1cCook Field; p. 9.

13J
rcliRbili ty of tho D:I-l~ but with better otructuro.1 and perfor~nnce characteristic~. The demand for better performlr.e obscrvn tion aircraft also led to the design and builclinr.; of the
XCOA-1, the first amphibian ever developed in the United States.
The aviation development program at McCook Field

m3.S

also

concerned with achievine; a better form of transport aircraft.
The most famous ar.1on0 the transport planes of the early 1920's
i:ms

the Foklcer T-2~ powered by one Liberty

11

12 11 engine. It was

this same plane that was flown by Lieutenants Macready and
I{elly on the first non-stop fli~ht from 1-!ew York to San Francisco
in r,:ay, 1923, in twenty-six hours and fifty minutes. The eztra
ga.soline tanks for this historic flight were installed on the
T-2 by HcCook Field en0 ineers. Yet, ·the T-2 by 1924 was beine
re-pla.ced rapidly by the newer L.H.F. T-3 which
sin.::;le significant difference "oeti-reen the T-2 and

also had a

'I'-3 since

that the latter was a biplane desi~n uhile the former used. an
elevated monoplane configuration. However, after extensive
testi:r-0, it was decided that the T-3 was not the ultimate
ans1-rer, and much additional work would be required before a
conpletely satisfactory transport aircraft could be dcveloped.6
Other types of aircraft were tested at McCook Field aside
from those already mentioned. These airplanes were divided into
three catec;ories: ground. attack, messenger, and ambulan~e. The
2:round attac}c aircre.:t-c ·,.,.;ere i::;radua.lly being abandoned during
tl1e 1920 's. The :rr:ain function of this type of airplane had been

tl--:e str8.fine of sround troops. For this mission, the '!)lane was

6curry, Onerations at ;'cCook Field, p.· 8.

hc:::.vily nr?'r!.orcrl, Howcvc~, the use of ar1:tor plat1nr; on an airplane ·was critically q_ue s tioned, thu:3 jeopardizing the reten-

tion of the ground attack airplane. The engineers at ::ccook
believed that .rnanueverabili ty ,-ras the greatest assest of an
aircraft in an attack situation. Therefore, they favored the
use of the more verse.tile pursuit aircraft for st:cafir.e operati o?J.s. '. I'hus, the small pursuit planes were as:;;umlng another
role in the future of Atr.erican military aviation. !!any people
forese.:~,: still r1ore uses for pursuit planes. In his colur::t1,
A via ti on in

D8.yton, Berna.rd Losh commented for many aviation

authorities when he st~ted:
Put it ·,Jas that the Barlin2: has a.lso sounded the deathknell of big plane construction. The initial expenditure and the cost of mainten:3.nce makes planes of this
type just about pe.ss~. They say the i-rorld is not confronted with the need of Dlanes carryin~ thousands of
pounds of bo~bs and 1-1hen this urgency arises, if it
ever does, a few smaller planes, swifter, easier to
· :r:!an9. 0 e and dwarfs 1-rhere costs are concerned can do the
work,7
The messenger aircraft's mission was implied by its name. This

airplane was the smallest in the Air Service in the 1920 1 s with
its adaptability to short take~off and landing areas beine; its
outs t ~ndinz feature. The official designation of the messen~er
plane ,;•ras _simply Engineering Di vision !{essenger. The !~essenr.;er
Has a bipla~e po1·1ered by a Lawrance L-4, 60 horsepower e~cr,ine,

but 1·:-hat was more important was the additional experimentation
,;•;hich resulted from the construction of this small pla~e. Pro-

vid.ed -:·ri th the techniques of flying fro~ confined areas, the
7::,3r:r~o.rd Losh, "Aviation in Dayton," Dayton Daily :r ~e~·rs,
~u:ust 1, 1924, sec. 1, p. 11.
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crcl:::'t capo.blc of service in almost any locality and under r.early

nny conditions,
Of all the pi.any projects cor:rpleted at McCook Field, probably

one of the ,";reatcst contributions to flie;ht safety r.1E.de o.t the
in::.: t21.llo.ti on was tne research applied in the area of :,e.:z-·::i.chutez.
The first vivid proof of the parachute o.s a safety de7ice ca:":'~

i•~hen Lieutenant Harold H.. Earris leaped from a doo-:ned pl~ne ar..d

was saved, On August 29 1 .1924, for the first time, both t~e

filot and the passencer were saved when Lieutenant Koontz, the
pilot, a.nd his passenge.r jur.1ped from a crashine; aircraft. Lieuter..an t Koontz, in this particular incident, remained at tr-:c
cont~ols of the plane until his passenger had leaped clear. But
the ir:::_)ortant · fact 1•ras tl-1..at the safety value of the parachute
ha d been exe~plified, taking it out of the realm of novelty

used at fairs and exhibitions. 8
United States Air Service parachute was the result of
several years of experimentation by the McCook Field En:ineering
Di vision. This particular parachute ;•ras made from the best quality Japanese silk. It measured twenty-four feet in diameter
while weie;hin6 eighteen pounds. The chute was designed to break'
the fall o~ the a via tor after a desc_ent of two hundred feet.
The Gerrr.a:10 •,- rere the first to use the parachu.te durinr; •,i orld

'. !2.r I. _:\.:cerican interest in this safety device came about as a
r2sul-: of this early exposure. Ho·wever, the traditional back
c:·n.J.~:e s00:-1 .:3ave way to the more popular seat type parachute

ccurry, Cnerations at ~~cook Field , p.

24.

1J6
which could serve as a cushion when not in use,
TKo of the more ir:1portant accessory items produced at !·~c-

Cook Field ·were the G-5 InternG.l Bomb Back and the D-1 Bor.ib

Sic;ht, The G-5 was capable of carrying twenty 100 pound bombs

or

a varied load of all three sizes, 250, 500, and 1,000 pound

bor.:hs , totalin.~ 2,500 pounds.9 The device, aside fror;. it~ increased storac;e capacity over previously used bomb racks, also
he.d a handle which i-::dicated to the bombad1er the nu!:'lber and.

size of the explosives already dropped and the nunber re~zinin~
a,nd tl1e order ii1 1·rhich they l'lere to be released.· }li tCi the ad-

dition of such a device, the bombs could be dropped sinsly or
in salvos.
In lceeping with the development of bombing accessories,

t':1e :0-1 Bonb Sicht was designed and built exclusively by the
En:::r,ir.eerins Di vision. This advancement was a far cry from the

ine::.~fective sights used durin~ ',Jorld War I. The old "horn;') si.3?-lts
r e q_ui:red the bombers to attack at low levels, thus making thenselves dan~erously vulnerable to antiaircraft fire. The D-1
ena:Jle the bomber to locate its tare;et without maintaining a

str~i~ht course of flight for a lengthy period, thereby imp1'ovi:::1g the aircraft's ability to fly evasive action in rer;ard

to enerr~ ground fire. This sight also enabled the bonber to ap-::):ro.'.?.,ch the ta~get frol'!l any direction. Because of its i!:lprove-

::e::-1 -cs, tr.e :J-1 provided n:uch Greater acquracy when attacking
a. l:'.ovin,~ target. This ·t-ras accomplished by the sight throush its
a"':)ili ty to coi~rect for cross i:·,inds. In general, the D-1
CJ

.,. cu~ry, OpeY.'a.tioY"is at :·IcCook Field, p. 17.
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rev olutionized bombin1:, tactics, for henceforth a1rcro.ft could
atta ck from hii her altitudes, tare ets which were never hoforc

possible. 10

Durinr: the early 192o•s, a variety of experiments concerni n,z r:iiscella neous flying apparatus were conducted :3.t

r:ccook

?iel d.• One suc h i tern in this cate6 ory was the auxiliR!'Y, re-

lea se c_::asoline tank. This tank ,;•ms attached to the bomh rack

a~d coul d ~ e released to liehten the weight of the aircraft in
orcler to e;ain altitude quic ldy. It was also considered of ~eat
val 1;.e T:;h en conducti n e; lone dista nce fli g hts.
' !ith t :1 e hi 6 her altitud,es and greater distances flo~·m by
pil ots in t h e 192o•s, it became necessary for the first ti ~ e

t0 des i .s n special clothin.c_:: for s.via tion purposes.- The ?-~cCoo i-::
?ie~cl scier-tists answered the proble~ by developinr; flir(h t £Ui ts

f or use at all altitud es a nd in all conditions. Such sp ecialized
clo thi ng enabled the pilots to "l·,i thstand extreme cold, as low
as s i:<:ty des rees belo,,1 zero. Cold 't·: reather flying usi Yif{ open
c oc k pits also led to the desicn of electrically heated :'lyin1?;

sui ts -:JY EcCook enc;ineers .11

?: e~·r types of oxyGen equipment were constructed at ;~cCook
t o r:eet the increased derr.ands o,f hi,~ h altitude flyine. It was
t hrou:~h t heir efforts
and

:!'t9.s }rs

tna t

new styles of oxygen tanlrn, r,eters,

were desi c~ned, Additional safety 1 t.erns included ex-

peri mentation with ~r~ored nilots seats, flotation devices for
s.5.r c ~ fl :::'t fl y in3

mrer long distances of water, and the printin~

10,,,,rry ' Onerations at McCook Field, p. 18.
11 .. ,
1 - , p.
~
\.., ;,,..,.
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of ri. cri .s.l navi ,_,c,-atio:n n:rp·,~: t c further assist the nilot.
'?he list of achiev -:;·::'. Emts o.nd contributions to the .:-:.d.var:ce~snt of American aviation technology by the ~cCook Field engineers tms, in fact, vl~ctus.lly endless. In the precetlin{:

:!")B.0 es,

only o. -v-ery fe .r of the outstandin0 and more interestinP, activ0

i tic s 1·rere documented, but the intention was to e;ive the reader

a ~as ic understandinc of this important chapter in the history
of fli ~ht in the United States. Albeit thier motto denoted the
ph~rsical S:".1allness of the ir.staJ_lation, the scientists a.nd e-r12:i-

ncers of :•: ccoolc Field, by their in,senu1 ty and forti tuC:.e estab-

lis h ed. a tradition of excellence vrhich ,;·ras to make the ~-,ords
Day tor., Ol:i o, and a via ti on s ynony:nous •

CHAP'.L'ER XV
1\. PETUOD 0:-' DJVE3TIGATIONS

Just when it appeared that cionditions at McCook Fleld ~ere
becomi. n~ better, . the aircraft ind_ustry launched a ne,r ca.mpalr~n

of cri.ti.cis.rn a;:;ainst the r;overnrnent's handling of the av1at1.on
proble □ •.

The crl.evances of the aircraft industry were as follows:

1ne _c,t .. l...-:~· o: a'...r.'.')l·.:1r: ccntract;~ ·,:· c .., petl.tiv.e btdi 1-. :.·.:--~:..'r"t.ir .::o!itr?.~c~-:s to t:111 lo~·re:;~ cornpet1.t1.ve
:, .. ·: .~. of :e:r. c:.:..s-:- than ~he <:o:n.::,;;1ny 4 .·, eloptng a cer-:-c..L. ;-lar.•,, lcrc:.·.,,:: ..; ::.ne de·:nl0pin:; co-:-1pai:y to stand the
<'OS~ o: •:,.·rr.:lop:;ic:1>; a.rd ,:i•;r:~ :r.r.; r;c,·1err-.-:cnt a plane
·;~-::.i-:c -~
i·r~n: t:·.-: r-" 1par~:/ a chaccE: to r~ co~,er the

_.~,c: '>:' cor:t'..."'.. .,i'cy a~ :i-:-o:.u')tion ~,.. factorl.es •
.. "~.l . . ,."•~£,11-::..:: ~-:~! .,.r :a~ ,J_p· :,...·ri:t ':t. -1 ~~-,::,'.·:£.
fluct 1.1at \ons
:r. r;c·.,::,e.~:r :.e_y .ro_l~ , ~csul:,~r:..:-; al·::2..;·s . . the loss of
--:a.: :r. Th:.~ :. ~, d1.:.0 .;o the lact: of :-ov1Jr.:- .71ent approor1 '!t; 1 O"!S :•r ·1 _c:1 ~-ro·.:ld C.!.'GD.tc n :101·-::al f _ J W of bus lness.
~r-;3:;r 1ctio•1 of ca_::>i tal :.:'l the :.:--·1 •s:;ry.
I1any com°'"L':~l".S d.•:r5..'1';" ~~-=:: i·'.lr 1·1a.·1e li1.lirj_'l.tcri ·3.r. .::. gone out of
'r,_.:. .. e::s. .. :...·ot;;.bl · t1•ro tLir-d.s of 'cr.e cao ital 1.nvested
ct. ~he close o.: th•, -r':!r n as bcer1 ·t;loed. o ..lt or driven
·
~ ..., ••
~
·1,..u tr·, 1
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If these accusations by the a1.rcraft industry did not appear
fa,1iliar,. they should have.

'I'he questlo~ st1.ll rema1.ned when

anrl ho•.-1 ,·rould the r;overnment answer the charges?

At this tl.8e, a formerly unheard-from vo~ce came to the
defense of the aircraft industry.

Major General Patr1ck, 1.n h1.s

Yeport to the Secretary of War for 1924, demonstrated his dis-

approval of the conditions in the aircraft industry.

He stated:

1Aeronautical Char:iber of Commerce of America, Inc., Atr~~0f~
vA~r
~oo~
v_GL..,.>J
J....,,o.
_.
,._,.. ~92~
..L
..-J• p • 6 .,

:i:t is cleslrahle and approprtate to lay parttcular. e::i-

pk:i.sis on the unhcD-lthy state of the aoronautlco..l in_I.J o 'lr,si.r re8errn ls 1.n cx.1.strmce o.ncl quantity prod.uetlon in the event of an

(l11stry in the United 0tates.

cqor~ency would be almost as difficult as in 1917. Duo
to t~c lack of any appreciable use of aircraft for co~~c rcinl purposes, our factories are entirely depend0nt
for the i.r support upon the mear;cr o.pproprlat tons proviclcd annually by Co.r. :~rc::;~~ for purely t?;OVernmental
01irf)o::::cr.;.
If t:,hi:.: rJr1plo.raulr.:: sltu.atlon l,J to b'! eor~ec~cd, tt must be ln the flrst place thr 0u~h increased approprlatlo ns for the aeronautical asencic~
of the :,!o.r, i..Javy, and Post Office Departments, coupled
~1th authority for those in charee to allocate orders
for aLrcraft wlthout resorting to co~petitlve bld3, ·
and in the second place, through the enactment of lcg_islatlon designed. to ln~ure the development and growth
of com~ercial avlatlon.
Thus, General Patrick went on record regarding the aircraft cont~coversy which ln hls oplnion has created a gravely dangerous

situation.

3owever, the General was ::nore than a man of words.

~ason Patrick reco~nized, like few other men in the War

De part ment, just how vital the aircraft industry was to military a?iation.

Although he was powerless to enact the needed

appropriatio ns. the General stlll belleved that he could do
something to aid the aircraft industry.

His plan for attacking

the problem was as follows:
':''r:e manufacturer s, or at least so.11e of them who had
designers of their own, were most anxious to secure
orders for building planes according to their ovm destsn. These, however, had to be submitted to the Engineering Division before they could be approved by the
C~ief of the Air Service. As such designs by outside
a s encies were passed upon by the Engineering Dlv1sion
d.e s i:::.ners and '\•;ere really in corrrnetl. t ion with those

w~ich they had created, there wa; the claim on the
:;•c..:['t of thE: ::ian1J.facturers that the engineers at the
~ ivision a lway~ ?refcrre~. and ~av~ preference to, dc3i :~n. s 1.,;htch _!".2.d ori~;ine:~ G:~ "ilitr: ti!e:"!l.
In other i•:ords,
outside aGencies were thuG broug ht lnto conpet1tion
~ ith 3ovcrn~ent employees to give the product of their

o ,.-:n ::;ldll the prefcronce;.

It wa::_; claimed that this ~iD.8
throttlln~ tnltiatlve, really preventing the more rapld devcloomcnt of aircraft designing, as it waa 8Zprcs~
sec..: 11 taklng the brec.d out of the mouth of the ver,y
hune;ry aircraft industry. 11
?u.rthermore, at this same Enf-slneer1.ng D1.v1.slon
aircraft were actually beln~ built, not ln numbers,
but a few of an experimental character, and again the
110.rntfacturer::; complained tr,at thlr. was undue interference ~ith their enterprises.
It took time to study these matters, to de~tde
just what was proper, t~e best co~rse to folloi~. I toCll"!G con'! in.ced. that the content ions of the :rrar.:.uf ac turer.:
·,-rcrc v&.l i< D.n.d that it 1•:ras e:-_;sont ial to chanse rsrl ically
th0 :::n.r;incurir:r._; Divis ion's prae;t 1.cc.
I ~lee l.del tr.0.t
v!f; ,·,ould b~J.l.ld no rr10:r·8 airplanes at the Divtsioc a ..rr:_,
firth~r □ oro, that no more alrplane d8Si€ns would be
cy·,·, ?.te,i there:.
Wr--. ·::ould. '.:°ti 11 rr.aintaJ. r1 a d.e s i ,~n i Ylr,i:
:~t.e.ff, but lts f·,;_nctloc. ·:roald. ·::>c to pass i.,;,po:'"~ t:-r; d.e.:;i-::1.s snbrc.ittcrl to th:::-; Air ~QT'll.cc, i:1'r:1.lo it 0,;o:J.l/:. ':":J:.:

available for consultatlo~ ~ith outside designers,
:D.anuf 2.cturors, and those ~·rho had ideas to propose.
It will be readily understood that the feelin3 of
'_;:;(~ rnanufa.ct~rers to-:;;ard. t!le Zn3ineerin?; Divistc~-:. ·.-r'.-:.en
I tcok office ~ere quite bitter. Although all who ~ere
L1 ·:: -,erested in the dG':elo--:.::-:ent of aero~autics sr.o'..,;,1-:.:.
:.a ,-e bE;en ,·ror!.:in,z to _:'e~her and to-:·:ard a co:ir:.on goal,
':11 i. s a~1ta,::ont s::: bct,;•men tr.e Govern.r,ient e:r,_ployee s a:-.d.
'.;/.ose ou.ts:dc ~,:•2..z a serious hand1cap ani actuall::· ;,~·eve~ted the dcvelbp3cnt which ~as so necessary.
It took so::ie ti:ne to brine; about the needed. rer or~. Only one step could be taken at a time, but ultl.:uatcly the conditions were radically changed; the
feclins towards the En~tneerlng Division grew bettGr
and 'better. It ·was finally rep;arded not as a dotcr:-:·ent
to progress, and therefore advancement between t~ese
different agencies which was essential in order that
i:·:-e should, as 1-rn nm·;r are do 1.:ng, lrnep at least abreast
of the rest of the world 1.n design1ng and b~tld1ng aircraft.3
the importance of the actions by General Patrlck can never
be ovcresttmated.

Yet, the glaring problem of meager Con~res-

3io~Ql appropriations for aircraft construction could not
cl-:.2.n:.-;cd oy the Chief of the Air Service.

oe

E1rentually. Con,~ress

did take action towards alleviating the aviation controversy,
3patric1-:, The U.S.

L

:.hr~ J·. t r . pp. 100-10 5.
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but

~ ;-,~:re

--::ere first a lons series of invest 1.ga.t i.onc, nar1.y of

whic~ solved nothing.

· 'l'hc Army initiated the firs[j _inquiry of any real S1.2;Ilif1C8."'1ce

during the 1920' s.

This i:west i[!;at 1.on was brou'?;ht about

by tho insistence of General Patr1.ck and other a1.rpower advocates.

:':ajar t] c:0-c:ral .Jilliau1 i..assiter ,·ras a(ipo1ntecl to lead. the in-

quiry, and hence the title of The Lassiter Board was adopted.
The findincs of tho board were as follows:

1. ~he aircraft industry in the Jnltes States was entirely ino.~lequatc to ;:ieet peace ar.d i·rar-t 1.me r ,~a1J.ire·1ents.
2. i :ninim1J.r:J. appropriation of 1~25,000,000 per yea~ for
the next ten years ~as needed.
J. A personnel consistin~ of 4,000 officers and 2,5S~
enlisted men 1·ro.s r,:;q_uired.
l;. 2q_uip[ilent consist ins of 2,500 airplanes, 20 airst",ips,
and J3 oc.lloons was needed..
5. A tactical or 0 anizat1on -.,;h1.ch could . provtd~ a tas~
force consisttn3 of all necessary elements, suet as
pu:rsui t,, attaclc,' and bor!lbardment airplanes was reQUiI'ed. • .:+

::o,;ev0::-, 1·rhe!1. the report of the board was submitted on ;:9.r ~h 22,

::.92.3, -;:,he Ge::-1eral Staff d1.sasrced i;,;-ith its reco:n.mendations and,
t~cr~fore, did not send it to Congr?SS for further conslderatlon.
'l'1.1e

n . ndin,gs

of the Lassiter Board obviously had a profound in-

fluence on General Patrick by virtue of the action he later took
in tryin3 to settle the design controversy between the Engineering
Division and the aircraft industry.

Yet, the fact rei:!lained that

Cons ress had still not acted.
::"'i~ally, on r,:arch 21~, 192L;, the House of Representat~,,es

;assed a resolution calling for another general lnvestige.tion
of a~iation.

This marked the tenth time since the Ar~istice

'?'.r:rtce, Ar-r.v A1r Serv'ce, p. · 132.
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fivr:: yco.r::;, pr;:.cti.c.G.11: :~incc thr1 A:r:nU:;tic~. Cc,:,:;,s h~'-.S ricc,n c:citicL.-:cd for tnc fa1.lurc to ap:iro~riutc 0nou~h ~oncy for aviation. The decline of ths int' 'r·o
c•.L.,-,J..P.
OL'
O'LlT ,..,i.,., a1 nf·
,.,_ ,,.,,..,.,_,., t a·nd
.L.\-)r,
\,,t l,i:,r•'-r
u V . 1,,;• t
l . ·roe"'
:
- l. ' ll
.._.._, i..,
l, _:.
l.
r.., . t;
.. ,.
prolonci;orl delay in the appearance of commerc1.al f lJ~~::-:
~re continually laid at the door of Congress, until ~e
o~rsolvos have almost be~un to believe it is true.
The
·.Jar ancl :r.avy Dopa:rtments larr;ely on the plea that co ' i 1:1C:rc in.l 8.vi'atio:1 n.nd a civil a.1.rcraft industry arc; '.fit:J.l to our .no.t io:10.l de-::·ensc. :3ut, here 1:·rc are, ,:l t'.r :10
1
'....:·:,.· .·.i.::otT::r,
yet confrontec, wit::, t'.':C certainty t?"J3-";: ~.::Lr
tJ~8/l.::;'.)0}:•::; in ti .·:o of peace {lncl airpm·:cr in tt:-;,c c-: ~---::_-_r•,
,·--~~.
,.·l;-10
•rJ~r,:,~,~o;·cn.J;,l <-·ac-t-.r-.r<:< 1· ,,., our l ~ fc in t}:,:, '(,<"•~..1...,..,
.: • ...:., •.,;
V
_,,
. ) . .,,,c,..A,....,.
V
1., ~-~
'.°
ure. It -.ro~ilC: see;-;i tto.t tf co·r.mcrc ial av tat iGri is
·:-2..s i8 and Lnpo:rat i ve Tc our:ht to spend. ,:,ore: on i ·.:; 8.:.'i
.le~:;:::, proport.ionatol:r, on r.1ilitary establis:--:.::e-::t:c,,
~··Jrthcrmorc, where many a~encics are spending moneJ ic:·
~'r i;;;_'c Lori. there is bound to be duJl icat ton and ':iasts.
It ic like pourinG ~ater into a leaky barrel.to continue to appropriate ~oncy for aviRtion ~ithout hav1n~
t irst forrnulatcd am:_ e:::acted a national air policj•. d
1
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lf anyone failed to ta'.rn Cor.,~ress:;ian Reid sertously, tr.cy
certainly :aisintcrpretGd the man.
:rl1.".J..t he sa. id v1hen he co::1J1er.:.ted tha. t

1

?rank ?..etd meant exactly
u

if comraerc 1.al av iat ~on is

b0,s i~ and i.:::nerat l ve we ou 6 ?1t -:o spend more on 1. t ani ::.s ss,

p:::::-': io~1.ately, on military establish..:nents."

-,::::-o-

It i•ras not lor:~;, 'oefore

::.=ie i,i !:.8.d. an opportunity to put his words into act ton.
-~i:;.-- ::;;ervice ap9rop:i'.'iatlon bill came before the HousG o: :-.ep?:o-

ssnts_'e,ivcs for a vote tn .January, 1925, Representativss :{eid

and L~Gu~rdia assailed the portton of the bill whtch called for

the a)pr6priation of $500,000 for the construction of the ne:;
;~cCoolc ?ield site.

Along ~·ii. t:1 the reject ion of the appropri '3.t ion,

J.e id. rmd LaGuardia launched a· general at tact{ upon i•IcCook Field's

?he ulti:J.ate aim of these Congressmen seemed to have

~ce~ t~s total disinte3ration of the Engineertnz Divis '..or" .Ar:ay .Air Service s.::,.6- the lJa•ry Aircraft Factory
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onerated under ~he di7ision of the Bureau of Aeronaur C!
c.r,, vy 9
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~lowcver, tho He id-La.Guardia amendment was defeated by a

joint effort led by Congressillan Roy G. Fitzgerald of Ohio and
Senator Fess of Ohio.

Congressman Fitzgerald based his defense

of the approprtatl.on on tho Lmportant role McCook Field t'.::Ji
played for many· years in the areas of military and c~vil a·TiD.-

tion. :l.O

Ee also stressed. the fac·t that the land for ~:r1e new

:IcCook ?ield site had been donated by the citizens of ~ay~on,

and if the appropriation were defeated, a black mark acains~
Con~ress Nould be registered in the eyes of the people ·of O~io.
i1'cedles::: to [;,cJ.Y, the Reid-La.Guardia a'.llcndment was :·rithd.:r·&..~m.

::-::::ot ions i:·rnre no~-: runninc ?lot both in Washin;::;toY1 ar,d 1n
D2,yto::1.

The exist in?~ tension -::·ras seen in an a.rticle by I'. C.

i:c::e.twr.,

~

lfoCoolc Field en6 ineer.

:,~ci·~ahon stated:

Jn 1;i:_r,~;; from. recent press reports there ts a gro~•;L::-:
impression that people want to know if McCook ?ield
has ever done anythl.n.g. The 1npressl.on l.s also cat:.--.c~ed that ~cCoot Field is re~arded as a sort of asylu~
for nQt inventors. It is not an inventl.on incubator.
I'r"J..e, so:::ie patentable features are developed, but t1-:ciY
".·:ill not be treated here. In the mal.n, they perh~-f s
·:·:crn.ld be ree;arded as im.portant but uninteresting • ..!.1

It must not be thoueht that a naa:e calling contest had
Gvolvsd. betv.reen the employees of McCook Fl.eld and the repre-

sentatives of Congress.

~=oHevcr, it must be noted that the

.r::eEJ.bors of the La:o.pert-Perlctns Comm.1. ttee had •made nu:nerous

--- - - - '/rris :Jayton Losing Confidence in A'1iat1.oh," The 3liostrca:n,
·a·r"~
1025
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.l 'l'.· .. -~J··,r,y :Yn<l ::n.-1:-,r .s!·,ou:-::. br:: re:qJir(: ,:J. to li~~!it their
.f. f'.C tc~.~_., o ocr.at iori :.:; to field re: pairs an-:1 ron.r-:onD.hl c
c:~:,Cl'l.::icn-~::i.l 0,1,:inc;(;~·~r.-: , cmd. all oJ.rcraft or,l,1:;rs tc
cli~tributo Q without cc·~ctltiv e biddi~s a~cn~ an
.:.>.::10r·.:a·.rc,ri list of ·:1z~1~ufc_~;t;. rcr:::. iE nro0ortio:' 1 to ~:rietr
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c,-: ~t .,:,,tc ::wnts must have i•7a.rr::ed the hearts of the scier-.ti..st:: :;
It 1-ras obvious where: the sym-

22~0r □ ined

to i2prove the condition of thci aircraft industry

:~•·1o"C'icc-t ~-rhic}1 GVeryonc ·.-rould
'C Y,

ar~roe

was a

worthwnll c project .

it ;,·w.c also clear that they 1.ntcnded to dentrcy :,11.J...j_-

... r: · .;:1c f ino..l rep or~ of the Le.npcrt-P crk1.ns Co:.1:,~ 1_-:-; -.:.ee

•:a::

1925, ·the aircraft industry was certrd.Ylly
p. 22.
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vi·, td. le8.tml f or it ::: yco.rs

er 1.t t c i ;:,-m •

01"

T'-"!c•
f 011n'i
,. roport
.
, tr.r,
...,

:··ovr;T ;- rrrcnt ~uilty of the lo.cl-:: of cont1.nu1.ty in orders, loc~r::n

on contro.cts, diTcct co:ripctition by government plants, fa.llure
to rcco ~;nizc and. protect f,,.csign rtghts, and a destructiYc system
1 It

of co·1'.)otitive bid.dln~ .... -r

It ,ms qutte apparent by these find-

eve~. t~o report of the Lampert-Perkins Committee tad on~ ~lar-

a -:i n hn.1f of invcst!.r;ation ·,rhich coul,i ·be used to

L~.;✓ rc.7e

the

Althou~~ ?resident Coolld~e agreed with the findi~~::: oft~~
Lo.r,:pert-Per1rins Committee, he stlll r.i011.eved that so;:-;_eth~ns
should "be done to l;,1p~::-ove the character of aviation ln the t:i~lit .'.J.nr.

=:o i~vestie52.te tr.iJ probler.1s of :i:n.1.litary aviation, l?ros!.c.~n.t

Coolid.::;o- ai)pointecl the :.?resident's A1.rcraft Board, kr..o-:•m 7a.riously as the ~arrow Doa~d or Morrow Committee in honor of ltc

'.::::,; ~:arrow Conr::ittcc nad instructions from. the Preslde~t ~o report to hiCT on the best means of developtn~
~nd applyinc aircraft to Tiattonfl Defense, coverln~ all
phases of the -aircraft program. 5
;:' he com:ni ttee began taking testimony in September, 1925,

a.net filed its report on December 10, 1925.

In many respects, the

f Ln.din,J'S and recoraracndat tons of the r'iorrm·r Board were ve-:::-y .:.1.m-

ilar to those of the Lampert-Ferklns Cornmitte~.

The only sig-

.' 1-.:· :.cc:mt c..ifference :·ras the the :-1orrou Board spoke fc"!' t•,.:~ ·,rar

..,.

. ...

C:18.:nbor of Co:n;;icrcc of A.'11.~rica, -r... nc.,

OO: ' j ',rl ,

!).

2•

':he nr.vrio o[ t.· .. Ait ,...,c:--'liCG _·) ::f'l(; AL'
;eL:,; ,nit.ion of the t::o '."1.,_ncti0n:. of :~r.~ sir •
:J..:J.:: i llary f.,.:.-1 1. Di'l(; _r:.,· J.dr.: ·,' •

L

C:·1:;.:"•·o

t'.-.

,

.
l

.

~~c ~3sistant seore~arie3 represe~~t~G avi~t
c,DfY,,:..nted. fo:~ the i'lr, :-:-~.1y, and. Co:J.110.rce uc>::,_c:,-._c_::1<;s.
5 . .,_nu.~ t,,ro t)ri;r,ar:ter ~-=,ner;:;.i.:; be adde:l to t.hs h~--- ·.•":Y. ,.
5. rl-:e rr:illtary f.tn(l civi.11.ar. a"1lat1on 1Je kept se :... ;~.:--· r..1. ."' :;,.J...,.)
i

'

... Con~ress for the f~~st ti~e had an opportun:..t! ~~
~~ ~ sider a constructive lc;:islati~e progra2 ba= ~~ ~: ~ ·
re~o~ts reflectin? the sincere opinions of compe~8n·
· ,c ,_. ?reeci fro.'!1 tte d.e ;.:tr~,.c tive arsd. false notion.:...~'.-:::,.
l-:g,.:i. persistently becloJ.ded and characterized otl':s ::- i ·.7 r:c: ::. z ations, these reports per::iitted Congres.s tc ,:,; ,::. __ _
- i .• - ~ - .1
,,. 1
• s ..,
c,,'
~ - •-- :::: .c
_.._ o J• ._ c +-.., o .,,..
_, '.:. t..,· ""- .-, i - : r ~_.;..:., s • 1 7
0

1.,

t ~ree acts ~tich were the most st
')~_ .:;c:es cf ·.::;,vi.atlon legislation passed since the ~m-';.r· :.:: ::~C'.

b.p-

pro9r1ation Bills of 1917. The legislative program of trr. yeur

1926 included the enactment of the following:
.. . :::'he Air Commerce Ac-c of 1926 ( ?ubllc Law Ho. 2 5!, ,

.,r 1 ~ • ,...._-._ 1 ,
1926.
- ·ur: . May 20,
:a·:y .' · ve - ._: , ·-r :~. re "' .• ft Program Act (Public ~a:·1
. c. . -1- 2, ?9t,. ~.:):", ~r,:::::::) , approved June 24, 192 ~ •
. i-.c !_:. ... y '!:.·,re - :,0: · 1. i!'c:ra.ft Progra:n Act (Public ;:..u.1
r•~. n --r
c. l!t., . ~('-.-,
,; ........
__ c .,·•c:-~ , approve d J une. 2 , 192c.,; . le
j..

,..

J

•

•

I

Yollowin? t h e passage e r the Ar~y ?ive-year Aire ~ ~: ~
~ ·; or ~anizatl.o~ of ::il~tary Aeronautics, pp. 70-7 ~.•
·; 7

~ - Aircraft ~ear 2~o~

:927,

pp.

2-3.

Pro ~~an Act, bctt8r ~n own

U8

tho Air Corps Act or ~orln i~ill,

t he chan ~e s did not go into effect until October 15, 19?. 6. 'I'he

response to and the details of the new systGm were d0cu~c~ted

in the jcCook Field Review for 1926, which

□ tatcd:

ih2 ffiost im port~n t stsp ir the history of t~o Ar ~y rt• I -,..
~8::-•~;·ic e i.s -::l~(~ es-:r;!;li sf_r::c~.1:: of tf)e ne~l;:- ".A.i~ ::orp~~::
-r•;-. c o r:~:r~:11-: led by· t fie; -~)r~ s ~::ls·;~~ ' s _;, i r 3oarrl ~·1!"1:: ~ :1b sr~ c~ently a~thortzed in t~e ~r~y Air 3 lll pa~sei jy ~~s
~as t Congress. In the ~~or~a~lzatton of the A~r ~0rvice
-::. : .Tu~ bTL,,;s.d ier ::ens rals h:J.ve ~')een ass tr;:;ned to ass U~-;:
~:hC; c;,-. ie f of the Ai!' '.::er pc:, :,,ajor General i'~ason ;,; •
r.:J.'.:;:::-i c :-c, :·fr:e:r(') f.or::ierl;y there~ :iad :ieen only one. T'ne
.-:r;: ::1.::,9ointee: .:.: a.:re 3r-Ly.:dicr Cre;r~eral ':1. Z. Gilr.:10~8 ~[•.i.
A-

l..

Jnier t~c Alr Cor~s ~L~ activtties are di7i~ed i~:;o three di st inc t ~::roup2, ::acr1 !J..:."1c.0r the superv 1.s 1.on
of

8.

·Jri.22.c:.. iGr :::cne:ral. 'l:h o se ,_; rcups are des tr,:na~ed as

fallo~s : ~he Cperation Division. under General ?e c~e~
( previously a~pointed) ~tti headquarters in ~ashing~on;

·:,:'he: i•Iater iel Div is ion, under General c;.1.1:nore wi tf. t{e: ,.-.~orary head~uarters at ~cCook Field, Dayton, O~io, pe~d ing completion of the ne~ ~right Field near Dayton;
an~ t~~ ?raintns Center, under General Lahm with healq,.._a2.0te:rs at :i:Celly Field, Texas.
T~e neN ~ateriel Division co □ btnes the func ~~ ~~3
~f tte Engineerin~ Division at ~cCook Field ~1th tnc3e
of the Supply Division and of several other acti v ities
for2erly under separate supervision, thereby coor1i~~t inf5 under one heo.d all a~tivities pertalnl.ng to the
devc lopnent, proc~re~ent, and maintenance of military
aircra:::'t engines, and equipment .19 . .
~onstruction of the new Wright Field site east of Dayton
h'.:1.d.

·:Jeen u.mlerway since April 16, 1926, 1·1hen F'. B. Patterson

an(l the rest of the Dayton Air Service Incorporated Committe0.
officiated at the ground breal:ing ceremonies. Therefors, by
.,: arch, 1927, suff i.cient -,mrlc had been completed at Wright ?ield
-:-:o •.,~a:i-ra.!lt :he beginning of the evacuation. and dernoli t 1.or-_ .' )f
.-.c;Cc:::i,-: ? i3l_d build.lngs. A total of thirty-five major buildings
1
•

~~-~r
··•
V ,_; '-' .'..

92:r..gineerin:2; Division, Air Service, !'I-lcCook ?i.e 1 'i Hev 1.ew,"
~•~1d·
D~,,~on
0~1.0
192~
J. ~
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~-e ··:e.-: i~cld

;::;.2 :.e.,ed in .10. or o:' both the ',!r -:-:-c
~:h:.lc p:r-e;_on:::.ly ·:ilbur ·.rr t ·ht or-~.1.v .:.ad :-er:c_· :.:!. .:..• ... i• :.::-.:~:.c-.::io 1 . · .. e: a.u-;::1-::::ri.t? :o-: this c1.c~~on ·,ms haso.-::. o .. , r
:_:.r
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:-:.elc.
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the :soplc of the United States have forgotten how i~por~~nt

eulc~y ~c ~cCook ?ield:
•• , si. fe~·: years t:-:1::: si,:ntf icr.;.n.2-0 of the na::1e and all
t:-.n:t it :-:s.s !:leant to l:.'."".oric0.;1 o.·1 iat ion t::1.11 fade ~::-1 ~e,

:~r:tzy 1 i::::ibo that pro:~rc ss ~e.~rn s of the past, P..~f o:'1.lj•

-+::hs older scncratior: -::·;ill recall the ,·mrld. recorc.s
s>r:tt'::cred. t:1ere, the nn-:es ;::3-dc and. ltve3 lost, t::e
':Jrc.::,;'::l-':ta~~in:? e::pcrir.ient and adventure that co::1po!::cd
its decade of history. 1

C:'e.co::;:;, 11 ::ccook ?ield ?asses Into History,
.~,.: __ -:-~>'c:::?.~.1, Octobr-1r, 1927, p. JO.
-- • • • • 1.
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tii2 ~s a ~asis for evaluatton, the offlclal explanatlon BD)e2~ed ~asically factual but left something to be desired.
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dtlct;.s Cor,1_pany niaclo further p:.-1.rchn.so::::

:':•'icJ.c;

in the locality of

::c,rch
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of ::ill otJ.t the important work of advanced cng1.naerins ancl desi .1:_-,; 1, upon uh1.ch the ult1.matc succens of our progra::i mu.r.:t de-

pend.

7•
~

rn•

J..'10

Airp~anc Eng1.neorin~ ' Dcpartmont wtll ma1.nto.in, under tho

direction of Major Vincent as Chief Engineer, a separate staff
i;-rith ofO.ccrs in tr.e Linrlsey Duild1.n[s s:.t Dayton, Ohi.o, a-r..C:. :·rill

oe responsible to the Chief

of

the Equ1p~ent Division.

8 . All :l i sbuTsGments :nadc for the A1.rplanc En.g1neer1.n:::; De_p;;i,rt-

:·3,,_t, ·:r!lotr:cr ori:;. inated at ;,'icCooh: Fteld or in the Lindsey

? '..lildin.z , will be paid by the Dtsburstn_,'j Offtce:?; at i·:cCook
?i e ld.

9 . ? ~is ne~orandum superseded all prev1.ous office memoranda in
re3a:::-d to the engineering organtzation at Dayton, Ohio.
'::'~-::.: o:::-d.ers ~-rere signed, E. A. iJeeds, -Co°lonel Stgnal Cor:;lS.1

1 . :c?arland, ed., Tllstory of t'ne B ,. P
_
i •.a..
•

,

II, 280-28J.•
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nc,ction ~-rl.th, t i1c Avio.tion Section of the C1:'.:nEtl Corps.

!I

ci8 o full, co~pletc a~d ezclu::ive jurisdiction and cont~ol

:--'J ,·'.:.::c s, ~.iachinor7, tools, or appliance:: anc. all other ,;.: o-~ ·:"_·..;.:, , 1·ca1., )c:::.~soI1al or raixcd [tro hereby transferrc cl f ror.1 the

..

t ,,,..,..,,. Chief SiGnal Officer and pla~e~ ~n~er the

Ju:··:.::-·. i c ,c ion of the .Surcau of ~;..ircraft Product ion."
·:•.::•his o ~cdor s1:.all "be and remain ir~ full force and effect

•. J.l' '.. :·~-~ t:1c c on tinua11ce of the present ~-mr a:-1.d fo:.· si:;:~ ;no:nths
;::_::-;:; ,: : . ~ -'c t.e: ·::;crr:i ination, thereof ~)Y the proclamation of t ·'.:c

t~· ~::.-'c;/ o:"' ·9c:?..cc, or until t}1eretofore a;aended, modified or

',loodrow Wilson

APPEl-:DIX V
7h e Aircraft Board was established on October 1, 1917, to
t;,., }:e '.~h e place of tr.e Air·craft Production Board. The

c ·(.!C:.1/" ·,:e

wa s the result of added responsi bil1 ties due to the ez:r,B.n ~JJ..! G.

e.via ';:ion program. The official sanction fo"l.' the Aircr:J.ft ?oa:r.' i
car::e :'rom the 65th Congress in the form. of Public orc=~e r :;o. 4,8.

'.T.' his f:-: tateT"!ent while auth,::,rizing the forrra. tion of the Bo8.rC
outlined the composition of the organization which included
the Chief Sie;nal Officer, two representatives from t~e :-.::r:--:r. y,
the Ch ief Constructor of the Navy, two additional naval cfficers,
and three civilians.
':'he Aircraft Board had the power to supervise ar: d clirect:
••• the respective departments concerned with the r,;n-cha se, production, and roanufacture of aircraft, en~ines
e.nd all ordnance and instrureents used in connection
therewith, and accessories and ma. terials thereof, ir:cludin~ the purchase, lease, acquistion or construction of plants f£r the manufacture of aircraft, engines,
and accessories.

However, these responsibilities were not binding, for in February, 1918, the Judge Advocate, Acting Generals. T. Ansell,

presented the opinion that the Aircraft Board should have "only
advisory or recommendatory functions. 112 This .led to a redefin1-

tio~ of the duties of the Aircraft Board by the Chief Sigy,_al
Officer in accordance with the Secretary of Har and -:he
History of the B.A.P., I, 94.
2

Ibid., p. 94,

r

,

vid~n~ r r~ G~tcri a ls for the construction of aircraft ~Y

for· the a.irc:r::dt t0 be :T,a!'lufactured i-r1

...t./.. C

the most s1~n1ficant ret~~tion

r····, ':1..:. ·'·;,.c turin::;

plants except th:r'ouch the medi u::: of t:10 ?ror~u:re-

·:::·-<; D:J.·risio:r.... 4 'I'his chan.~e rr,ea:1t that e.ctual contr·c-1 of e.ir-

s to.·•;~ :r.csvD.luo. ti ons of res:ponsi hil1 ty aJ.s o lent ::-rea ~ly to t:--,e
~:s u~~srstandin~ by much of the public of the significance of
t~ e Aircraft Board.
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